CHANGE, CONFLICT POTENTIAL AND POLITICS

Two Gambian Case-Studies

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STATSVETENSKAPLIGA INSTITUTIONEN

LUNDS UNIVERSITET

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CHANGE, CONFLICT POTENTIAL AND POLITICS

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Av

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Of, course, our country
has developed:
the president has bought
a new big car
and Mamadou Musa has built
his fifth big compound...

(Gambian worker in 1972)

We were taken into
forced labour
and in the hungry season
we had to go to the bush
to find green leaves to eat.
Nowadays
when we have nothing to eat
the government sends cous to us.

(Gambian farmer in 1972)

The white men taught us
how to make bread and butter
- A girl in Jeswang -
I wanted to be the bread to her butter
But the white men
have taken the milk and the flour from us.

(Gambian worker in 1972)

Now the commissioner
is one of our own people
And we can talk to him
about our problems
and he will not take us to court
only for the fact
that we have asked him for help.

(Gambian farmer in 1972)

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1.1 Conflict and Violence

Conflict and violence have always been two common and somewhat prevailing characteristics of political life. They interested the first among the well-known philosophers,[1] they were studied by, among others, Machiavelli and Hobbes, and they were actualized with the appearance of the grand scale theories of Marx and de Tocqueville in the 19th century.[2]

Thereafter, conflict and violence in internal politics were partly forgotten by political scientists,[3] who, instead, directed their attention towards other things. Their analyses were mainly prescriptive, or, at best, descriptive until about twenty years ago. They did not deal with these phenomena without implying value premises of a certain kind.[4]

The first political scientist to renew the anlysis of power, conflict and violence was Harold D Lasswell.[5] In the middle of the 1950's politologists adopted sociological models and theories of integration and consensus, and the application of these implied an indirect study of conflict and violence.[6]

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1) Plato and Aristotle dealt with these phenomena in their analyses of societies. See, for instance, Calvert 1967, pp 32 ff, Kort 1952, and Sabine 1963, pp 51 ff and 102 ff.

2) Marx & Engels 1968, and Herr 1962, pp 89 ff.

3) Certain scientist who were not mainly political scientists but sociologists (i.e Mosca, Pareto, Simmel and Sorel) dealt explicitly with conflict and violence in their analyses. See Bottomore 1964, passim, Coser & Rosenberg 1969, passim and Parry 1969, passim.

4) See Stone 1966, for a critical view on the common assumption that well defined institutionalized patterns of behavior always exist in every society, and that violence cannot be behavior guided by norms. Modern analyses of conflict and violence also imply value premises but here certain fruitful phenomena are not placed outside the definitions of these concepts. See, for instance, Galtung 1969:II.

5) Lasswell 1958.

6) They built large-scale theoretical schemes to explain the persistence and relative stability of political systems. Thus, they can be said to have analyzed indirectly why conflict and violent behavior emerged. This is not to say that they dealt primarly and explicitly with these phenomena. See, for instance, Easton 1953, 1965 and 1966.

Violent behavior directed against political objects in internal politics was, for a long time, considered a result of pathological traits or similar factors among certain groups of people.[7] Many social and political scientists still use "violence" as a term for "non-institutionalized behavior of the masses", while they do not consider the kinds of violence used by political and other elites in order to oppress people.[8] Such violence tends to create counterviolence, and a process of escalating use of violence is started. Neither do they take notice of the non-personal violence which is built into certain structures. Galtung is one of the few modern scientists who gives the concept of violence such a broad denotation that it includes not only the whole process of escalation but also structural conditions which make groups or classes of people suffer.[9] Using his concept of violence, we are able to analyze causes of conflict behavior and the use of various means of conflict resolution in a more fruitful way than earlier.

Thus, after the presentation of the theories of Marx and de Tocqueville conflict and violence in internal politics did not receive very much attention from political scientists. The analyses of these phenomena first emerged again within the fields of sociology cnd political sociology.[10] Perhaps, this new interest was stimulated by the revolutions in China and Cuba and later also the Vietnam War and other wars of liberation in underdeveloped countries.

In the international arena the two discussed concepts received attention from political scientists much earlier than in the

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7) Criticism on this view is presented in Nieburg 1969, pp 5 ff. Hartogs 1970, pp 14-15 defines violence as illegitimate and unjustified use of force, and he makes a distinction between organized, spontaneous and pathological violence.

8) Some political scientists distinguish between "mass violence" on one side and "coercion", "legitimate use of physical force" etc on the other. Thus, actions of elite groups are not considered violent and illegitimate in the same manner as other kinds of violence. See, for instance, Janos 1964, pp 130-141, in Eckstein, ed, 1964.

9) Galtung 1969:I, pp 168-169. Marxian scientists have also given violence a broad meaning, see, for instance, Wolpe, 1970.

10) See Coser 1956, Davies 1961 and Eckstein 1964.

internal arena, and this interest resulted in a series of theoretical and empirical works.[11] This was, probably, due to the fact that the world had been shaken by two great wars and held its breath during the so-called Cold War.

A change in the view on the frequency and importance of conflict and violence in internal politics has occurred. Nettl, a political sociologist, once said: "... we must regard periods of lengthy warfare, civil as well as international, as a normal feature of political and social development in many areas of the world..."[12]

The combinations of factors that direct political scientists in their research will not be analyzed here. Perhaps it will suffice to say that at least two combinations of factors affect a researcher's choice of subject and the manner in which he analyses the problem he has chosen to study.[13] These combinations are (1) the personal values and the social frames of reference of the researcher, and (2) the prevailing and established perspectives not only within his "research society" but also in the society as a whole.[14] (From another point of view, more will be said about values and political theory in I:3.)

Analyses of conflict and violence must, of course, like all other studies, be guided by analytical frameworks if they are intended to have an explanatory capacity and generate new ideas within political as well as other sciences. What kinds of theories, then, are available for political analysis of change, conflict and violence? The relevancy of centemporary political approaches to the study of these phenomena will be the subject of discussion later on, but some aspects will be dealt with here, namely the distinction between consensus theories and

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11) Some examples on such works are Frankel 1967, Kaplan 1957, Morgenthau 1967, and Snyder, Bruck & Sapin, eds, 1962.

12) Nettl 1969, p 28.

13) Some authors make a distinction between intellectual and social problems see Burgress 1962, in Rose, ed, 1962, and Dencik 1973:I. The values and social perspectives are, probably, relevant to both kinds of problems.

14) Kuhn 1964, pp 43 ff and Myrdal 1969, pp 37, 39 ff and 43-47.

coercion theories and that between substantivistic/institutionalist and formalist/marginalist theories.[15)]

According to consensus theories, societies and political systems are held together and maintained by value consensus among their members. New generations adopt the established values through the socialization process, and, thus, societies continue to exist.

There are, however, many critical points in this kind of theory. First, the scientists agree on neither a common definition of "consensus" nor on that of "values".[16)] Secondly, consensus theories de-emphasize the existence and importance of conflicts. Drastically formulated, it could be said that conflict behavior, according to these theories, must be a result of inadequate or ineffective socialization.[17)] Thirdly, change is hardly analyzed in these theories.[18)]

"Values" are most often given a denotation similar to that of "attitudes", "beliefs", "goals" and "social perspectives" as used by some authors.[19)] A large number of empirical studies have revealed that there are great differences, in these regards, between various strata in a society.[20)] Thus, it seems that consensus theories are too similar to Rousseau's "volonté générale" to adequately correspond to a social world inhabited by human beings.

If, on the other hand, all societies are maintained and exist only because some groups or classes of individuals can use their power to control people and coerce them to do things that they actually do not want, violent behavior would be more common than it is. Few (if any) political systems would be so

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15) On the distinction between consensus and conflict theories, see Cohen 1969, pp 21-32, Dahrendorf 1959, pp 163-164 and Johnson 1966, pp 19 ff. For a distinction between substantivistic and formalistic theories, see Godelier 1971, pp 10 ff, Gerholm 1971, pp 13 ff and Cohen 1969, pp 13-14.

16) Horowitz 1967, pp 265-266, in Demerath & Peterson, eds, 1967.

17) For this criticism on consensus theories, see Johnson 1966, pp 33 ff.

18) For general criticism on consensus theories, see Cohen 1969, pp 29-30.

19) Stone 1962, p 98, in Rose, ed, 1962.

20) See, for instance, Bendix & Lipset 1967, pp 29 ff in Coser 1967:II, and Lipset 1959, passim.

stable as they are.[21] Most coercion theories also presume (often implicitly) that people have an inherent aggressive drive or a need for power, and that his can be contained only by the presence or actions of more aggressive and more powerful individuals or groups of individuals.[22]

Neither of the two principal categories of theories mentioned seems capable of fruitfully explaining the fact that conflicts in processes of rapid change are often violent. Political scientists have, hitherto, made use mainly of consensus theories, while coercion theories have received much less attention (see pp10-12).[23]

In the present work, efforts are made to create a synthesis of these two groups of theories, which are partly opposed and partly complementary to each other.[24]

The second distinction between kinds of theories made above has its basis in range and generality of theories.[25] It has to do with the scope, domain or aspects chosen for analysis. The discussion first emerged in social anthropology (but seems to have received more attention within economics and economic anthropology)[26]

There are two different schools of thought - substantivist/institutionalist and formalist/marginalist. The former concentrates its analyses on the institutions and structures of changing societies and, therefore, have a holistic perspective. The latter chooses some aspects of social life and often focuses on

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21) However, it could be argued that powerful groups or classes can use "ideological means" to pacificy the masses so that they do not realize their real values, goals or interests. See Bachrach & Baratz 1972, pp 51 ff, Dencik 1973:II and Reich 1973.

22) Cohen 1969, pp 21-22.

23) Examples of "consensus theories" within political science can be found in Almond & Coleman 1960, Almond & Powell 1966, Deutsch 1966, Easton 1966, Pye 1962, and Truman 1951.

24) Cohen 1969, pp 21 ff.

25) Concerning "range" and "generality" of theories, see Galtung 1969:i, p 459, and Sjöblom 1968, pp 8 ff. "Generality" means the number of hypotheses that can be derived from the theory and "range" means the range of phenomena which can be covered by the hypotheses.

26) See Gerholm 1971, in which different schools are presented and represented.

the individual and ascribes certain characteristics to him. (Drastically formulated, it could be said that certain assumed characteristics of individuals in industrialized Western countries are applied to individuals in underdeveloped countries.[27])

During later years, the latter kind of theories have been critized for lacking much of information and capacity of explanation that could be obtained from studying structures and institutions and for having dealt inadequately with individuals in cultures outside Europe and North America.[28]

In several multi-disciplinary studies of underdeveloped countries Gunnar Myrdal has rejected the idea of using partial approaches to the study of change and development. Instead, he has proposed the use of institutional and holistic approaches.[29] Furthermore, a Swedish political scientist, Lars Rudebeck, studying development and underdevelopment, recently argued for, among other things, institutionalistic perspectives in analyses of political development.[30]

Much of the criticism on formalistic (and marginalistic) approaches has been taken into account in the present work. Although individuals are seen as seeking more values than they have, efforts have been made to view them not as individual actors maximizing utility but to view them and their behavior from structural and institutional perspectives.

Thus, the present work is intended to analyze change, conflict potential[31] and politics on a basis of a synthesis of conflict and consensus theories on one hand and a synthesis of substantivistic and marginalistic theories on the other.

1.2 Politics, Theory and Political Theory

What is politics, theory and political theory and what kinds of phenomena should be analyzed within political science? These

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27) Godelier 1971, pp 10 ff. Examples on such analyses can be found in Weiner, ed 1966.

28) Godelier, 1971, pp 83 ff.

29) Myrdal 1968, pp 26-31.

30) Rudebeck 1970, pp 84 ff.

31) On the definition of conflict potential see pp 24-25.

questions, at first, seem very elementary. Even if they are, they are, however, relevant today, since they tend to receive various answers from the political scientists. The dissensus has its base partly in the fact that politics is given different definitions and partly because there is no agreement on what a theory is.

The discussion within political science is touched upon here in order to make explicit some of the difficulties that contemporary approaches to political analysis have in explaining change, violence, conflict and deprivation in the forms which will be presented later on. Before different views on the concept of "theory" are discussed, a number of definitions of "politics" will be enumerated.

According to Lasswell, politics is all the power aspects in a society: "the shaping and sharing of power".[32] To Easton, politics is "the authoritative allocation of values for a society",[33] and Dahl regards politics as "power, rule and authority".[34] Apter views politics in a dynamic perspective and says that "politics become, in large measure, the business of coping with role differentiation while integrating organizational structure".[35]

Some of the definitions are very wide, but if one further penetrates the works of the authors cited, one will find, that they concentrate their analyses upon power that is used mainly through the formal political institutions.[36]

In the present work, politics will be seen as all activities that influence the distribution of values in a society and

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32) Lasswell & Kaplan 1950, p xiv, and Lasswell 1958, p 13.

33) Easton 1953, pp 129 ff.

34) Dahl 1963, p 7.

35) Apter 1965, p 3.

36) Poulantzas has placed the "political" in a structural and conflict context. To him politics is the point were the contradictions in a society are condensed, see Poulantzas 1971, passim. However, his view on politics is too abstract to permit direct, concrete analyses.

The sociologists' view on politics could also be interesting to us, and it will be represented by Neil J Smelser and Lewis A Coser. The former says that politics is "the creation, organization, distribution and utilization of power",

the way in which human needs are satisfied.[37] We want to know not only what amount of values is distributed to whom and from whom values are taken, but also who defines the criteria according to which the distribution occurs.[38] Furthermore, we also want to know the structural conditions underlying the allocation and distribution of values.

What, then, is a theory? The classification made by Brown is the simplest that I have found. He makes a distinction between (1) theory as an untested explanation whose status is ambiguous. (2) theory as the opposite of practice, and (3) theory as a "deductive system of propositions".[39]

The first and third meanings are of interest here because political scientists are inclined to use the term "theory" for descriptive accounts, classification schemes and conceptual frameworks.[40]

Stinchombe, am American sociologist, attempts to escape this criticism by making a distinction between causal and other theories.[41] In the category of "causal theories" he includes demographic, functional, and historicist theories.[42] Cohen, like Stinchombe, differentiates four classes of theories, namely analytical theories (axiomatic propositions which are true by definition), normative theories (which point out and describe ideal states that are worth striving for), scientific theories and metaphysical theories.[43] A scientific theory is

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see Smelser 1968, p 26, and to the latter politics is "activities aiming at sharing the power or striving to influence power, either among states or among groups and organizations within states", see Coser 1956, p 1.

37) Which the needs are will be discussed later on. Here it will suffice to say that there are many views on this concept. On one hand their is disagreement on the number of needs, see Cantril 1965. On the other hand there are different views on the sources of needs. For Marx needs are socially and historically determined, see Marx 1968:II, pp80-82, while others make a distinction between inherited and socially imposed needs, see Berelson & Steiner 1964, p 240

38) The content of the values, i e their qualitative aspect, will not be discussed here, although it is an important aspect.

39) Brown 1965, pp 165 ff.

40) One example is the "probalistic theory" presented in Almond & Powell, 1966.

41) Stinchombe 1968, p 28.

42) Ibid pp 57 ff and 103 ff.

43) Cohen 1969, pp 2 ff.

a universal, empirical proposition which gives a causal link between two or more types of events.[44)]

Galtung[45)] and Zetterberg[46)] concentrate upon a definition that is almost identical to the one Cohen gives of scientific theory.

A scientific theory, then, consists of a number of interrelated and deducable hypotheses which explain causal relationships between two or more phenomena or variables. With this definition as a point of departure, it can be said that the present work does not generate any theory, and it does not aim at building one. It rather comprises what Merton calls general orientations (which point at variables which ought to be taken into account) and empirical generalizations (which show relationships between variables but which lack a set of interrelated propositions).[47)]

The present work is characterized by hypotheses about relationships between variables or clusters of variables that are expressed by the words "tend to", "go together", "is linked to", "is likely to" etc. This reveals that some values of the variables correlate at certain periods in time but it is not possible to distinguish cause from effect. Instead, the variables are seen as mutually influencing. They have a feedback effect. Variables that correlate positively in one period or phase can have produced change in each other so that they are negatively related to each other in the next phase. For instance, this is the case when we deal with changes in struc-

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44) Ibid.

45) Galtung 1969:I , p 451. A theory is "a set of hypotheses structured by the relatinn of implication or deductability".

46) Zetterberg 1965, p 11: "A scientific theory, then, is a sword that cuts two ways. On the one hand, it is a system of information-packed descriptions of what we know; on the other, it is a system of general explanations".

According to Dubin, a theory is "a closed system from which are generated propositions about the nature of man's world", see Dubin 1969, p 8. Nagel 1971, pp 20 ff. differentiates between deductive models, probalistic explanations, functionalism or teleology and generative explanations.

47) Merton 1968, pp 139 ff and 149 ff.

48) Dubin 1969, pp 10-11, argues that research might have two purposes which, sometimes, coincide: understanding and prediction. However, the analytical foci are different in the two cases. In the first case, it is concentrated on interaction, in the second on outcomes. The present work can be said to direct its focus on understanding and interaction.

tures, beliefs and degrees of deprivation.[48)]

Many of the analytical "tools" used in the present work have been utilized to explain very different phenomena and within different disciplines.[49)] Assistance has, therefore, been needed not only from political science but also from sociology, social psychology and social anthropology.[50)]

Finally, some comments will be made upon the contemporary approaches to analysis within political science and their capacity of explaining violence, conflict and change. Three main categories of approaches very similar to each other are the functionalist, systemic and input-output analyses.[51)] All three (1) have as their principal aim the explanation of why political systems persist, (2) assume value consensus as an essential part of all systems, and (3) regard politics as one aspect (analytical) of many others. They also share much of the criticism raised against the contemporary approaches within political science. The following points of criticism are relevant here (1) the analysis is static, (2) it does not take into account power conditions and changes in these conditions, (3) it does not deal with patterns of control and it minimizes the importance of social conflict, and (4) the analysis has a conservative bias in directing its attention towards maintenance of the status quo.[52)] Concerning Easton's input-output-analysis the following can be added. It assumes implicitly the sovereign state as the largest analytical unit and it is elite oriented since it directs attention towards "political relevant" members and not towards the masses.[53)]

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49) The hypotheses of the present work are based on results from analyses of individual behavior like suicide, crime etc to collective behavior like revolt, revolutions etc. See Berelson & Steiner 1964, Berkowitz 1962, Davies 1969 and 1972, Feuerabend & Feuerabend 1972, Galtung 1964, Gibson & Martin 1964, Johnson 1964 and 1966, Lang & Lang 1968, Smelser 1962, and Turner & Kilian 1957.

50) Nettl 1968, pp 44-45, talks about catchment areas between different disciplines and he considers it fruitful to integrate the work of different disciplines.

51) Almond & Coleman 1960, Almond & Powell 1966, Easton 1953, 1965 and 1966, Merton 1968, and Parsons 1951.

52) Meehan 1967, pp 161 and 167, Young 1968, pp 34-36, Wiseman 1966, pp 209 ff.

53) Spiro 1967, pp 168 ff, in Charlesworth, ed, 1967, and Young 1968, pp 45 ff, and 48 ff.

Decision-making has been analyzed within various contexts, partly within organizations[54] and partly within entities like nations.[55] Generally it can be said that analyses of decision-making in organisations can not explain macro-phenomena like the emergence of collective violence and political change. They could, possibly, be used for studies of rebel movements and political elites which - like two firms in a duopolistic market - compete for supporters.[56]

Communication theory is a third category of political approaches.[57] The amount of information to and from the political system and the decision-makers is studied. Feedback is a central concept in this approach since it directs attention towards change. In the criticism of Deutsch's model, Young says that it is capable of dealing with evolutionary processes but when it concerns rapid and comprehensive changes in political systems, it will not be of great help to a political scientist.[58]

A fourth category of political approaches is the group theory.[59] According to this, the political system is seen as a market which is held in equilibrium through the competition between groups, which agree to rules of the game (values) in the system. The government functions as a mediator and co-ordinator between the groups. Group theory, which is not a theory in the sense presented above, can explain changes on a smaller scale but not rapid changes on a national scale.[60]

A fifth category of approaches focuses on "political development", "modernization" etc. These approaches are of different character and various generality and range, and they should, therefore, not be presented under the same heading.[61] However, they are dealt with here in the same context for the sake of simplicity.

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54) Etzioni /1971:I/ pp 59 ff in Etzioni, ed 1971 and Simon 1965.
55) Snyder, Bruck & Sapin 1962.
56) See, for instance, Leites & Wolf 1970, for a decision-making and economic approach to the study of rebel movements.
57) Deutsch 1953, and 1966:I.
58) Young 1968, pp 57 ff.
59) Truman 1951.
60) Young 1968, pp 87 ff.
61) Some approaches of this character are Almond & Coleman 1960, Almond & Powell 1966, Almond & Verba 1966, Apter 1965, Deutsch & Foltz 1966, Nettl 1968, Organski 1965 and Silvert 1964.

These approaches vary from ambitious efforts to build grand scale theories to the study of certain aspects in the process of development that political systems are assumed to pass through.[62] They also point out different sources of change. Some take their base in psychological explanations, while others search for independent variables in macro factors like structures, institutions and value systems.[63]

However, they have one thing in common: the imprecise and ambiguous use of certain central concepts like "development" and "modernization". The change which they describe and try to explain are extrapolations (often implicit) of the direction that Western industrialized countries have followed.[64] The only one within political science, as far as I know, who has studied change and thereby tried to avoid such extrapolations is Nettl.[65]

The ambiguity of many central concepts and terms probably has its base in the fact (which Pye has pointed out[66] that there exist at least ten meanings of the term "political development", and the same could be said concerning the use of "modernization".[67]

None of the approaches mentioned is able to deal with conflict or explain the outburst of collective violence or the oppression of the masses in underdeveloped countries.[68] A common trait of these approaches is that they consider violence as something abnormal and deviant, which seems to be far from an adequate

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62) Certain aspects are studied in the works presented in Coleman, ed, 1965, LaPalombara, ed, 1963, LaPalombara & Weiner, eds, 1966, Pye, ed 1963, Pye & Verba, eds, 1965, These "aspect studies" should de distinguished from various small scale and concrete studies of, for instance, party structures. See, among others, Staniland 1969, in Leys, ed, 1969.

63) Examples of psychologically oriented theories are Hagen 1962, McClelland 1961 and Pye 1962. Representative to macro-oriented approaches are Apter 1965, and Nettl 1968.

64) Nettl 1969, p 16 in Leys, ed, 1969.

65) Nettl 1968.

66) Pye 1966, pp 33 ff.

67) See, for instance, Bendix 1964, pp 84 ff and 118 ff. Guerreiro-Ramos 1970, pp 21-59, in Beling & Totten, eds, 1970, criticises extrapolations of this kind.

68) The works of, among others, Huntington do take conflict into consideration, but they are not intended to be theory building. See Huntington 1968.

description of the social reality of man.

Distributive analysis is a sixth category of approaches to analysis in political science.[69] The central theme here is the allocation of values in political systems and the power conditions underlying this allocation. The approach has many advantages in comparison to others, because it takes power conditions and changes of these conditions into account. Changes are thought to have the potential of creating conflicts over the decision-making positions and other values in society. The approach has not been critized for being unable to explain change and conflict but for being too comprehensive to be tested in all its parts at the same moment.[70] It could also be added that the deductive and formal character of the approach implies problems of operationalization when dealing with empirical phenomena.[71]

Besides the aforementioned analytical works there are, within political science, still more approaches, three of which are game theory, economic theory and applications of social psychological hypotheses.[72]

Game theory is most fruitfully applied on smaller entities like decision-making groups or individuals but is not very suitable for analyzing macro contexts and rapid changes in societies.

Economic approaches have been used in order to study Western multiparty and two-party systems, and they are not applicable to analyses of change, conflict and violence.

During later years, social psychological approaches have been utilized within political science in order to explain, for instance, the outburst of collective violence. These are variations of either balance theories[73] or frustration-aggression theories.[74] Furthermore, some other approaches born within the discipline of sociology have merged within political science.[75]

69) Lasswell 1958, and Lasswell & Kaplan 1950.
70) Young 1968, pp 76 ff.
71) Ibid pp 75-76.
72) Concerning an application of game theory to political phenomena, see Schelling 1963. Economic approaches to political life are, for instance, Buchanan & Tullock 1962, Curry & Wade 1966, and Downs 1957.
73) Schwartz 1971, in Davies, ed 1971.
74) Davies 1969, Feierabend & Feierabend 1972, Gurr 1970, Nesvold 1964, and Rummel 1966.

1.3 Political Theory and Values.

Some authors make a distinction between normative and other kinds of theory.[76] They presume that political and other social sciences can formulate and test theories and draw conclusions that are free from the values and the social perspectives of the researcher. Others hold that all theories which deal with events in a human society cannot be free from values and that there is no use in trying to escape value premises. Instead, the researcher has to choose "the right side" after having asked "science for whom?", "discoveries from whom and what?" etc.[77] When he has chosen, he has to use his theoretical findings in practice.[78] What could be called a third standpoint is taken by Myrdal, who admits that social sciences can never be free from value assumptions or premises but that it is the duty of the author to formulate these premises and assumptions explicitly.[79] Efforts in this direction will be made below.

It would, however, be useful to make a distinction between different kinds of values in social science. First I would propose a distinction between ascribed and achieved values. The first have been brought to the researcher from his society through the socialization process. The second is achieved through education and training in the research society. Both kinds of values can be divided into consious and unconscious when melted into the research work. In the first case it is the aim of the researcher to attain some ideal social state by using his findings; in the second case the researcher is bound by his values and is not aware of their diffusion into the scientific work.

The present analysis has to be considered against the background of a cluster of values and perspectives, most of which

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75) Amann 1962, Bienen 1968, Brinton 1956, Calvert 1967, Coser 1967:I, Davies 1962, Johnson 1964 and 1966, Lipset 1968 and Smelser 1962.
76) See Brecht 1959, passim, Björklund 1970, pp 37 ff and Cohen 1969, pp 2 ff.
77) Dencik 1973:I, pp 29 ff.
78) Mao Tse-tung 1967:II and 1967:III, in Mao Tse-tung, ed, 1967. See also Israel 1969, in Dencik, ed, 1969.
79) Myrdal 1969, pp 55-56 and 132-133.

are, probably, concealed to the author himself, but some of which can be explicitly formulated as follows.

(1) Violent behavior is regarded as a normal[80] trait in political life and is seen as a result more of structural and/or environmental factors or the mutual influence between structures on one hand and drives, needs, impulses etc on the other than of the latter solely.[81]

(2) Conflict and violence, thus, ought to be available for analysis through analytical frameworks, models or theories which are constructed to describe, explain and predict all kinds of social and political phenomena.

(3) I believe that most liberation movements in the world today have their basis in popular support at least as much as they rely on terrorization and coercion of the people in the areas which they control.[82]

(4) The present analysis has an asymmetrical character (i e it only penetrates the subjective feelings of the ruled and not of those who rule), but it is not intended to function (if it is successful) as a guide to any part in any conflict.[83]

(5) The political elite in many political systems is able to use pacification and other conflict neutralizing methods to prevent the masses from using violence to improve their social situation and even from perceiving social states of affair that imply less suffering. Some of these mechanisms of conflict "management"[84] are seen not only as "dysfunctional" for the masses and for the political system as a whole in the long run, but also ethically repudiable.

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80) What is "normal" can be judged against the background of either statistical frequency or some ethical norms. Both cases are implied here.

81) See Coser 1967:I, p 98, for a distinction between realistic and non-realistic conflicts. The latter is caused by unrealistic needs within the individuals.

82) For the former view, see Mao Tse-tung 1967:I, in Mao Tse-tung, ed, 1967, and for the latter Leites & Wolf 1970.

83) Some scientists would argue that a successful study of conflict and violence (even if it has a symmetrical character) can never be available to and applied by the masses because those in power can prevent them from receiving the results of the study. See, for instance, Dencik 1972.

84) The definitions of conflict do, of course, determine what ways are proposed for the solution of the conflicts. Some points of view will be given on that theme.

Aubert 1963, p 33, makes a distinction between two ways of resolving conflicts: (1) bargaining and compromise, and (2) law and application of norms. Coser 1961, pp 347 ff, says that the resolution of conflicts can vary from mutually

(6) Most of the definitions of concepts, classifications of phenomena and analytical perspectives of the present work are born in Western capitalistic societies and are, probably, more applicable to this social context than to that of the social world of the workers and farmers in an African country. In short, many concepts and the manners in which they are applied have an ethnocentric bias.

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agreed upon settlements to the total destruction of the enemy. Dahrendorf 1959, pp 223 ff distinguishes between resolution, suppression and regulation. Galtung 1965, pp 350 ff mentions two principle kinds of conflict management: (1) behavior control, and (2) conflict resolution. The latter includes (a) complete agreement, (b) compromise or (c) suppression of the parties.

Höglund & Ulrich 1972, in Höglund & Ulrich, eds, 1972, pp 20-21 mention conflicts on three levels, namely the structural, the interactional and the ideological, and they propose different methods for resolving conflicts in these three levels.

2 THE BACKGROUND OF THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Choice of Subject and Purpose of Analysis

The study of conflict and violence is of great importance in social science for two main reasons. It is important to find out (1) whether some social conditions imply violence that brings unnecessary[1] suffering to large groups of people, and (2) whether the personal violence used to change violent structures brings less suffering to people than does the use of non-violent means.[2]

These two problems are related to each other, and they are so complex and comprehensive that they will merely be mentioned in the present work. Instead of dealing with these problems, the purpose of the present work is to find certain factors that - during periods of rapid social and political change - hang essentially together with positive beliefs about violence as a means to improve one's own social situation.

The existence of a conflict potential (CP) in every political system is postulated a priori. It is supposed to be particularly strong in rapidly changing political system. The CP comprises

(1) belief patterns (general and political beliefs),[3]
(2) deprivation of three categories of values (economic values, power values and respect values), and there are two analytical kinds of deprivation, namely (a) absolute deprivation (AD), and (b) relative deprivation (RD),
(3) value inconsistency, and
(4) structural contradictions.

All these terms will be defined later on (see pp 26-27).

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1) When I say "unnecessary" suffering, it could be argued that there also exist "necessary" suffering. I agree that there are two kinds of necessary suffering, namely (1) natural disaster which the human being is not, yet, able to control or prevent, and (2) violence to achieve liberation from oppression.

2) Galtung discusses the question whether it is possible to estimate the suffering connected with revolutionary wars and compare it with the suffering caused by structural violence, see Galtung 1969:II, pp 171-172,and 181-184.

3) General beliefs will be analyzed in five dimensions, among others beliefs about power structure and about non-empirical phenomena. By such phenomena I mean things whose existence has no intersubjective validity, see Brecht 1959, pp 33 ff.

The following principle questions, of which only some will be considered in the present analysis, have guided the field study in the Gambia:

(1) What kind of beliefs are related to certain structural variables and changes in these variables?

(2) What degrees of deprivation are related to certain differences in beliefs and structural positions?

(3) What other factors in CP - if any - are essentially related to positive beliefs about violence as a means to improve one's own situation?

(4) What other factors in CP - if any - are related to different views on the political system and its components?

(5) Is systemic violence perceived by the individuals who are the victims of it?

The questions will be specified and will be given the form of direct, testable hypotheses in various parts of the present work.

The Gambia has been selected as the place for the field research for at least four reasons:

(1) the contradictions that exist in most of the African countries today are also present in the Gambia although on a smaller scale,

(2) no previous field study of the present kind has been done in the Gambia,

(3) changes which have taken place earlier in many other African countries are just now occurring in the Gambia, and

(4) few African governments would give permission for an inquiry such as the one that has been made in the Gambia.

Most of the African countries have ethnic cleavages and an increasing class division which are mirrored at the macro-political level in the form of conflict and violence.[4] The

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4) See, for instance, First 1970, passim and Post 1968, pp 68 ff. By ethnic cleavages I mean emergent economic and social differences between ethnic groups. Most of these differences were initiated and reinforced by the colonial powers. In the Gambia, for instance, Wollofs and Akus were the first to receive any education and to fill positions in the administration, while Mandinkas and Jolas did not have any advantages of the colonial rule.

Gambia does not deviate from this pattern but there is one exception: no collective violence has, yet, been directed against the political elite of the country. Other actions of discontent have, however, been directed against the political leaders.[5)]

It is difficult to ascertain whether the lack of previous investigations in an area is advantageous or disadvantageous to a field study.[6)] What has been most important in the presnt case is the fact that the aspects which are being studied in the Gambian political system have never been dealt with before. So, it is hoped that the present analysis will generate some new knowledge to political science.

Some changes like urbanization, structural differentiation and polarization extended and expanding education, increasing GNP per capita etc are most fruitfully studied in their initial phase.[7)] The Gambia is in that phase now, since the changes have occurred later there than in many other African countries.[8)]

The fourth reason for the choice of the Gambia is not the least important. Many theoretical frameworks and arm-chair analyses would gain much from being confronted with the empirical world or the social reality of the individuals whose behavior is being studied, but various practical (and political) obstacles can prevent this confrontation from taking place. The Gambian politicians and authorities and trade unionists have taken great effort to facilitate the present field work.

A fifth reason could be added: Swedish tourist agencies are engaged in Gambian projects which will have far reaching economic, social and political consequences for the Gambian people, and

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5) Political strikes and demonstrations have taken place after the formal independence in 1965. See West Africa 1970, pp 194 and 229, and 1972, p 511.
6) Galtung 1969:I, pp 142 ff.
7) Davies 1961, p 6, Davies 1969, pp 7 ff, Deutsch 1961, p 494, and Deutsch 1966, p 252, and Feierabend & Feierabend 1972, in Davies, ed 1970.
8) According to United Nations' Statistical Yearbook 1965-1971. A comparison based on data from this source was made before the Gambia was selected for a field study. The Gambia was compared with several other African countries.

it is of great relevance to know how the Gambians themselves think about this Swedish interference in their country.

Finally, it is hoped that the present work will contribute to a better understanding of the Gambian political system not only to political scientists and authorities which direct assistance to underdeveloped countries but also to workers in the Gambian capital and to the farmers in Kerewan themselves.

2 The Analytical Framework Sketched.

Here a short description will be given of the analytical framework used in the present work. The framework will be presented more in detail in various parts of the work and in relation to the empirical findings.

Individuals seek and exchange values. As soon as a surplus above the personal need is attained, exchange occurs. Where the frequency of exchange of values is high, there is a political system. According to Blau, "value consensus" holds such a large system together and makes the individuals function as links in a whole.[9)]

In the present analysis "value consensus" alone is not assumed to be the decisive factor holding systems together.[10)] There are coercion and exploitation as well. Where consensus is absent, coercion enters.[11)] When coercion as well as consensus is absent in the exchange of values, there is no political system.

A system is a collection of individuals, groups or classes connected in exchange of values. Elite groups are individuals who own or control more values per capita than other groups, which demand and consume values that are qualitatively different

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9) Blau 1964, pp 24 ff and 263 ff.
10) Value consensus is a basic assumption in the analysis made by Blau 1964, and Curry & Wade 1966, since coercion and exploitation are taken out of the context of exchange. According to these authors, exchange is voluntary and profitable to all actors.
11) See, for instance, Apter 1965, pp 41 and passim.

from those that others demand and consume and which are aware of the common interest in protecting the value positions from decreasing and in defending the system from radical changes. Elites differentiate themselves from others through a distinct consumption of values.[12] The political elite is one of the elite groups. It is identified as the elite group that has taken as its responsibility (or is perceived to do so) the distribution and allocation of values in a society.[13]

The political elite, as well as other elite groups, interact with the masses (divided into potential or actual social classes), and this interaction can be described in terms of input-output-feedback.[14] The interaction is influenced by factors that can be analytically divided into capabilities, which will be made below. The character of the interaction is partly determined by the relation between consensus and coercion (belief patterns) in the system and partly by the structures of the system and the capabilities of the political elite.[15] The elite can, but does not necessarily, constitute a social class; more often it is implied in a social class. A potential social class is a category of individuals who acquire values in an almost identical manner and have an almost identical amount of values per capita and identical style of life and life opportunities.[16] Classes vary in the capability of producing, mobilizing and controlling values in frequency of exchange and in chances of controlling the mechanisms through which values are generated and exchanged.

An actual social class is a potential class in which the individuals have begun perceiving that they have a common relation to others who have another amount of values per capita than themselves and that their terms of exchange are affected by the amount of values and the actions of another class of people.

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12) Lloyd 1971 pp 142 ff.
13) The term "authority" will not be used here since it is most often given a definition assuming legitimacy of the political leaders and/or the powerful groups. "Authority" is often said to be "legitimate power", but it cannot be assumed *a priori* that the majority of people in a system is ruled by consent and not by coercion. See Janos 1964, pp 131 ff in Eckstein, ed, 1964.
14) According to Easton, the system analysis can be applied to any unit that is interesting to analyze, see Easton 1966 p 21, 1965 pp 30 ff.
15) Apter 1965, pp 272 ff and Almond & Powell 1966, pp 20 and 34ff.
16) See Lipset 1959, pp 61-63 and 109-114, Stavenhagen 1972, pp 28-34 and Tumin 1967, pp 56 ff.

Values can be divided into three categories: economic values, power values and respect values (more on this later on).

The capabilities of the political elite are here analytically divided into (1) generative, (2) distributive, (3) convertive, (4) regulative, and (5) communicative.

The generative capability has to do with the ability of the political elite to produce a new and larger amount of values within the political system. By distributive capability I mean the ability to distribute values to various groups and classes in a society and to transfer values from one group/class to another. The convertive capabiblity has four aspects: (a) conversion of one category of values to another, (b) conversion of input to output, (c) change of the content of the value categories, and (d) change of the structures within which the values are produced and distributed.

The regulative capability is the ability of the political elite to affect the terms of exchange and to control the exchange processes and the structures within which they take place. More concretely, it is the ability to control the behavior of individuals, groups or classes. Communicative capability means the ability of the political elite to receive and send information to and from other groups or classes of individuals.

Now that this short description of the political elite and its role in the political system has been made, a short account for violence, conflict and conflict potential will be given.

There are several kinds of violence, but here a distinction between system induced violence and personal violence will be made. System induced violence is defined as inequality which is inherent in, or built into, the system. For instance, the colonization of countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America implied structural changes resulting in various degrees and kinds of inequality that had not existed in these systems before.[17] The contemporary relations between many industrialized countries on one hand and non-industrialized on the

17) See Alberfini 1970, pp 73 ff and 90 ff, Frank 1969:II, pp 3 ff, Lacoste 1970, pp 175 ff and Myrdal 1968, pp 181 ff and 584-603.

other also imply systemic violence in the latter.[18]

System induced violence is the difference between the amount of values a person, group, social class or nation actually has and what - seen from an objective point of view - it could have.[19] Such violence implies a state, a relation and a process, whereby somebody is deprived of values which he would have if the values were equally distributed all over the world.

That is to say that (1) many Latin American, Asian and African countries are deprived of values in relation to industrialized countries, (2) groups or classes within industrialized countries are deprived of values in relation to other groups or classes within these countries, and (3) groups and classes in underdeveloped countries are deprived in relation to other groups or classes within the same countries as well as to those in developed countries.

The existence of personal active behavior is not necessarily a precondition for systemic violence. The state or relation itself is depriving and, thus, violent. (The failure to act could, however, result in deprivation of certain groups.) If structures implying violence are preserved by some person(s), one can ask whether or not it is intended.[20]

A powerful group, for instance, need use neither personal violence nor the threat of such violence to prevent inequal structures from being changed; it might be able to create beliefs that sanction the existence of these structures.[21]

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18) Albertini 1970, p 119 ff.

19) This is similar to Galtung's tentative definition of structural violence. It is almost identical to Rudebeck's definition of political underdevelopment. See Galtung 1969:II, p 168 and Rudebeck 1970, p 13. The amount of values a unit could have, from an objective point of view, is what is possible in relation to the present resources or in relation to the knowledge about these resources. The subjectively felt difference between actual and expected amount of values is here termed deprivation.

20) Galtung 1969:II, p 171.

21) See, for instance, Bachrach & Baratz 1972, pp 55-56 on non-decision-making and its consequences.

Many other aspects of structural violence could be discussed, but this will not be done here, since they are not directly relevant in the present context.[22)]

Behavior or an act on the part of a person or a group of persons resulting in deprivation of values of another person/group, is personal violence.[23)] Elite violence belongs to this category. It is violence directed against other elite groups or the masses. The masses can feel subjectively deprived independently of the degree of systemic violence. That is to say that there can be a high degree of subjective deprivation although there is no systemic violence and vice versa.

People's beliefs about violence can also vary independently of the existence of systemic violence and degree of subjective deprivation. However, it can be assumed that there is mutual influence; subjective deprivation is connected with systemic violence and with positive beliefs about violence as a means to improve one's own situation. For instance, systemic violence tends to be accompanied by elite violence and these two tend to create a high degree of deprivation and positive beliefs about violence in the sense mentioned.[24)]

Conflict is seen as a state, condition or situation by some peace and conflict researchers.[25)] Others, however, mean actions, behavior or processes when they use the term "conflict", and for them the preceding conditions are usually termed "conflict potential".[26)] Conflict is here seen as a state in which the effort to /attain/ some goal is prevented or is perceived to be prevented by somebody or something.

The conflict potential is here taken as <u>one</u> important condition for the emergence of a conflict and conflict behavior.[27)] When

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22) Galtung 1969:II, p 169-173.
23) This is the author's view on the concept of violence. When the term was presented to the interviewees in the Gambia, their personal view on what is violence was, assumingly, manifested.
24) However, there is a "ceiling effect". Elite violence and systemic violence that nearly eliminate an individual or groups results, of course, in a decrease of the expectations,and,hence,in the degree of subjective deprivation. See Thornton 1964, pp 75 ff in Eckstein, ed, 1964, on the results of terror.
25) Examples can be found in Galtung 1965, p 348 and Marx 1968:I, in Marx & Engels, eds, 1968.

some person, group or structure counteract(or is perceived to do so)the elimination or decrease of the CP, we have a situation which can be termed a conflict.

The feelings and beliefs behind or combined with the emergence of a conflict will be termed conflict beliefs, and they should be differentiated from hostility.[28] Conflict beliefs can, but need not necessarily, be hostile. Empirically, conflict beliefs range from the idea that the conflict can be settled through, for instance, negotiations to the opinion that violence, i e a seizure, by force, of values from the other party in the conflict, is the only way in which the conflict can be solved. In the present work, conflict beliefs are dichotomized into violent (positive to the use of violence) and non-violent (negative to the use of violence) beliefs.

The behavior in a conflict, too, ranges from anticipated, positively avaluated and mutual actions to destructive behavior, but I dichotomize it into violent and non-violent behavior.

If we consider the role of the political elite in a conflict situation, we find that it uses different means in order to manage the conflict. These means rely heavily not only on the capabilities of the political elite but also on the beliefs of the elite and the structures of the system. The means used will also depend on whether the political elite is a party in the conflict. The elite can be involved in two principal ways:

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26) See Coser 1956, p 8, and 1967, pp 26 ff, and Aubert 1963, p 27. To Coser a conflict is "a struggle over values".

27) The conflict potential does not always produce conflict behavior, and all conflict behavior is not a result of a conflict potential. Dahrendorf makes a distinction between latent and manifest interests and this distinction corresponds to that between conflict potential and conflict. See Dahrendorf 1959, pp 183 ff, Horowitz 1967, pp 297 ff, argues that conflict is placed in structures. Feldman 1964, pp 114 in Eckstein, ed, 1964, argues that all societies involve a potential for revolutions.

28) Coser 1967:I, pp 32-36.

(1) it might be one party in the conflict (for instance, when demands made on it are not fulfilled), or (2) the elite is demanded to settle a conflict between two groups or classes in the society.[29)]

The concept of conflict potential has been mentioned above. The CP comprises (1) absolute deprivation, (2) relative deprivation, (3) value inconsistency. (4) contradictory beliefs, and (5) structural contradictions.

Absolute deprivation is the perceived difference between the amount of values that an individual, group or class feels entitled to (expectations) and the amount he or it has or obtains (value position).

Relative deprivation is the perceived difference between the amount of values others with whom one compares one's own situation have or obtain and the amount of values one actually has or obtains oneself.

Value inconsistency is an unequal distribution of values in the three categories. The greater/the difference between the amount of, for instance, power values and economic values a person has, the greater his value inconsistency is.

Contradictory beliefs are, in short, differences in knowledge, evaluations and feelings between individuals, groups or classes.

Structural contradictions are, in short, relations in which one group or class tends to gain or lose values, absolutely or relatively, on the part of another group or class.

29) The relation between the political elite and the political system on one hand and other members of the system on the other can be illustrated in the following manner:

ELITE VIOLENCE	SYSTEMIC VIOLENCE	
	STRONG	WEAK
STRONG	oppression	suppression
WEAK	repression	peace making

All the factors mentioned are assumed to be connected with violent beliefs. The stronger the degree of absolute deprivation, the degree of relative deprivation etc, the more likely a person, group or class is to evaluate, for instance their own use of violence positively.

The components of CP are affected by the activities of the political elite and its capabilities. The fact that large groups feel deprived will not necessarily be known to the political elite. Wants (in the sense Easton use the term[30]) might be unfulfilled without taking the form of demands, which are direct propositions, questions etc put to the political elite.

To affect the CP, the political elite can either change the structures of the system or act on the components of CP directly. In the latter case there are several alternatives of action (see footnote 29), but schematically they can be divided into (1) value allocation, (2) production of beliefs, and (3) use of personal violence.

In the first case values might be distributed to those who feel deprived; in the second ideologies can be used in order to legitimatize the existing structures and/or distribution of values. In the third case values are taken by force from some group or class or somebody is prevented from attaining the amount and kind of values he feels intitled to and is trying to attain.

2.3 Assumptions and Comments on the Method.

The analysis in the present work is based on the following basic assumptions:

(1) Actions, behavior, goods, relations and conditions which are evaluted positively or negatively can be classified into three main categories, namely economic values, power values and respect values.

(2) There is, in all societies, a scarcity of positive values,

(3) This scarcity leads to an unequal distribution of values.

30) Easton 1965,pp 122 ff and 1966 pp 71 ff.

(4) Every individual primarly wants to have a balanced base of values.[31] If it is unbalanced, the individual seeks to balance it by raising the lower position(s). Secondly he tries to increase the base of values, i e values in all three categories.

(5) Every decrease of the value position is against the will of the individual and opposed to his preferences.

(6) Structures that tend to create an unequal distribution of values are contradictory structures and they have a potential for conflicts and conflict behavior.

What empirical anchorage and support do these assumptions have? Positive values are sought by the individual. Within psychology one usually talks about needs of the individual. Many classifications of these needs have been made. One psychologist found more than 6000 needs. In an analysis of the present kind we have no use of such a classification. Instead, it will suffice to mention the distinction between primary and secondary needs.[32] The former are physiological and the latter are socially learnt.[33] Only when the primary needs have been satisfied are the secondary needs given priority.

Values is another term for needs. The former term implies a wider context and will, therefore, be used here, What kinds of values, then, are relevant to a political analysis? What kind of classification, if any, should be made? An inventory of the classifications made can start with the simplest one: those in which all values belong to one and the same category. Some social and political scientists do not classify the values at all but say that "values are all things that are evaluated".[34] Arendt has the opinion that people revolt in order to attain

31) A balanced value base means that the amount of values in each category is identical. An unbalanced value base is, for instance, low power position, high economic position, low respect position. The qualitative aspect is ignored here. That is, I do not investigate what values are sought within each category.

32) Berelson & Steiner 1964, p 240.

33) There is no agreement on either the psychological or hereditary needs is a mutual relationship between these two kinds of needs. To Freud, Lorenz, Marcuse and many others, aggression, for instance, is an inherefed need. See Brenner 1955, Chap 2, Lorenz 1969, passim, and Marcuse 1969, Chap 1.

34) Blau 1964, pp 36 and 100. Blau talks about rewards and mentions six types of rewards.

freedom from poverty and freedom in their social relations.[35] For Marx, freedom from exploitation is the basic value.[36] Tumin, like many other sociologists, argues that human beings seek gratification (values) within three spheres: property, power and psychic gratification.[37] Runciman takes the Weberian classification as a point of departure for his analysis and according to this, human beings seek values within three domains: class, status and power.[38]

Pennock uses the term "political goods", and he mentions four kinds of such goods, namely security, welfare, justice and liberty.[39] A more systematic classification has been made by Lasswell. He points out eight values which are divided into two main categoires.[40]

Gurr combines this classification with the empirical findings which Cantril received in a comprehensive study of human needs, whereby more than 8000 persons in a number of countries were interviewed.[41] The result of this was a three-fold classification: welfare values, power values and interpersonal values.[42]

It is assumed here that the findings of Cantril are representative to the situation in many African countries, since people in some underdeveloped countries were interviewed. The following classification is proposed here and will be used in the present analysis:

Economic values:

(1) "things" necessary for physical survival,

(2) income,

(3) property

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35) Arendt 1963, pp 23 and passim.
36) Marx 1968:II, in Marx & Engels, eds, 1968.
37) Tumin 1967, pp 40-42.
38) Runciman 1966, pp 37 ff.
39) Pennock 1966, pp 422-423.
40) Lasswell & Kaplan 1950, pp 55-56. The classification is made in the following manner:

Reference values:	Welfare values:
power	well-being
respect	wealth
rectitude	skill
affection	enlightenment

41) Cantril 1965.
42) Gurr 1970, p 25.

Power values:

(1) ability to predict changes of one's own situation,
(2) ability to act in a manner that corresponds to one's own beliefs, and
(3) ability to influence the behavior of others,

Respect values:

(1) feeling of belonging to a group, class, nation etc,
(2) feeling of being liked by other people,
(3) skill and enlightenment.

In the analysis later on in the present work, a distinction will be made between the classification made by the author on one hand and the associations raised in the minds of the Gambian workers and farmers by the questions presented to them on the other.[43)]

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43) Following factors have been used as indications on values in the three categories:

Economic values:	Power values:	Respect values:
(1) income, and (2) property	(1) participation in formal politics: voting, membership in a party etc.	(1) occupation (2) housing conditions (3) education (4) age (5) status of own kinship group

In Kerewan education has been excluded from the list and is substituted by kinship group and in Banjul kinship group is excluded.

Income in Kerewan was estimated on the number of bags of groundnuts that the farmers had sold during the last season. The weight of the bags ("donkeys" of a certain size) was estimated on information received from the co-operative movement. Then the weight was multipled by the price stated by the co-operative movement. By

"associations raised in the minds.." I mean the workers' and farmers' subjective feelings raised when the following questions were presented to them. Economic values: Thinking about the amount of money you earn, things you own, services you get and so on - Where on the ladder do you stand economically? Power values: now if we think about the chances you have to decide in matters concerning your own life and the activities of other people - where on the ladder do you stand in deciding things? Respect value: We think about the treatment and respect that you get as a person in the Gambia. We can say that you can place yourself on a ladder showing the respect and treatment that you get - Where on the ladder do you stand today?

Thus, qualitative aspects of the value categoires have not been measured or taken into account. I admit that this is not a problem merely for aociology of knowledge and for philosophy of ethics but also for an analysis dealing with people's needs and political allocation of values.

So much about the first basic assumption. Now over to the second: all societies are charactized by scarcity of values. Another assumption is implied here, namely that people in all societies demand more values than are available.[44] This view has strong support in the findings and opinions of most social scientists.[45] Since there is a greater need more values than can be produced, there is always competition and/or conflict over scarce values. The unanimity is not so strong when we come to the third assumption. There are social anthropologists who argue that societies exist or have existed free of any unequal distribution of values.[46] However, most of the modern anthropologists, argue that at least some values are unequally distributed.[47] The sociologists share the view that all societies are stratified.[48] Political scientists have accepted this view.[49] Strafication implies variations in the distribution of values.

Concerning the causes of this unequal distribution of values the sociologists are divided. Some of them argue that those who contribute most to the perpetuation of the society receive most values,[50] while others insist that groups or classes which have a certain degree of power in the initial phase will succeed in obtaining more power and other values.[51]

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44) Carried to its extreme, this formulation has the consequence that an insatiable need of values is ascribed to people. This is a premise that was presented by the utilitarians, J M Mill, for instance, and it does not seem to be applicable to people in underdeveloped countries. See Dalton 1961, p 52.

Furthermore, there are authors who argue that this principle is not applicable to small scale, self-sufficient economic units in which exchange of goods prevails and a money economy is non-existent, see Godelier 1971, pp 55 and 71.

Since the Gambia has been penetrated by a colonial power and has been forced into a world market, I presume that the assumption made has, at least, some degree of relevance in the Gambian context.

45) Every changing society dependent on the world market and influenced by Western capitalistic countries seems to be characterized by a scarcity of values. See Albertini 1970, pp 95 ff and 123 ff, Lacoste 1970, pp 180 ff.

46) See Smith 1966, pp 171-176 in Smelser & Lipset, eds, 1966.

47) Balandier 1970, pp 38 ff, Sahlins 1958.

48) Lipset 1959, pp 61 ff, Fallers 1966, p 142, in Bendix & Lipset, eds, 1966 and Tumin 1967.

49) Examples can be found in Berg 1971, Dahl 1963 and Lasswell & Kaplan 1950.

50) Wilbert More is a spokesman for this view, see More 1963:I,

On the fourth assumption, the following comments are in order. In earlier analyses of human behavior the ideal models of "homo politicus", "homo sociologicus" etc were used and applied to the empirical world. However, it is not implied in the fourth assumption that people seek maximal power for the sake of power, maximal respect for the sake of respect and so on, but rather that they want to have balance in their value base (their total amount of all values), or, at least, successive and predictable changes in the distribution of values and in their value base.[52)]

The fifth assumption - that every receding movement is opposed to the preferences of the individual - is ambiguous and doubtful if we consider isolated cases. There are individuals who accept deteriorations in their value base, even if they do not directly wish them. However, if such retrogressive movements grow rapidly, individuals tend to reject them.[53)]

In the second, fourth and fifth assumptions it is implied that individuals seek those values which are pointed out in the present analytical framework, or, that they, at least, accept the criteria according to which the value allocation occurs. This condition is not always present. If it is not, there is a contradiction in the beliefs (including preferences): the individuals receive none of the things that they evaluate positively, or receive such things to a very small extent, such things that they evaluate positively. Therefore, we have returned to the second assumption.[54)]

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in which he polemizes against Tumin on this question.

51) See Tumin 1967, pp 87 ff and 106 ff, and 1963.

52) Cantril 1963, p 14 and 1958, pp 22 ff and Seligman 1966, pp 360, in Smelser & Lipset, eds, 1966.

53) See the discussion on vertical mobility and its consequences in Germani 1966, in Smelser & Lipset, eds 1966 and Svalastoga 1965, pp 110 ff. By slow change I mean social mobility or similar changes that occur from one generation to another and by rapid change I mean social mobility or similar changes within a generation.

54) It can be argued that an individual is able to reject not only the allocation of values, the criteria according to which the allocation occurs and the value categories, but also the system as a whole.

The sixth assumption is based on the empirical findings of many investigations.[55] A feodal structure, for instance, implies an unęqual distribution of values and this, in turn, tends to create conflicts not only over values but also over structures.

2.3.1 "Subjective" or "Objective" Measurement?

The beliefs of the individuals and the degree of deprivation they feel can be measured in two different ways: the "objective" or the "subjective" method can be used.[56] These terms demand an explanation and this will be given later on. The triangle below can be used as a point of departure for the discussion:



Beliefs, deprivation and structures are interrelated and mutually influential. Empirically, deprivation is included in beliefs but here an analytical distinction has been made between them.

Changes in beliefs tend not only to affect the degree of deprivation but also to create pressure on the structures. The degree of deprivation affects the beliefs and also, in the long run, the structures. The latter, in turn, have effects on the beliefs and on the degree of experienced deprivation.

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55) See, for instance, Bwy 1971, in Davies, ed, 1971, and Russet 1964.

56) "Objective" means that the background variables and the structural conditions of an individual are studies. "Subjective" means that we ask the individuals about their feelings of deprivation, their beliefs about violence etc. This distinction differ to a certain extent from that between "objectivistic" and "subjectivistic". The former means that the analysis is carried out against the background of a structural theory implying postulated "conflict conditions". The latter implies the use of theories, based on assumptions about the feelings of the individuals whose behavior is being analyzed. See Dencik 1973:I, in Dencik, ed 1973, and Schmid 1968, pp 224-229.

What has been said can be illustrated by an example. If, for instance, exploitation is believed to be justifiable and sanctioned by divine powers, it is more bearable to the individual; if it is not, the deprivation tends to be strongly felt. But long term deprivation also affects the beliefs; the individual is likely to begin questining whether the structure are good if they prevent him frmm receiving what he feels entitled to. Thus, he is likely to work for structural changes.

Now, if we use the subjective method, we measure only the beliefs and the degree of deprivation as these are accounted for by the individuals themselves. We do not take structural conditions into consideration. The beliefs and the degree of deprivation are assumed to be determined only by the personality system of the individuals.[57)]

If we, however, use the objective method, we either analyze structures as determining people's beliefs about violence and their degree of deprivation (without asking the individuals themselves) or as forming the personality system of the individuals which then determine what beliefs the individuals have and the degree of deprivation they experience.

What has been said can be further illustrated by using the four models of relations between types of variables that have been presented by Galtung:[58)]



In using the subjective method we ask the individuals themselves about their view on the distribution of values, how they experiences deprivation and what they think about the structural

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57) On difficulties in using subjective methods in other cultures than the own, see, for instance, Biesheuvel 1949, in Price-William, ed 1969.

58) Galtung 1969:I , p 32.

conditions. They can also be asked to estimate their value positions against the background of certain scales.

The subjective method has a number of advantages over the objective: (1)it makes it possible to study reference group behavior and relative deprivation,[59] (2) we are able to analyze the individuals' views on power conditions and, thereby, avoid the difficulties in finding objective criteria on power,[60] and (3) one can measure value deprivation, beliefs about political objects and beliefs about violence directly.

However, the application of the subjective method demands direct field studies. Since these have been carried out in the present work, the advantages of this method have been applied here.

When using the subjective method there is a risk of psychological reductionism; that is to say that one tends to explain everything with the assistance of only psychological variables. The whole social perspective behind the analysis is also at stake, for if we use the subjective method, we give minimal weight to structural conditions.[61]

The objective method does not always demand field studies. One can, for instance, use statistical data, and then let income and property constitute the economic position, participation in politics the power position etc. The use of participation in politics as the criteria for power position is, however, ambiguous, since it need not be true that most of the powerful people participate in the decision-making of a government, an organization or a political party.[62] Furthermore, these kinds of institutions are not always present in a political system.[63]

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59) Runciman 1966, p 151.
60) Concerning the difficulties in obtaining objective criteria on power, see the articles in Bell, Edwards & Wagner, eds, 1969.
61) Examples of psychological reductionism are Hagen 1962, McClelland 1961, Pye 1962, and Rogow 1969. By the social perspective I mean the values and frames of reference that guides the scientist in his analysis. A political scientist using only subjective indices will overlook much of information that has explanatory value, see, for instance, the studies in Almond & Verba 1965.
62) Analyses in which objective indices have been used and their relationship to the stability of political system is

In the present analysis both methods will be used, because one of its purposes is to study the relation between structural conditions and subjective feelings and the individuals' view on these conditions. Principally, the B-, C- and D-types are the methodological tools with which data have been collected. The single-headed arrows showing the cause-and-effect relations are, however, omitted. The variables are, as has been said above, assumed to have a mutual influence.

2.4 The Samples

In order to investigate the conflict potential and changes in it, I sought a group of workers in a changing country. The reasons for selecting the Gambia as the country for a field study are given on pages I felt that workers being members of the Gambia Workers' Union would fulfill the demands for such a group. It was known to me before the samples were drawn that many of the older workers of this union had participated in the strikes during the 1960's, and that the younger workers were highly educated and discontent with their working conditions. All workers had experienced structural changes as well as changes in real income.

I visited the country for a pilot study in January 1971. Workers, civil servants and politicians in Banjul and farmers in Barra and Berending were interviewed. I also discussed the content and structure of the questionnaire with Gambian politicians and teachers.

Furthermore, it was my intention to have a group from which conclusions about a larger population could be drawn. Hence, I had to draw a sample representative to a certain, specified group.

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postulated, are given p 24, for instance, Gurr 1972 and Nesvold 1964.

63) The situation in Ethiopia and Saudi-Arabia could be considered, see Read: "Ethiopia", pp 105-116 in Legum, ed, 1969, and Rustow: "South-West Asia", pp 405, and 413-414 in Ward & Macridis, eds, 1963, respectively.

In January 1972 I visited the Gambia for the second time. The General Secretary of the President's Office and the Minister of External Affairs gave me permission to interview "as many persons as you want". The leaders of the G W U were willing to assist me in drawing a sample of workers of some of the work section in the Banjul area. Workers employed by the Public Works' Department as well as workers employed in the tourist branch were selected. According to the files at G W U, there were 648 active (paying fees) members within these sections (drivers, electricians, mechanics, fitters, blacksmiths etc and room-boys, bar tenders, waiters, cleaners etc), They worked in Banjul or just outside the capital although some of them lived 20-30 kilometers from the capital: in Bakau, Serrekunda, Jeswang, Sukuta and Bulikunda.

For financial and other reasons it was not possible for me to have samples larger than about 175 persons each. To receive breakdowns which could be analyzed meaningfully the samples had to consist of at least 80-90 persons in each group. The groups of people selected ought to have consisted of at least 100 persons in each in order to allow for a certain number of "drop-outs".[64] Therefore, one out of four members in each of the above mentioned sectors of the G W U was sampled (in all, 162 workers).

The leaders of the trade union contacted the workers and informed them about the project. A worker, a representative of the G W U, made appointments with the workers that had been sampled (on the average three or four a day). Most of the workers were interviewed in their homes after the work day. They were informed that their names and answers would never be mentioned or presented to the authorities and that the interview would take about one hour.

A translation of the questionnaire was made into Mandinka and Wollof. Most of the workers were able to speak English, but some of them were not able to understand the questions and to answer them except in their own language, Wollof or Mandinka.

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64) Galtung 1969:I, p 60.

It was possible for my co-worker and me to interview 134 of the 162 workers sampled, and they were interviewed from the middle of January to the middle of May 1972 (except for three workers whom we met and interviewed in January 1973). On the average, the interviews lasted about one hour. A few interviews were made within half an hour, others lasted two hours.

Thus, 83 % of the workers sampled were interviewed. Of the 28 workers who are not represented in the analysis later on, the main part had moved recently (and occasionally) to the countryside (Georgetown, Basse Santa Su, Farafenni and Mansa Konko). Only three of the 28 workers refused to answer the questions. They said that they did not want or did not dare to talk about politics.

In the countryside I wanted to draw a sample in a village whose population supported itself mainly by cultivating groundnuts for sale and that was ethnically homogeneous (a Mandinka village). Furthermore, it was my intention to interview people responsible for the support of their families and that were similar in sex distribution to the sample of workers.[65] Thus, it seemed reasonable to select male farmers over 18 years.

However, it was not possible to draw a sample in the same manner as in Banjul, since there were not files available similar to these of G W U. According to the sources known to me, Kerewan seemed to fulfill the requirements mentioned. Gambian authorities (the President's Office, Statistical Office and Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources) gave me a free hand to choose whatever village I wanted but they supported me in the selection of Kerewan.

After having discussed the matter with statisticians in Sweden and functionnaries at Kerewan Area Council, I sampled every fourth yard-owner on the tax lists for 1972. My co-worker and I met the Alkali (the chief of the village) and asked him

65) In the sample of G W U workers, three women came to be included. Before the sample was drawn, it was not known to me that the union had female members. According to Sosseh (see Sosseh 1972:II), the portion of female members is estimated to 2-3%. When the sample in Kerewan was drawn, I ignored this small percentage.

for permission to make the interview project in the village. The Alkali knew most of the people in the village, and could mention the names of most of the men over 18 in the yards sampled. These yards were visisted, all the names were checked and appointments were made with the farmers.

There were 138 yard-owners in Kerewan. 34 of them were sampled, and all men in their yards were interviewed. In all 148 farmers were included in the sample. The following Friday, the Alkali announced in the mosque of the village that the project was to take place.

128 farmers (86%) were interviewed from the 24th of March to the 28th of May 1972. (We made efforts in January 1973 to find some of those in the "drop-out" category but we did not succeed.) It was at the end of the dry season and most of the farmers were not working the fields but stayed in the village (in their homes or at the village bantaba). When we met the farmers, they were informed that the national government in Banjul had given us permission to talk to them but that their names and their answers would not be presented to the government or to the commissioner. The farmers were also told that the interview would take between one and two hours.

Most of the farmers were interviewed in their homes or at some place in the village. It was rather difficult to make the interviews without occassional interferences from other people (fathers, mothers, sisters, brothers etc of the interviewees). The average interview lasted one hour and a half, but the longest took nearly three hours.

The farmers whom we did not meet (except two) were out of the village, most of them in neighbouring villages or in the capital. Two of them were not in a condition to comprehend and answer the questions. None refused to meet us. The main part of the farmers that we did not meet were young, and, therefore, farmers of young age have been under-represented in the sample.

I myself did not live in Kerewan all the time but visited the village for short periods. Often I was in the capital in order to visit the authorities and to interview workers who were

able to speak English. While I was in the capital, my co-worker interviewed people in Kerewan. All the interviews were made in Mandinka.

2.5 A Comment on the Sources Used.

Principally five categories of sources have been used in the present work, namely (1) structured interviews with workers and farmers (2) unstructured interviews with civil servants, trade unionists, politicians, journalists etc, (3) primary written documents, (4) secondary written documents, and (5) participant observation.

The structured interviews are presented throughout the present work and comments on the questions and the statements are made accordingly.

The unstructured interviews are not presented in total anywhere but they are mentioned as sources now and then. Such interviews were made when it was impossible to find another source, when written document gave different versions of some events or states of affair or when descriptions of the personal opinion of some politician or trade unionist were needed. About 30 undstructured interviews were made in 1971, 1972 and 1973. Only those who did not refuse to have their names published have been used explicitly as sources.

Primary written documents mean documents published by Gambian authorities, journalists or organizations. Most of the description of the contemporary situation in the Gambia has been based on sources of this kind. Some grave problems are accompanied by this utilization. First and foremost, figures and other data in these documents have often been changed and rewritten although no explicit reason has been given for this. Sometimes reasons have been given but some figures did not seem to correspond to these received from other sources of information. This applies, for instance, in the case of employment and unemployment in the Banjul area. Furthermore, there is a strong discrepancy between statistics presented by the U N and those published by Gambian authorities or authors who describe the political life of the Gambia.

Secondly, some data necessary for an analysis of the present kind are not available. Data needed for a description of the economic structure were particularly difficult to find. The Gambian income from tourism, the profit of the enterprises in the country, the ethnic background of the civil servants and the distribution of income are examples here.

Thirdly, it could be mentioned that many written documents were difficult to obtain. Figures on the number of strikes and man-days lost during the late 60's, for instance, became completely available only after about ten visits to the authority concerned.

Secondary written documents are articles, books etc based on primary sources of which I myself have not read. The history of the Gambia and the events that occurred during the early 60's, for instance, are known to me mainly through such documents. Most of them were written by Englishmen during colonial days.

Participant observation in its formal sense demands a long term participation in the group or society being studied and the ability to understand and speak the language of the people being observed. I did not stay in the Gambia long enough to understand what I observed not even if it had been explained to me by a Gambian, and I did not learn the main languages of the people in the Gambia. So what I have observed has been interpreted by myself and sometimes by Gambians.

2.6 Financing of the Project and Support in General.

The financial sources of the research project in the Gambia were two. In the autumn of 1971 I received one of the scholarships that were distributed by SIDA (Swedish International Development Authority) for social, economic, political etc research in underdeveloped countries. Furthermore, from the University of Lund, I received a scholarship for undergraduate research in the Spring of 1972 and the Spring of 1973. None of the scholarships mentioned were accompanied by any requirements or demands influencing the form or content of the research proje t in the Gambia.

Furthermore, it would not have been possible for me to carry out the project in the Gambia without assistance and encouragement from many institutions and persons of which only a few can be mentioned: the President's Office in the Gambia, the Kerewan Area Council, the Gambia Workers' Union, Yankuba Baldeh, Banjul (my co-worker in the Gambia), the workers of the Gambian Workers' Union and the farmers of Kerewan, participants in the seminars in peace and conflict research in Lund, Lars Rudebeck, Uppsala (political scientist doing research in the problem of underdevelopment) Torben Worre, Copenhagen (historian doing research in modern African - and particularly Gambian - history), Hans F Petersson (professor in political science at the university of Lund), participants in seminars in political science and sociology in Lund, Bernie Masterson (who assisted me in translating my work into English), Ebba Skjöld (who typed my manuscript) and many others.

3 THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK I: STRUCTURE AND POLITICS

3.1 Historical background

When Europeans for the first time sailed into the mouth of the Gambia river at the end of the 15th century, they found well organized political systems. These were, however, not static political units but had changed many times during history. When the first Europeans arrived, the Gambian kingdoms were under the rule of the Mali empire, of which they were peripherical areas. The Mali empire was decaying, and later it was conquered by the Songhai rulers. Some hundred years earlier the areas around the Gambia river had been under the authority of the king of Ghana.[1)]

Situated north of the river were Wollof kingdoms, ruled by Mansas (kings), and south of the river lived the Jolas. They did not organize their political systems in a hierarchical manner like the Wollofs; the head of the village was the highest political authority.[2)]

Eastwards along the river the Serahulis had settled down. They had been the leading ethnic group in the Ghana empire but by the time of the arrival of the Europeans, they were also subordinate to the leaders of the Mali empire.

Among these three ethnical groups there was a smaller number of Fulas and Mandinkas, Islamic traders and craftsmen, who had migrated from the inner parts of West Africa and settled down around the Gambia river.[3)] They had arranged themselves into the existing political units and had accepted the authority of their rulers.

Jolas were animists and are believed to be the original people of the contemporary Gambia and Casamance (in the south of Senegal). The village was their largest political unit, and they elected a chief from themselves. They had no coordinating political authority above the village level.[4)]

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1) Davidson 1966, pp 56 and 60 ff and Gailey 1964, pp 5-6.
2) Gray 1966, pp 325-327.
3) Davidson 1966, pp 60-63 and Deschamps 1968 p 37.
4) Deschamps 1968, pp 37-39.

The populations of Wollofs, Fulas and Mandingos were organized in the following manner from the smallest unit to the largest. A number of kordas or compounds constituted a kabilo or ward (each occupied by a patrilineal kinship group). Every village comprised three or more kabilos. The Alkali was the head of the village.[5] In some cases a number of villages were clustered together into larger units over which a Seyfolu presided.[6] Two or more districts could constitute a little kingdom or mansa.

The power of the Alkali was limited because he had to take advice from the senior men and/or leaders of the compounds. Important decisions, i e decisions on land rights and rights to a kabilo, were made under the influence of the leaders of the compounds.[7]

It was the pattern described which the first Europeans found in the Gambia. They first traded peacefully with the Africans, but later on they were followed by English, Franch and Dutch traders, who competed for economic influence in the area. Privately owned companies were established in order to take over the commerce. An what eventually came to be called St James' Island, the English founded a fort, and the French conquered Albreda, just to the north of this island, and made it a commercial center. However, the British authorities did not become seriously interested in the area along the Gambia river until the end of the 18th century.[8]

There were rumours about affluent deposits of gold upward of the river, and the Europeans extended their journeys to the inner part of what is now the Gambia. They did not find any wealth, since the Gambian kingdoms were situated beside the great trading routes that connected West Africa to the northern parts of the African continent.[9]

The private merchants and adventurers that were interested in the area from the time of discovery and onwards were content

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5) Quinn 1968, pp 444 ff.
6) Gailey 1964, pp 16 ff.
7) Quinn 1968, p 445.
8) Gailey 1964, pp 16 ff.
9) Davidson 1966, pp 33-34 and 60.

to control certain points along the river and they never tried to penetrate the inner parts far from the river. The Portuguese who made efforts to conquer some of the Wollof villages were defeated.[10)]

Hides, ivory, gold and honey were brought from the area and several different goods were freighted to it. When the European emigration to America increased, when the need of labour on the plantations in West India became greater and when the industrialization in England started, the slave trade (which had begun earlier) became a pillar in the economy of European countries.

At the beginning of the 18th century, the Songhai rulers had been defeated by Morocans and the empire had been destroyed. The small states along the Gambia river had become more or less autonomous. The slave trade increased. At the beginning slaves were taken from the lowest caste, but when the demand for slaves became greater than the supply, the indigenous chiefs and kings made slaves of more people and sold them. The White men started selling weapons to the Africans, and the distribution of firearms to the West African chiefs and warriors changed those power structures that had existed in the area.[11)]

The European slave trade decreased at the end of the 19th century and ceased at last. This change was caused partly by the lessening British dependence on the Triangle of Slave trade and partly by pressure from certain groups in England.[12)]

The Muhammedans constituted minorities in larger groups of animists until the 19th century. Large portions of the Fulani population in the inner parts of West Africa had adopted the Islamic religion already in the 14th century, and during the following centuries they migrated all over West Africa. In the 18th century this migration of Fulas increased. Three states had emerged in the areas situated to the east of the

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10) Davidson 1966, pp 202 ff.
11) Davidson 1966, pp 202 ff and 216 ff, and Oliver & Fage 1966, pp 112 ff.
12) Webster & Boahen 1967, pp 79 and 114-117.

region that became contemporary Gambia: Futa Jalon in Guinea, Futa Bondu in Senegal, Mali and Niger, and Futa Toro in Senegal.[13] They were dominated by Fulas, and in the 18th and 19th centuries they came to play an important role in the history of the Gambia.

For many reasons (that will not be dealt with here), the French changed their colonial policy in West Africa. In the middle of the 19th century they started conquering as much area as possible, while the British continued holding certain points along the rivers and the Atlantic coast. Later they built a fort on an island further up-river. On the island Banjul, at the mouth of the river, they founded a town, Bathurst, in 1817. Thereafter, the English were able to control all trade on the river.

When the French pressed further into Africa, the leaders of the three Fula-dominated empires started to raid the areas around the Gambia and Senegal rivers. By violent means they tried to convert animists and half-hearted Muhammedans to their faith, a puritanic sect of Islam. They believed that their mission was to extend Islam in its puritan form and to prevent the White men from penetrating the areas along the West African river.[14]

In the middle of the 19th century they met the French in many huge battle, and time after time the conflict took the form of civil war in the area that constitutes the Gambia today.

From the beginning the Marabouts, the puritanic sect, believed that the British would support them against the Seyfolus, which were the greatest obstacle to the spread of the Puritan Islam. They also believed that the British would give them support against the French but they were disappointed in both cases.[15]

During the 19th century wars a lot of people fled from the Marabouts and from the threat of forced labour under the French. Many of them settled down in Bathurst. However, it was not until this town was directly threatened by the Marabouts that the English sent troups to fight them.

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13) Ibid pp 3-6, 22-24.
14) Webster & Boahen 1967, pp 24 ff.
15) Gailey 1964, p 40.

The holy wars paralyzed the agriculture periodically and destroyed the old power structure that had existed for a long time.[16] The slave trade ceased, the wars and the costs of the forts forced the English to put the Gambia under Sierra Leonean administration and later to try to sell the area to the French. These actions raised a strong resistance from those Englishmen who had settled in Bathurst. However, the French and the British authorities did not reach an agreement, but the Gambia became a British enclave in French occupied territory.[17]

In 1882, the British decided to change the administration of the Gambia. A governor was appointed in Bathurst, and the town was administrated as a colony, while the rest of the area was given the status of protectorate.

The political organization that had existed in most of the villages along the river had been destroyed during the wars, but still there were great organizational differences among the ethnic groups and geographical areas. The British did not take these differences into consideration but established a uniform administrative system, indirect rule, which was applied in all its colonies.

The protectorate was divided into two districts, each headed by a Travelling Commissioner. A Seyfolu (chief) was appointed in each district, and in every village an administrative head, an Alkali, was installed. The persons to fill these roles of authority were taken from older, royal families or were appointed arbitrarily by the British. In 1895, yard tax was introduced, and yard owners having more than four huts were obliged to pay yearly taxes in cash.

The last rebellions were suppressed in the beginning of the 20th century; the Marabouts had established themselves all over the country, and in 1906, the protectorate was divided into five divisions. A Travelling Commissioner was appointed the administrative head in each of them. The divisions com-

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16) Ibid p 45.
17) Gray 1966, p 435-443.

prised districts headed by a Seyfolu. Some years later the institution of a subschief was introduced between the Seyfolus and the Alkalis. The most important task of the latter were to collect taxes and to preserve peace and order in the villages, that is to say, to preserve the status quo.[18)]

In every division ~~xhexxe~~ a Native court was established, in which the Seyfolu sometimes presided as a judge but the Commissioner most often delivered the judgments.

The dividing lines between the districts and divisions did not fit into the areas that had existed earlier and did not have any relationship to the lines between ethnical groups. The introduction of a Commissioner in each division also created problems of loyalty among the people. The Commissioners came to compete with the Seyfolus and the Alkalis for authority. And the solutions of identical tasks were often made in different manners in different districts because there was no institution that coordinated the activities of the commissioners.[19)]

The Gambian peasants had produced only for their own consumption or for that of their own village. The population in the protectorate had been self-supporting, but when the Europeans introduced cultivation of groundnuts in the beginning of the 19th century, it spread, and land that earlier had been used for cultivation of food products was turned into groundnut fields. When selling the groundnuts, the peasants received payment into cash, and the money was spent on food that he had to buy or on goods that traders had imported. In 1830, the cultivation of groundnuts had extended so far that the Gambia started exporting groundnuts.[20)]

Some cotton farms were established, and cotton articles were made in the Gambia. However, the Gambian production had to compete with cheaper British made cotton and, finally, the cultivation of cotton ceased. Some rubber plats were also established but they were closed during the First World War.

The Gambian population became more and more dependent on the

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18) Gray 1966, pp 490-491.
19) Gailey 1964, pp 134 ff.
20) Ibid p 42.

cultivation of groundnuts, and during the 1930s it dominated the country's economy. The taxes that were collected from 1898 and onwards were funded in London, but the protectorate did not have any advantages from this fund, since the money was not invested in any improvements in the villages. Thus, the British "made a profit" in the Gambia until 1940, when the colonial policy took other forms than earlier.[21] It should also be mentioned that the largest part of the money collected was spent in a monetary reform in the 1920s.[22]

The most important purposes of the administrative apparatus mentioned above were to judge according to British laws, to adjudicate these laws and to collect taxes. Besides this the British had no other interest in the protectorate; the government of the colonial power was content if the protectorate was self-supporting and if the status quo prevailed. This view on the Gambia and many other colonized areas directed the British colonial policy until the Second World War.[23]

The extent and the standard of education and the maintenance of public health, for instance, were backward in the countryside.[24]

In Bathurst, which did not experience any advantages from the colonization either, a Legislative Council had been established in the 1930s. In 1946 it was reorganized and one indigenous politician could be elected by the people in Bathurst.

In the beginning of the 1950s organized political groups emerged in the town. This phenomenon had its background partly in the rising political consciousness among the Wollofa and Akus who had been educated and partly in the fact that the Legislative Council after 1950 was to include one more representative from the Bathurst/Kombo St Mary area.

However, the political parties that were founded had no mass support and never tried to receive it (at least not in the protectorate, since its people had no right to participate in the elections).

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21) Gailey 1964, pp 166 and 172.
22) Ibid pp 168.
23) Ibid pp 117 and 179.
24) Ibid pp 179 ff.

I M Garba-Jahumpa, who had been a teacher in Bathurst and had participated in a series of pan-African congresses, founded the Muslim Congress Party.[25] At the same time the Democratic Party was established under the leadership of Reverend J C Faye. A young British educated barrister, P S N'Jie, was a member of this party, but after the elections in 1951 he left D P and founded the United Party.

According to the existing constitution, the Gambians had no possibility to exert any influence upon the policy of the country. The heads of the ministries were still English officials, who were directly controlled by the Governor, and the two popularly elected Gambians in the Legislative Council had only advisory functions.

Only when the constitution was revised in 1954 (after pressure from the indigenous politicians) could the Gambian political parties exert any influence on internal politics. The Legislative Council then contained 14 elected members (seven from the colony and seven from the protectorate) besides the Governor and the British officials. The representatives from the protectorate were not directly elected but were appointed by the Seyfolus from among themselves.[26]

Before the elections in 1955 another party, the Gambia National Party, was founded under the leadership of K W Foon.

The population in Bathurst had had the possibility to participate in local elections from 1946. Bathurst Town Council (now Bathurst City Council) had been established in the 1930s and after the Second World War it was reorganized to have a popularly elected majority. But it was not until 1960 - when the constitution was radically changed - that the masses in the countryside had any possibility to exert influence on the central decision-making in the Gambia.

The economy in Banjul had become more dependent on Governmental activities and the British authorities than earlier. This will,

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25) Data concerning the foundation of the parties vary from one source to another. The description above is based on Jones 1972, Mboge 1972, N'Jie 1972:I and Worre 1971.

26) Gailey 1964, p 188.

however, be discussed in another part of this chapter. In the countryside, the farmers had become more dependent on the production of groundnuts and on the money economy. This also will be taken up later on.

3.2 Politics

In a previous chapter (p 8) a theoretical definition has been given of the political system. It is not very useful when we come to the empirical material that has been collected for the present analysis but it should be considered a guide. Empirically we have to use the territory of the Gambia as the analytical unit.

The political elite comprises the Ministers, the Members of Parliament, leading opposition politicians not elected into the parliament and trade union leaders. On lower levels, ~~xxxxx~~ namely those of the districts and villages, Seyfolus and Alkalis and Marabouts constitute the political elite.

Politics is all activities that influence the allocation and distribution of values in a society and the ways in which and the extent to which the needs of the members of the society are satisfied.

The allocation and distribution of values can be influenced in many ways, but here these are classified into three main categoires: expansion of the total amount of values in the society, redistribution of all values (transfer of values from one group or class to another) and structural change. The last includes both of the first.

In the first case new values are added to the existing amount. This need not, and usually does not, produce any structural change. A prerequisite for this change in the allocation would be either structural differentiation, or structural change in a stricter sense, namely changes of the relations, or both.

In the second case the total amount of values is either unchanged or changed but it is distributed in another manner than earlier. Nor does this kind of change need to produce

structural change, since the relations between individuals, groups or social classes are the same as before. It is a process in which people in high positions have lost some of their values and people in low positions have gained some new one. Structural differentiation could, however, be a pre-condition for such a change in the distribution of values.

Structural change in its strict sense implies a change of relations, and, hence, a comprehensive change in the allocation and distribution of values. In most of the underdeveloped countries, a change of relations between groups and classes and between these countries and the industrialized countries seems to be a pre-requisite for the satisfaction of the human needs in the former.[27)]

Crises and social change affect the amount of values in a system and also the distribution of values, and, in some cases, the content of the values in the three categories (changes in preferences). There have been many social as well as non-social crises in history. The latter, which includes, for instance, natural disaster, will not be dealt with here.[28)] It will suffice to remark that there are and have been many social crises which have produced collective violence and structural change.[29)] What is of interest here is how social change and certain factors in this change affect the distribution of values and the expectations of people.

"Social change" has been given many different definitions and, accordingly, various sources of it have been identified.[30)]

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27) Albertini 1970, pp 15 ff, Frank 1969:I, pp 20 ff and 1969:II, pp 334 ff, Lacoste 1970, pp 205 ff.

28) This is not to say that natural crises do not have any relevancy to a political analysis of the present kind. There are cases in which a political elite has not made any decisions to change certain structural conditions aggravating the results of natural crises. In other words: non-decision-making can have consequences which might be defined as systemic violence.

29) For historical social crises that have produce violence and/or collective behavior, see Norman 1945 in Turner & Killian, eds, 1957, Rudé 1964, passim, Schapera 1956, passim, and Smelser 1962, passim.

30) For two opposing views, see Frank 1969:I and 1969:II and Smelser 1968.

There are, at the one extreme, micro-explanations of psychological character, and at the other macro-explanations of historical-sociological or -economic character.[31] The sources of social change will, however, not be dealt with here but only some general patterns will be discussed.

As has been said above, structures are relations between individuals, groups and classes. The relations can - if an ideal model is used - be trichotomized into the following types: (1) hierarchical, (2) pyramidical, and (3) egalitarian.[32]

In the first case individuals, groups and classes are subordinate to one another in a descending order, and there is a small unit at the apex. The distribution of values is highly unequal. All activities are supervised by the higher groups and the communication has to pass through a long channel from the sender to the receiver. Most often it is also directed in one way: from top to bottom in the hierarchy.

One does not find only such structures in a concrete political system; one does not find a pure type. But in some empirical systems volontary organizations, trade unions and other substructures are dominated by other structures and the decision-makers in the former are subordinate to decision-makers in the latter.

In the second case, the relations are not so rectilinear. There can be more than one unit at the top and at every level below there are always more than one. The values tend to be more equally distributed than in a hierarchical structure. Subgroups and organizations are also more autonomous in relation to the top unit than they are in a hierarchical system.

In the third type all individuals and groups are equal to each other in relations as well as in values positions.[33] All subgroups have an almost identical degree of influence on the distribution of values.

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31) Psychological explanations are given in Braibanti & Spengler 1961, Hagen 1962, McClelland 1961 and Pye 1962. Explanations of macro-type are given in Smelser 1966, pp 23-48 in Finkle & Gable, eds, 1966 and Marx 1964, pp 40 ff in Etzioni & Etzioni, eds, 1964.

32) On similar classification of structural types, see Apter 1965 and Nettl 1968.

33) Apter 1965, p 87.

The structures of a system can also be classified according to another criterium, namely the degree of differentiation.[34] If a simple and unrealistic dichotomization is used, differentiated and un-differentiated structures will be found.[35]

In the present context social and political change means change in belief patterns, or structural change or both. There are two kinds of structural change: (a) change of relations, and (b) structural differentiation. The former implies a vertical change and the latter a horizontal.

Belief patterns can change frmm secular to sacral and vice versa. Structures can become more differentiated or less differentiated. They can also change from, for instance, hierarchical via pyramidical to equal or vice versa.

Furthermore, structures and belief patterns can change at different rates or, even, independent of each other. In such cases, contradictory beliefs and contradictory structures are likely to emerge.

After this schematical description of analytical types of structures and structural changes, I am going to give an account for the formal political structures of the Gambian political system.

3.2.1 Formal Political Structures in the Gambia

3.2.1.1 The Representative Body

The Seyfolus played a passive role in national politics until the middle of the 1950's. From 1945 and onwards, they had assembled at a yearly conference where they exchanged experiences from the activities in the districts.[36] When the discussions on a constitutional change took place at the end of the 1950's, it was revealed that the P P P wanted to decrease the traditinnal influence of the Seyfolus on politics at dist-

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34) Almond & Powell 1966, pp 42 ff and Smelser 1968, pp 77 ff.
35) A dichotomization of structural differentiation is very common in many works written by sociologists and political scientist, see Smelser 1968.
36) Gailey 1964, pp 134 ff.

trict and village levels. However, the Seyfolus made strong protests.[37)]

When they raised opposition to the changes proposed by P P P a compromise was made, according to which the traditional authorities should have eight places in the House of Representatives. The 19 other places would be filled through general and direct majority elections in the colony and the protectorate.[38)]

Gambia Workers' Union, which had been registered in 1958, had become due to two general strikes, a political force directed against the colonial power. The P P P and the G W U joined in the demand that the process of liberation from the British dependence should be accelerated.[39)]

In 1961, representatives of the colonial power and leading Gambian politicians assembled at a conference (it was demanded by the latter) where constitutional changes were discussed.[40)]

The talks resulted in a decision according to which the number of directly elected mandates in the House of Representatives should be increased to 32 and the number of indirectly elected Seyfolus decreased to four.[41)] The Banjul-Kombo-St Mary area now was given only five directly elected mandates and the provinces 27. The representatives should be elected in majority elections but the demand on residence in the constituency was given up. Elections should be held every five years.[42)]

The Gambia received internal autonomy in 1963, and Dawda Jawara became the first Prime Minister of the country.[43)] Two

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37) Ibid p 19 and Worre 1971, pp 5 ff.
38) The colony was given seven mandates and the protectorate twelve. Against the background of the proportion of voters, the colony was overrepresented. Acoording to the new constitution the candidates should have their residence in the constituency in which they stood for elections. Both these factors would decrease the influence of the Seyfolus.
39) Jallow 1972, and the Republic of the Gambia, p 14.
40) The Republic of the Gambia, p 14.
41) Gailey 1964, pp 190 ff.
42) Ibid,
43) In the same year a United Nations' commission visited the country and investigated the conditions for political independence. Three alternatives were presented by the commission, namely (1) complete independence and sovereignty, (2) a federation with Senegal, and (3) complete integration into Senegal, see West Africa 1964, pp 607, 741, 791, 814 and 841.

years later the country attained complete formal independence. In the same year the P P P proposed a republican constitution. The proposal failed, by only a few votes, to reach to two thirds majority in the referendum held the same year.[44)]

In 1970, a new referendum was held on the republican question, and this time the affirmative votes were in the majority.[45)] Jawara became the first president of the country. According to the new constitution, the House of Representatives appoints the president, but the representatives have to declare before the elections which candidate they support. In the elections of 1972, the P P P received 28 of the 32 mandates, and, accordingly, Jawara was re-elected.[46)]

3.2.1.2 The Government

The ministers of the government, each of them the head of a ministry, are appointed by the president. Their number has increased since 1963 due to the fact that the government has changed from being an administrative branch of the colonial power to a decision-making body of a formally independent country.

For administrative purpose the Gambia was divided into five divisions.[47)] The government is represented in each of them by a Commissioner who is appointed by the president. This is an administrative rather than a political official.

The divisions are divided into districts in which the Seyfolus are administrative heads. These are elected by the Alkalis from among themselves. Each district comprises a number of villages or towns headed by an Alkali. The post as a village chief is normally inherited within the same descent group, but occasionally a chief can be suspended (for instance if he has

44) The proposition needed two thirds majority to be accepted. The percentage of affirmative votes was 65.8 and negative 34.2. The question was politicized along party groupings. P P P supported the proposition while U P worked against it. See Worre 1971.

45) In the 1970 referendum the proposition received 70.2 % of the votes, see G N B 1970 No 45.

46) G N B 1972 No 37, and West Africa 1972, pp 453, 478 and 511.

47) Lower River Division, Western Division, North Bank Division, Mac Carthy Island Division and Upper River Division.

misused his power) and a new one can be elected by the people.[48)]

3.2.1.3 Local Government

Parallell to the divisions are, since 1961-1962, six areas.[49)] Local politics has its forum in the directly elected governments, in which the Seyfolus are ex-officio members. The other members are appointed through general elections. The executive branch of the elected body is the Area Council which is composed of officials that have been trained and appointed by the national government.

The area council is responsible for the public service at local level and for the collection of taxes. The most important income of the council is the tax from yard owners and licenses of different kinds. Building of roads was the heaviest expenditure of the councils during the 1960s.[50)]

After the first elections to the local governments the mandates were distributed almost equally between the P P P and the U P. However, in later elections the U P has lost its positions, and today the P P P is in the majority in all councils. Along with the U P, independent candidates compose the opposition in the local governments.

Banjul City Council has 14 elected and 5 appointed members. The funtion of the council is to take care of water supply, electricity and street maintenance in the capital. During the 1960s, the U P was in the majority in the B C C.[51)]

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48) Seiku Fatty 1972 :T.
49) The boundaries of the areas are in general identical to those of the divisions.
50) See The Gambia 1962 and 1963, The Gambia 1964/65 and The Gambia 1966/67.
51) The B C C was dissolved in 1970 due to bankrupcy. The functions of B C C were taken over by a committee appointed by the national government. The council will not be re-established until the financial position is solid.

3.2.1.4 Political Parties

A short description of the life of the political parties in the 1950s was given on pages 49-50. Four parties existed at the end of this decade namely the United Party, the Muslim Congress Party, the Democratic Party and the Gambia National Party. They were first and foremost election organizations for the political leaders and did not penetrate the masses in the countryside or in Banjul. However, in the middle of the 1950s, the U P had built a firm organization in Banjul and is said to have had about 2.000 members.[52)]

A group of young and educated men from the protectorate founded the Protectorate Peoples' Party in 1958. The leading members of this group were Lamin Bora M'Boge and Sheriff Ceesay, the latter being the leader of the party. One year later the party changed its name twice and finally it was named Peoples' Progressive Party.[53)]

A young veterinarian, Dawda Jawara, who had grown up in an up-river village and then had studied in Britain, became a member of the P P P. Soon he was appointed the chairman of the party.

Already from the start the P P P organized itself from the village level in the countryside. The party founded a committee in every large village. These committees were composed of six to eight members. From themselves they elected area committees consisting of 12-30 members. At the highest level a central committee was elected by the members of the area committees. Later on the central committee came to have 40 members among whom the members of the parliament were automatically included.

From the start the P P P had a few thousands of members, and today the number is probably about 20.000.[54)]

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52) Data on the time of party foundations and the changes in party structures vary from one source to another. The description here is based on the common lines of the following sources: Jones 1972, M'Boge 1972, N'Jie 1972:I and Worre 1971.

53) M'Boge 1972 and Worre 1971.

54) According to M'Boge, the senior administrative secretary of P P P, the number of members was 80.000 in 1972. I did not check this figure against the files of members, but it is doubted by most of the politicians outside P P P. Furthermore, it can be said that P P P received about 65.000 votes in the 1972 elections.

The U P copied the organization of the P P P. The party founded committees in the larger villages and towns but thier number does not reach that of the P P P committees. Furthermore, the U P lacks the connecting link that the P P P has in the area committees.

The P P P also has a strong youth movement. It is affiliated to the National Youth Council, which is a co-ordinating organ for the youth movements of the country. The P P P youth movement has a strong influence in the council, which is, in practice, controlled by the party.[55] The U P does not have any firm organizations among the youth but it has some supporters in the youth movements.

Before the 1960 elections some members of the M C P, the G N P and the D P joined and founded the Democratic Congress Alliance. This new constellation received one mandate in the legislative body, while those who stayed outside the new party did not get enough support to be represented.

In the period between the elections in 1960 and 1962 all smaller parties disappeared from the political arena, and only the P P P, the U P and the D C A participated in the 1962 elections. The D C A received one mandate in Banjul.

Some years later the party split into two halves, one of which became the Gambia Congress Party led by Garba-Jahumpa. This party co-operated with the U P in the 1966 elections. The rest of the D C A joined the P P P.

While the leader of the U P was away from the Gambia, a group in the party formed a coalition (led by E D N'Jie, a brother of the leader) with the P P P. However, the coalition was only created when the leader returned and it split.[56]

In the 1966 elections, Garba-Jahumpa was elected for the G C P but two years later he dissolved the party and joined the P P P. Later on he was, appointed a minister of the P P P-ruled government.

The two party structure existed during the rest of the 1960s,

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55) John 1972 and M'Boge 1972.
56) West Africa 1964, p 1455 and 1965, pp 1075 and 1189.

but the U P was weakened due to opposition within the party but also because many MP:s left the party and joined the P P P. The party also failed to increase its number of members or, at least, to hold it constant, since the organization of the party became weaker.[57)]

A new party emerged when Sheriff Ceesay, a government minister and one of the founders of P P P, refused to change from one ministry to another, left P P P and formed the Peoples' Progressive Alliance in 1968. However, the party was dissolved in 1970.[58)]

A third political force was manifested in the 1972 elections: the independent candidates received more than 20 percent of the votes (more than the U P). This is not a homogeneous force, but its components have, in common, discontent with and opposition to the existing parties. Three principle groups can be distinguished among the independent candidates: (1) former members of the P P P and the U P, (2) educated people who have studied in Europe and returned to their country and who intend to be politicians, and (3) locally supported persons (teachers in the villages, sons of the chiefs etc). To a large extent these three groups are overlapping.

Some of the independent candidates assembled before the elections in order to put forth a programme separate to that of the policies the P P P and the U P but most of the independent candidates acted in isolation from one another. However, after the elections all these candidates assembled and issued a communiqué in which they criticized the P P P for unfair factics during the campaign. According to the independents, Alkalis supporting the P P P had prevented them not only from being nominated but also from campaigning in their villages. Candidates of the P P P had been allowed to enter the counting stations in the countryside, but independent candidates were barred.

In the communiqué the ruling party was critized for not having any election issues or manifestoes. Furthermore, independents

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57) West Africa 1966, p 651, G N B 1969, No 94, 1970 No 43, 52, 53, 95 and Worre 1971.
58) West Africa 1968, p 52 and 1972 p 453.

demanded that the constitution should be changed to provide a proportionate system of representation.[59)]

3.2.2 The Capabilities of the Political Elite.

The capabilities of the political elite mentioned on page 22 will now be described and considered in relation to the structural changes mentioned on pp 53-54.Furthermore, the concrete background to the capabilities of the Gambian political elite will be outlined.

The scheme below can be taken as a point of departure for the description.

CAPABILITY	STRUCTURAL DIFFERENTIATION	CHANGE OF RELATIONS
(1)generative	production of values within existing structures	change that increases or decreases the amount of values in society
(2)distributive	redistribution or allocation of values within existing structures	change that affects the distribution of values in society and that institutionalizes another allocation
(3)convertive	change of the content of the value categories while the relations are unchanged	change of the relations whereby the content of the value categories is affected
(4)regulative	keeping the criteria intact according to which and the mechanisms through which the value allocation and distribution occurs	change of the structures within which the allocation and distribution of values occur, change of the mechanisms through which values are allocated and distributed
(5)communicative	use of existing channels of communication in which demands and support flow and through which people's expectations and beliefs are affected	change of the channels of communication through which support and demands flow and people's expectations and beliefs are affected

59) The Nation 1972, 22th of April and 6th of May.

The capabilities will be discussed one by one in relation to the factors of the conflict potential. However, only the most probable effects on changes in the capabilities on the CP will be dealt with. What is most probable is judged against the background of empirical findings that have been presented by other authors.[60)]

3.2.2.1 Generative Capability.

The generative capability is, in certain regards, similar to the extractive capability as used by some authors.[61)] However, the latter also includes some aspects of the distrubutive capability as defined here but it does not include certain other characteristics.

Generative capability means the ability of the political elite to mobilize or produce a new and larger amount of values in the society.

Before the generative capability itself is considered, the basis of it, namely the resources and values available in the Gambian society will be described.[62)] The resources can be divided into material and non-material. In the former are indluded natural resources, economic structures, production, external trade etc, and in the latter, level of education, certain belief patterns, degree of mobilization etc of the population.

The material background of the generative capability will be accounted for first.

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60) Gurr 1970, chapters 4 and 5, Himmelstrand 1969, Human 1966, pp 269-270, Sahlins 1958, Stavenhagen 1972, pp 109-113, Wolf 1969, pp 278 ff, Wolpe 1970 and Worsley 1967,pp 109-117 and passim.
61) Hydén 1968, pp 21, 26 ff.
62) Resources can be differentiated from values. They are "raw" or potential values.

BATHURST & ENVIRONS
ATLANTIC OCEAN
Miles
Cape St Mary
Government House
Belcuta
Fajara
Bakau
Cotta Point
Tall Point
Sanyal
Cotta Creek
Charlestown Bridge
St Mary's Island
BATHURST (BANJUL)
KOMBO ST MARY
Mariel Kunda
Sara Job Kunda
Jeswang
Talinding Kunjang
Faji Kunda
Tabokoto
Abuko
Lamin
Kuntujang
Sukuta
Willingara
Sara Wouindeh
KOMBO NORTH
Guinguineo
Dalli
Grand Pont
Kaffrine
Kahone
Malème
K Abdallaye
McBaye M Baye
Kaolack
SENEGAL
N'Dofene
Ouour
Nioro Du Rip
Bitayen
Passy N'Goyène
Balangher Kaf N'Barry
Ker Samba Yoro
Ker Mousse
Saboya
N'Dungu Kebba
Kuntair
Jowara
Karewan
Saba
Salikega
Kwinella
Faraferni
Kuchang
Bullenghara
N'Goyen Sanjal
Sukuta
Dibo Kunda
Sara Kunda
Bantaba
Manjai Konko
Pakali Ba Bantaba
Kwinella
Mansajang
Jassong
Japoneh
Kunkuru Kunda
Jassong
Bureng
Elephant I
Bala
Diabugu
Pata
Kaur
Kuchang
Kudang
Kuntair
Fula Kunda
Sukuta
Kaolack
Ndanga
Kaur
Ker Demba
Kaolack
Nioni Mary
Kassa
Pakala
Kaolack
Kountaouta
Tambacounda
Sand
Make
Gambia Town
Kuntaur
Karantaba
Sami
Kurubing
Sara Kunda
Banjang
Sara Ndanga
Karewan
Samba Sira
Bansang
Diabugu
Kassemar
Basse Santa Su
Sutuko
Sutukoba
Baro Kunda
Juba Wuli
Fatoto
Kuleri
Garawol
Sami
Kuntaur
Gunjur Kator
Sand
Génate
Nétéboulou
Brifu
Kona
Sun Kunda
Gambissara
Madina Yéro
Velingara
Kounsera
Kounsera
Kolda
Fafabourou
Hamdallahi
Bakel
Boutilimit
Sokolo
Diawara
Kaédi
Boghé
Dioubocounda
Bakel
Senoncounda
Sokhoulé
Marssassoum
Sedhiou
Diouloulou
Bolandine
Sindian
Baila
Thiaban
Kolobone
Bignona
Cafountine
Kartung
Gunjur
Sifoe
Solety
Jambanjelly
Jambur
Sanyang
Farafenni
Bantang Kasagna
Berim
Bendala
Kalur
Burrong
Mandiaye
Jali
Dumbutu
Nema
Diamo Lalda
Tankon
Dimecouta
Fort James I
Jomboko
Kwinella
Mansajang
Japoneh
Jassong
Bureng
Elephant I
Barafing
Tankular
Jali
Dumbutu
Nema
Diamo Lalda
Tankon
Dimecouta
Bintang Kasagna
Berim
Bendala
Kalur
Burrong
Mandiaye



The Gambia, which consists of two strips of land divided by the river, is situated in the savannah area that stretches from Dakar in the north and Guinea-Bissau in the south and from the Atlantic Ocean in the west to Tchad in the east.

Geography and climate of the country is dominated by the winds, the river and the soil. During the dry season, hot and dry winds, knows as the harmattan, sweep from the Sahara into the country. In the rainy season (June to October), humid south-west winds prevail.

The country, about 50 km wide at the coast and only 20-25 km in the eastern part, stretches about 300 km from the coast into West Africa, and it is enclosed by Senegal. The river flows through a flat landscape; nowhere is the land higher than 60 meters above sea level.

There are three main types of soil: mangrove swamps, banto faros and the sandstone plateaus. The first are filled with water the year round, and during the rainy season they are overrun with salt water in the west, making them unsuitable for cultivation. However, the swamps further into the country can be used for cultivation of rice, and recently some of them have been drained for this purpose, The banto faros are of two types. The first is generally overrun with salt water and is not arable. The other is situated on a higher level and is flooded during the rainy season. There groundnuts and sometimes other crops are cultivated. The sandstone plateau consists of the less fertile soil of the savannah and constitutes the main part of Gambian land. Here groundnuts are cultivated and livestock is grazed.[63)]

It has been estimated that about 300.000 acres are cultivated each year (11 % of the area of the country). The average male farmer has 2.5 acres available to him and the female half, as many acres.[64)] In many parts of the country the density of the population is very high in comparison to that of other African countries.[65)] Therefore, there is a lack of land in

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63) Deschamps 1968, pp 19 ff and Seck & Mondjannagi 1967 pp 120 ff.
64) The Gambia 1966/67 p 28.
65) Morgan & Puch 1969, p 126.

some areas of the country. If other techniques are used, some of the swamps can be drained and parts of the savannah irrigated. However, if the increase in the population continues, the lack of land will persist.

The agricultural production can be divided into two main categories, namely production for local consumption and production for export.[66] Cassava, sorghum, millet, maize and rice belong to the first category. All these except the two last mentioned are traditional staples in the Gambian food. The cultivation of rice started in the 19th century and has expanded slightly since then; today, the production does not cover the need. By tradition the cultivation of rice is women's work. In 1965, rice became the most important grain for local consumption, and the next year the first Chinese from Taiwan arrived in order to advise and educate Gambian farmers in cultivation of paddy rice. Today about 2.500 acres are cultivated with Taiwanese assistance, and there are seven experimental stations supported by Taiwan.[67]

The generative capability of the Gambian political elite is heavily dependent on the economy of groundnuts. During the last ten years, groundnuts and their by-products have constituted 90-95 % of the value of the export. Increase in the crop has been a result of extension of cultivated areas as well as of the introduction of new techniques.

Most of the farmers cultivate groundnuts, which are principally sold to the Gambia Production Marketing Board (GPMB).[68] The crops of groundnuts vary considerably with the weather conditions but during the 1960s, the average production has been larger than that in the 1950s, which results to a great extent from the fact that ploughs and oxen and fertilizers are used more than before.[69]

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66) Sessional Paper No 2 of 1971, p 6.
67) Information from Agriculture Department, Banjul, May 1972.
68) Ibid.
69) West Africa 1967, p 527.

The production of groundnuts is presented in the table below.

	Thousands of ton		
	Total crop	Purchase by mills	For direct export
1958/59--1963/64, average	72	8	64
1964/65	99	43	56
1965/66	120	65	55
1966/67	126	76	50
1967/68	118	58	60
1968/69	120	52	68
1969/70	111	48	63
1970/71	113	65	48

TABLE III:2:A. The production and export of groundnuts during the last years of the 1950s and throughout the 1960s. Source: Sessional Paper No 2 of 1971.

About half of the production is bought by domestic mills which unshell the nuts or process them and thereafter export them. The rest of the production is shipped directly to foreign countries, mainly Britain.

The heavy dependence on one product, groundnuts, is a problem not only for the farmers but also for the political elite, since the government income from export duties are very difficult to predict. Weather conditions as well world market prices can create an imbalance in the budget; the former by changing the predicted amount of production and the latter by affecting the income for a certain volume produced.

As will be seen, industry and commerce are of little importance in the Gambia. The larger enterprises are concentrated in the capital and the areas surrounding it. in table III:2:B it is revealed that 70 % of all waged and salaried are employed in the Banjul-Kombo/St Mary area. The government employs people not only in administration but also in various service branches. These are coordinated in the Public Works' Department, which, although the small size of the labour force, plays an important role in government expenditures.[70)]

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70) See, for instance, Estimates 1972/73, p (vi).

Most of the larger enterprises are wholly or partly foreign owned. The foreign ownership has expanded during the 1960s.[71] A special arrangement, The Development Act, has been an important reason for this.

According to this act, all development enterprises are freed from taxes during their first six years and then they can get respite.[72] Most of the firms which have been established during the late 1960s have been defined as development enterprises. It is the purpose of the government not to interfere with the economic market, and the president has promised that no domestic or foreign enterprises shall be nationalized.[73]

During the 1950s a British oil company searched for oil deposits in and near the Gambia but did not find anything. Ilmenite was mined during that decade. The government now plans to take up this industry again.[74] Beside the deposits of ilmenite there are no other minerals in the Gambia.

The material background of the generative capability of the Gambian political elite has now been sketched. However, this capability is also dependent on the population itself, since the resources available in the country have to be transferred before they become values. Therefore, some general characteristics of the Gambian population will be discussed. It is estimated that in 1969, 87.918 Gambians were employed, whereof 15.998 were waged and salaried employees and 71.900 were self-employed, most of them in agriculture. 85 % of the population is dependent on agricultural production, which contributes 60 % to the GDP. The rest of the people are occupied in industry, commerce and administration. The contribution of manufacturing to GDP is only 3 %.[75]

The situation on the labour market in 1969 is mirrored in the figures below.

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71) Ibid p 102 and The Gambia 1971-72, pp 50 ff.
72) Sessional Paper No 2 of 1971, p 21.
73) G N B 1967, 28th of January.
74) Sessional Paper No 2 of 1971, p 20.
75) Ibid pp 6 and 20.

	THE GAMBIA	BANJUL/KOMBO	PROVINCES
TOTAL EMPLOYMENT	87.918	16.551	71.367
Wages & Salaried	15.998	11.221	4.777
Private firms	5.139	3.152	1.987
Government	6.409	3.819	2.590
Domestics	4.450	4.250	200
Self-employed	71.920	5.330	66.590
Farmers	61.100	100	61.000
Merchants & Traders	9.320	4.410	4.910
Fishermen	1.500	820	680

TABLE III:2:B: Employment in the Gambia in 1969. Source: Gambia's Manpower 1965.

From March 1963 to February 1969, the number of workers increased from 15.068 to 15.998 and the number of farmers from 55.100 to 61.000. In other words, the Gambian population has become still more dependent on agriculture.

Acoording to the report from 1969, 60 % of all employed in the Banjul area are only partially employed. Most of them want to have permanent work. It is not mentioned in the report how many there are who are completely un-employed but seek employment.[76)]

The Gambia is one of the most densely populated countries in Africa.[77)] In 1963, the country had 315.486 inhabitants, and the population is estimated to increase by 2 % annually which means that the country would have had about 400.000 inhabitants in the beginning of the 1970s.[78)] Thu number of people has been doubled in 60 years. In 1911 the population was estimated to reach the figure of 196.000. Banjul has had the largest increase. Here it is about 4 % per annum, while it is lowest in the Upper River Division in the eastern part of the country.

The three most important reasons for these differences between various parts of the country are (1) the migration, (2) variations in the natural increase, and (3) differences in standard of living. People tend to move from the eastern part of the

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76) Gambia's Manpower 1969, p 18.
77) Morgan & Puch 1969 pp 8-9.
78) Census of Population 1963. A new census was taken in 1972 but the result of this had not yet been published in 1974.

country to the west, particularly to Banjul. The capital has one of the highest birth-rates in the country and at the same time average death rate. Infant mortality is higher in the eastern than in the western part of the country because there are great differences in health service and in standard of living in general.[79)]

The main trends in the migration until 1963 is shown in the table below. These trends have been strengthened during the 1960s.

BORN IN	IN 1963 LIVING IN					
	Banjul	Kombo	Western Divison	Lower River Div	MacCarthy Island Div	Upper River Div
Banjul	80	6	4	5	4	1 =100%
Kombo	8	82	5	2	2	1 =100%
Western	3	2	92	3	1	1 =102%
Lower	3	1	4	91	1	0 =100%
McCarthy Is	1.5	0.5	0.5	1.5	95	0.5=99.5%
Upper	0.8	0.4	0.4	0.5	3	94 =99.1%

TABLE III:2:C: Migration in the Gambia. The percentage distribution is based on data in Census of Population 1963.

The migration to urban regions is characteristic of many countries, and it is also appearant in the Gambia.

The population is divided into more than ten indigeneous ethnic groups. Furthermore, people have migrated from various parts of the world, mainly from the Middle East countries, into the Gambia. The ethnic groups speak different languages and there are cultural and social differences between them.

Mandinkas is the largest of these groups and constitutes 40 % of the country's population. These people lived originally along the Niger river and spread over large parts of West Africa. The immigration to the area around the Gambia river occurred principally in two waves.

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79) Gambia's Manpower 1969, p 6.

Mandinkas was, and is, the dominating ethnic group in the Gambian countryside and also in the country as a whole. In some districts they constitute 90 % of the population. They maintain themselves by cultivating groundnuts.The lack of land in some areas, the population increase and the educational facilities have made many Mandinkas migrate to Banjul, where Wollofs are in majority.[80)]

Fulani is the second ethnic group in size. Their origin is unclear, but according to some sources they came from the inner parts of West Africa. Unlike the Mandinkas, they mixed with the Berbers from North Africa. But like Mandinkas, they migrated to other parts of West Africa in waves.

One group of Fulani came to be dominated by the Wollofs and Mandinkas, by whom they were employed as cattle breeds, and even taken as slaves, while another group of Fulani established its own herds of cattle and acquired a respectable position in the Gambian society.[81)]

Wollofs, the dominating group in Senegal, are believed to have inhabited the area longer than the two groups mentioned above. Today they constitute 12 % of the population of the Gambia, but in some regions (the capital, for instance) they amount to 40 %.

Jolas, the original people of the region, constitute about 5 % of the population of the country; they are concentrated in the Lower River Division, where their proportion is 30 %.

In Banjul and some of the districts foreign people constitutes one fifth of the total population. In the countryside they are mainly"strange farmers" who move from Senegal each year to be employed by Gambian farmers or to borrow land.[82)] In Banjul they are traders not only from various West AFrican countries but also from Middle East and India. Many of them are rich businessmen.

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80) Census of Population 1963.
81) Gailey 1964, pp 15-16 and 41 ff.
82) The Gambia 1966/67, p 29.

To complete the picture of the background of the generative capability, some comments should be made upon the religious distribution and the content of the religions in the Gambia. Most of the people were animists until the middle of the 19th century. Thereafter Islam has been the dominant religion and it still seems to be expanding today. Christian mission schools started their activity as early as the last century, but they have not expanded very much since then. Instead, many Christians have converted into Islam.

The table below, which is based on figures from Trimingham's books, shows that Christianity and Animism have relatively small importance in the Gambia.

	Muslims	Christians	Animists	
Banjul	75	24	1	= 100 %
The Protectorate	79	1	20	= 100 %
The Gambia	90	2	7	= 99 %

TABLE III:2:D: The distribution of the religions in the Gambia. Sources: Trimingham 1970, p 228 and Trimingham 1967, p 233. The figures for Banjul and The Protectorate are based on data in the former and the figures for the Gambia on data in the latter. The books do not reveal from what year the figures are taken, but the estimate for the Gambia as a whole is obviously more up to date than the others.

The content of the religions have to be considered in relation to belief patterns in general and to social structures. This will be made later on, when religion is considered as an element of the belief patterns. Here only some comments will be made upon the factors in the religions relevant to an analysis of the conflict potential.

The principles of Islam have melted into the original religions, and, according to Trimingham, Islam has a stronger influence on the rituals and some of the institutions than on the belief patterns of the people in West Africa.[83)]

However, the main characteristics of Islam have been adopted by the Gambians, namely recognition of Islam law and religious institutions, and acceptance of the ideals (confession

83) Trimingham 1967, p 42.

of faith, ritual prayer, fasting, almsgiving and pilgrimage).

In general, the Gambians believe in a life after the present, a monolitic god and social life as determined in large part by divine powers. Many of the original rituals and beliefs persist, and, thus, certain animals, plants and amulets are believed to have supernatural power, and young men are circumsised at the ages of 8-15 years.

The influence of Islam is, perhaps, most appearant in the religious institutions. There are two categories of clergy: imams and marabouts.[84] The imam is the sacred chief of a certain district and he is elected for life. The Marabouts are religious teachers, of which there are one or more in each village. The functions of the religious teacher can be fulfilled by anyone who has the necessary training.

In every village and town there is one or more mosque, and young people (at the ages of 6-18 years) are sent to Koranic schools were they memorize texts from the Koran. The Marabouts have a strong influence not only on people's beliefs but also on the activities in the villages. Most often the Marabouts is also a farmer and/or businessman, and the youths who attend the Koranic school have to assist him in the work on the fields. The parents are supposed to send gifts (e g foodstuffs, kola nuts and sometimes money) to the Marabout.

The influence of the religion on a national scale is indicated in two ways: (1) in the number of believers, and (2) in the degree that general beliefs, behavior and social structures are affected. In the Gambia the influence of Islam seemed to have decreased during the first half of the 1960's. The efforts to decrease the importance of the traditional chiefs (Seyfolus and Alkalis) in the beginning of that decade were accompanied by similar efforts in the religious "sphere". But since then, there has been an Islamic revival, particularly after the for-

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84) Trimingham 1967, p 43. The meaning of "Marabout" in West Africa (particularly Senegal and the Gambia) is different from that in North Africa.
85) According to the Minister of Education cited in G N B 1969, No 58.
86) President Dauda Jawara, for instance, returned to Islam in 1965. See Taylor, ed, 1967, pp 152-153.

mal independence in 1965. Not only the number and proportion of Muslims have increased in the Gambia, but the government has also decided to support Koranic schools and education in Koranic texts.[85] Furthermore, many of the elite persons who adopted the Christian faith in their youth have returned to Islam.[86]

Now that the background of the generative capability of the political elite has been sketched, the capability itself will be considered.

A new and larger amount of values in the society can be produced either by creating more values in the short run or by changing the structures so that more values are produced in the long run. The political elite can choose a short term strategy of producing more values within existing structures or a long term strategy which does not create more values instantly but in the future. On a concrete level the generative strategy selected by the political elite is indicated by government finances, the structure of export and import, and the development programmes.

Since values have been divided into three categories, economic values, power values and respect values, generation of all three kinds of values will be considered. However, emphasis will be given to economic values, since these can be seen as a base or instrumental values for the attainment of ather values.[87]

Activities of the Gambian government in the economic sphere can be said to have passed through five phases after the second world war. The first phase occurred during the years 1945-1951 and was characterized by a heavy dependence on the income from groundnuts and taxes on it. During the second phase, which lasted from 1952 to 1958 when the public service expanded. All funds that had been created earlier were spent during the third phase from 1958 to 1962 due to a more active policy. During the first half of the 1960s (the fourth phase), loans and grants from Great Britain were of crucial importance for the current government budgets.[88]

87) For the distinction between goal values and base values, see, for instance, Lasswell & Kaplan 1950, pp 83 ff.
88) The Gambia 1962/63 p 29.

The fifth phase started in 1967, when the current budgets sometimes were balanced and the current expenditures were covered without foreign assistance.[89)]

Direct taxes do not play an important role in the revenue of the government, but indirect taxes in the form of import duties constitute about half of the income. The percentage distribution of the principal income is shown in the table below.

	1970/71	1971/72	1972/73 (estim.)
Direct taxes	5	9	14
Indirect taxes	46	54	59
Licences, duties etc	4	4	6
Earning of gov:tal dept:s	11	16	6
Others	33	16	15
Total (dalasis)	26.600.075	21.438.810	19.651.630

TABLE III:2:E: The percentage distribution of principal government income 1970-1973. Source: Estimates 1972/73, p (v).

The generative capability will also be indicated by the relation between export and import. During the 1960s external trade was a great problem to the Gambian government; the value of import surmounted that of export. Groundnuts and their products contributed between 85 and 95 % to the value of the export, but since the crops varied strongly with weather conditions, the value of the export was very difficult to estimate.

The value of the import has augmented more rapidly than that of export. The figures of external trade in the late 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s are presented below.

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89) G N B 1970: 4th of July and Estimates 1972/73, p 108.

	EXPORTS 000 dalasis	Value of % GROUNDNUTS	IMPORTS 000 dalasis
1965/66	25.700	94	28.970
1966/67	31.565	93	35.625
1967/68	26.825	..	22.600
1968/69	36.905	..	46.660
1969/70	.....	..	.....
1970/71	29.900	96	42.600

TABLE III:2:F: Exports and imports during the late 1960s and the early 1970s. Data for 1969/70 are not available. Sources: Sessional Paper No 6 of 1966, The Gambia 1966/67 and Estimates 1972/73.

The quantity of exports decreased by 16 % from 1965/66 to 1970/71 while the quantity of imports increased by 21 %.[90)]

Thus, the capability of the Gambian political elite to generate economic values has been weakened, if we judge it on the basis of external trade.

Up to 60 % of the second development programme (1967-1971) was financed by loans from Great Britain, the rest of it by loans from various other countries. However, the programme was not completely realized but a project estimated at 2.500.000 dalasis was carried over to the third programme. The latest plans, therefore, contain new projects estimated at 18.500.000 dalasis.[91)] When the latest programme was announced, it was planned to be financed by sources from the following countries and institutions: United Kingdom 54 %, I D A 32 %, local funds 12 %, and sources not yet known 2 %.[92)]

The gross domestic product of the country grew 5 % annually from 1965/66 to 1970/71, while the GDP per capita rose by 14 % during that period. However, there are no sources available indicating the distribution of the G D P.[93)]

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90) Estimates1972/73, p 101.
91) Sessional Paper No 2 of 1971, p 8.
92) Ibid p 19.
93) Estimates 1972/73, p 101.

In summarizing the account for the generative capability of the Gambian political elite, then, we can say the following. The capability to create new values within the country seems to have been weaker than earlier in relation to the needs and demands.

The capability of the political elite to generate power and respect values is dependent on the capability to produce economic values. Here the two former kinds of values will be isolated from the latter and participation in formal political institutions and education will be taken as indices on power values and respect values respectively.[94)]

There is general suffrage in the Gambia, but since majority representation is practised, the votes do not have equal weight. This was particularly demonstrated in the 1972 elections, in which independent candidates received about 20 % of the votes but only one mandat (3 % of the elected MP's). On these grounds, there is reason to assume that many people in the Gambia feel that their voice is not heard.

Furthermore, many who want to be MP's members of political committees, and so on have no possibility of fulfilling their expectations.[95)] So, also in the case of generation of power values, the capability of the Gambian political elite is not strong enough to fulfill the needs and, perhaps, demands.

What, then, about education as a respect value? During the first half of the 20th century mainly Wollofs and Akus in Banjul received education, although there were few mission schools in the protectorate.[96)] Education, health service and social security were the most backward sectors in the Gambian society during the colonial period.[97)] At the end of the 1950s, the colonial power started investing in education, but when the Gambia became formally independent in 1965, only 3 % of the adult population had been to school.

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94) It is a simplification to use only participation in formal political institutions and education as indices on power values and respect values respectively. In the latter category of values could be included, for instance, housing standard, health etc. An account for the situation of the workers and the farmers in the samples is given on pp 94-125.
95) See pp 141-142.
96) Gailey 1964, pp 136 ff, and 180 ff.
97) Ibid pp 175 ff.

The number of school children has increased since then but the total amount of children has augmented at a faster rate; that is, the portion of children in school has not grown only slightly during the latest years, which can be seen from the table below.

	GAMBIA	BANJUL	KOMBO	WESTERN DIV.	LOWER RIVER DIV.	MACCARTHY ISLAND DIV.	UPPER RIVER DIV.
1964	11.504 (15.2)	3.723 (59.3)	1.342 (52.2)	2.249 (17.3)	2.067 (8.9)	1.429 (9.0)	694 (4.8)
1968	16.230 (20.2)	4.479 (66.1)	1.863 (69.6)	3.765 (27.8)	3.575 (14.6)	1.710 (10.2)	838 (5.4)
1972	17.463 (20.1)	4.754 (62.3)	2.152 (74.3)	4.226 (22.0)	3.553 (13.5)	1.886 (10.3)	928 (4.7)

TABLE III:2:G: The number of school attendents and their proc portion to the total number of children in the Gambia and its divisons. The percentage figures are based on the number of children between the ages of 5 and 14 years. 1963 is taken as the base year and it is estimated that the number of children has increased by 3 % anually in Banjul and by 2 % in the rest of the country. Sources: Census of Population 1963, The Gambia 1964/65, the Gambia 1966/67 and Education Department: Annual Report and Statistics 1971/72.

In conclusion of the description of the generative capability it can be said that this capability has been weaker in some cases and stronger in others. If the increase of the population is taken into consideration, we have to conclude,however, that the generative capability has weakened.

What about the structural changes affecting the generative capability? Here I cannot give anything but an intuitive sketch, since data necessary for a complete analysis are not available.

Economically the Gambia has been firmly tied to the international arena, a fact that decreases the ability of the political elite to act independently from the decision-making bodies within and outside the country. From vertical perspectives, the structures have changed in a hierarchical direction, while, from horizontal perspectives, they have become more differentiated than earlier.

The formal political structures have not changed very much. There has been a slight tendency toward hierarchy and diffe-

rentiation but the changes have lessened the possibility for the workers and the farmers to exert influence on national politics.

3.2.2.2 Distributive Capability.

Two aspects can be considered in the context of the distributive capability: (1) a simple allocation of values which have been generated recently, and (2) transfer of existing or newly produced values from one group or class to another. In the former case, values can be distributed equally or unequally. If the structures are hierarchical and a new amount of values is generated, it tends to be unequally distributed. In the second case, it is implied that values are being taken from one group or class and transferred to another. The people from whom values have been taken will, in the short run, experience deprivation and other groups will, if the process continues, heighten their expectations.[98)]

Structural change (regardless of the degree of differentiation) implies, by definition, that values are transferred from one group or class to another. Such a change affects not only the degree of deprivation, but also the belief patterns.[99)]

Here government expenditures and the sectors implied in development plans are taken as empirical indices on the distributive capability. However, it should be emphasized, that some indices used on the generative capability can partly be taken as measures also on the distributive capability. This is, for instance, the case when we discuss health service, education and so on.

During the 1960s, the procurement of communications, education and health were the most important sectors in government expenditures. The percentage distribution of the expenditures for three selected years is shown in the table below.

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98) Gurr 1970, pp 46 ff.
99) Berger & Luckmann 1971, pp 70 ff and 183 ff.

	1961	1965/66	1971/72
Non-ministerial	3	4	5
Police and prisons	9	8	8
Ministry of finance	21	21	24
Ministry for Local gov:t	5	5	4
Ministry of Agriculture	5	5	11
Ministry of Work, Communications	33	29	18
Ministry of Education	10	11	14
Ministry of Health	10	11	9
Others	5	6	7
	101 %	100 %	100 %
Total amount, dalasis	10.775.000	16.300.000	21.438.810

TABLE III:2:H: The percentage distribution of government expenditures in three selected years, 1961, 1965/66 and 1971/72. Sources: Sessional Paper No 6 of 1966, The Gambia 1966/67 and Estimates on Recurrent Revenues and Expenditures. It should be noticed that some of the functions of Ministry of Work and Communication were taken over by other ministries in the late 1960s.

The cost of administration increased during the earlier 60's and came to constitute a growing part of the expenditure. Special departments for different functions were established, and the government started - particularly from the middle 1960's, a more active policy.[100)]

The expenditures of agriculture and education have increased on the part of works and communication. In concrete terms, it shows that the political elite has made efforts to improve the situation of the farmers and to facilitate the transport of groundnuts. It also reveals that emphasize has been made on education. However, the standard of living and the extent of education is unequally distributed in the country (see pp 68,77). Although the table does not give exact information about the proportion of government expenditures spent on wages of the workers employed by the government, we can see the trend: they receive less than earlier in relation to what is spent on other sectors.

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100) Sessional Papers No 7 of 1965, No 6 of 1966, No 9 of 1967, No 1 of 1971 and No 2 of 1972.

The second measure on the distributive capability of the Gambian political elite is the allocation made in development plans. In the first development programme (1964-1967) the government emphasized the expansion and modernization of communications and education. The export of groundnuts has many times been delayed or, from some regions, occasionally impossible due to the limited and insufficient communication net.[101] The government has made efforts to solve this problem by bitumizing certain roads and building new ones.[102]

During the colonial days only a few people in the countryside were able to receive any education; and only 15 percent of the school-age children were literate.[103] In accordance with the first development programme a number of schools were built in the villages.

Also in the two next development plans the communications were given high priority. The plans and the percentage distribution of different sectors is presented below.

	1967--1971		1971/72--1973/74	
	Dalasis	%	Dalasis	%
Agriculture	3.250.000	13	4.430.000	21
Communications	11.000.000	44	10.600.000	51
Utilities	2.800.000	12	1.570.000	8
Education and social welfare	2.000.000	8	1.195.000	7
Health	750.000	3	970.000	5
Tourist development	300.000	1	(1)	
Other sectors	4.000.000	17	9.235.000	10
TOTAL AMOUNT	24.100.000		21.000.000	

TABLE III:2:I: The development programmes 1967--1971 and 1971/72--1973/74.(1) The cost of tourist development is not specified in the development programme for 1971/72--1973/74.
Source: Sessional Paper No 2 of 1971.

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101) See, for instance, Hasswell 1963, concerning the problem of communication in a village depending on production of groundnuts.
102) The Gambia 1964/65, pp 7 ff.
103) Ibid and Census of Population 1963.

At the end of the 1960's, the government attempted to improve agriculture. A number of mixed farming centers were established. There the peasants can participate in courses in modern cultivation techniques, especially ox-ploughing and use of fertilizers. This policy has been combined with economic assistance in the form of loans for buying oxen and ploughs.

The cultivation of rice has been extended, and the experiments in cultivating rice have started in the Upper River Division, where the conditions are believed to be favourable.[104)]

In the latest development programmes the government invests still more in itensification and differentiation of farming. The farmers are taught to use fertilizers in order to increase the production per cultivated areas. It is also the intention of the government to encourage cultivation of crops other than groundnuts.

The communication net will be still more improved but the heaviest oosts lie in modernization of the port in Banjul and the airport outside the capital.[105)]

From the description above, the conclusion can be drawn that the Gambian political elite has a distributive capability of the first kind mentioned on page 78; there is a simple allocation of values which have been generated recently. Transfer of existing values from one area to another or from one group or class to another has not been emphasized.

However, the investments in infrastructures and agriculture will have long term effects which can not be predicted from the data used here.

3.2.2.3 Convertive Capability.

Four aspects of the convertive capability will be mentioned, namely (1) conversion of one category of values to another, (2) conversion of input to output, (3) change of the content of the value categories, and (4) change of the structures.

104) Information from Agriculture Department, May 1972.
105) Sessional Paper No 2 of 1971 p 14.

Conversion of one category of values to another means, for instance, that economic values are converted into power values. There are many cases in which money and economic power is changed to political power; one is the use of bribery to gain political advantages.[106] However, this kind of conversion will not be dealt with here, since data necessary for such an analysis are not available.

Conversion of input into output in general has great relevancy in an analysis of the present kind. On one hand, we can investigate what happens to the support when there are variations in output, and on the other, it is important to ascertain how demands are converted into output. It can be assumed that variations in output will affect not only the degree of deprivation that various groups feel but also the kind and amount of demands. The degree of deprivation will be analyzed in another part of the present work (see pp 130ff). Here some comments will be made on the relationship between support and output on one hand and demand and output on the other. Thereafter, the content of the value categories and structural changes and their effects on the demands and supports will be sketched.

The support to the political elite can be divided into economic support (tax paying, fees to the ruling party etc), power support (voting for the ruling party) and respect support (legitimacy).[107] Here, only some general patterns will be considered. A more detailed analysis of the relationship between support and output will be made when I deal more specifically with the two populations which have been interviewed.

It is difficult to ascertain the economic support in the form of tax paying for two reasons: (1) most of the farmers and many of the workers do not earn a taxable income,[108] and

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106) Bailey 1971, pp 463 ff in Etzioni, ed, 1971.

107) There are at least two dimensions in legitimacy. The fact that people behave in a manner that is regarded as positive by the government can be a result of either compliance or approval. Compliance can be enforced with sufficient power, while approval cannot. See Blau 1964, pp 200 ff. Collective approval is legitimate leadership.

108) A yearly income from 750 dalasis and upwards is a taxable income. Recently the government also decided to tax the income above 500 dalasis if the person is married and his wife/her husband earns 500 dalasis or more per annum. See Estimates 1972, p 114.

(2) direct taxes constitue only a small part of the taxes paid to the national government.[109)]

However, government sources show that 90 % of the taxes were collected during the late 60's.[110)] It should be mentionned that it is difficult for people in the countryside to evade taxation since the Alkali in each village has the function of collecting the tax, and he knows most of the people in his village.

According to a leading functionary of the P P P, the party has no difficulties in collecting the fees from its members. Most of the adult farmers are members of the P P P.[111)] The economic support from the farmers seems to be a result not so much of material (economic) output as of non-material. The charismatic leadership of the president seems to make the farmers support the government.[112)]

What has been said concerning membership in the P P P also applies to power support in the form of voting for the ruling party. The distribution of the output among different constituencies does not seem to have any relationship to the percentage of voters supporting the P P P. Those constituencies receiving most and those receiving least from government activities do not differ in percentage distribution of voters supporting P P P.[113)]

It is still more difficult to ascertain the relationship between output and legitimacy, since the latter term refers

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109) See Estimates 1972, p (v).
110) Sessional Paper No 1 of 1971.
111) M'Boge 1972.
112) There is no difference in tax paying or membership in the P P P between areas receiving most attention in development programmes and government expenditures and those receiving least. For the expenditures, see The Gambia 1962 and 1963, p 52, The Gambia 1964 and 1965, pp 18-21, and 44-52, and the Gambia 1966 and 1967, pp 38-40. For the voting figures, see G N B 28th of May 1966, G N B ... No 32 1972, and The Gambia 1962 and 1963, p 103.

The findings mentioned seem to contradict the argument of Deutsch that support in a rapidly changing political system is a function of output more than anyting else. See Deutsch 1966, pp 251-252.
113) See footnote 112.

to a phenomenon which cannot be analysed directly without measuring the beliefs of the people. Therefore, voting for P P P and membership in this party can be taken as indirect indices on legitimacy for the political elite. However, a detailed analysis of the workers' and farmers' support for the political objects will be made in another part of the present work.

Next I will attempt to find out whether output of the political elite is related to the demands of various groups and classes in the Gambian society. A more detailed analysis will be made in another part, but here some general characteristics will be commented upon. Demands for the three categories of values will be studied in relation to output.

Hitherto, no organized, patterned demands have been raised by the farmers. It applies to all three categories of values. A reason for this lack of demands must not be taken as an indication of satisfied needs. Rather, insufficiency of channels through which the demands can be manifested seem to account for the low frequency of demands raised.

The workers have made their economic demands through the trade unions, mainly the Gambia Workers' Union. The government has responded to these demands through various measures: increase in wages, price-control and threat of sanctions against strikers.[114)]

Low educated workers seem to feel that their demands for power values are nearly satisfied, while high educated workers in the capital obviously are discontent with their power position.[115)] Respect (to a high degree a function of income and education in the capital and the same factors plus kinship group in the village) seems to be demanded more than it is distributed in the case of the workers.[116)]

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114) See pp 104-105.
115) See pp 141-142.
116) If we use education and occupation is indices on respect, the following can be said. It is assumed that all workers in the capital want to send their children to school, but according to statistics, 62 % of the school-age children in the capital received primary education in 1972. Furthermore, if satisfication with the present occupa-

How the demands from other elite groups to the political elite are made and how the latter responds to these demands is not possible to analyze from data gathered in the present work. However, some comments will be made upon this when the communicative capability of the political elite is analyzed.

Change of values in the three categories and the effects of structural change on these values will be dealt with in the analysis of the two populations sampled.

3.2.2.4 Regulative Capability.

The manner in which values are distributed and allocated is dependent on the social structures, but political and other elite groups tend to generate beliefs that sanction and legitimatize[a/] certain distribution.[117)] If elite groups are interested in preserving structures and the criteria according to which values are allocated, new ways of exchanging and distributing values will be counteracted or controlled. However, elites themselves can make efforts to change structures, and, hence, the ways in which values are distributed.[118)]

The scheme below can be taken as a point of departure for a sketchy desciption of the regulative capability of the Gambian political elite:

FROM ABOVE			FROM BELOW			
			STRUCTURES		BELIEFS	
			CHANGE	PRESERVE	CHANGE	PRESERVE
ELITE ACTION	STRUCTURES	CHANGE	1	2	3	4
		PRESERVE	5	6	7	8
	BELIEFS	CHANGE	9	10	11	12
		PRESERVE	13	14	15	16

tion is taken as an indication of satisfaction with the respect received, the workers in the sample do not receive the amount of respect they feel entitled to 54 % of the workers and 76 % of the farmers in the samples are content with their occupation

Only those patterns that have emerged in the Gambia will be commented upon. However, before this is done, a short description of the scheme is in order. Efforts/beliefs among the masses are placed on the horizontal axis and those of the political elite on the vertical. The initiation of a structural change or change in beliefs can come from the masses or from the political elite. The scheme is a simplification first and foremost in that it does not differentiate between groups and classes among the masses. Furthermore it does not take notice of actions that do not intend or imply structural change; but are counterattacked and controlled by the political elite.[119] Such actions are omitted from the scheme.
(1/2): In the beginning of the 1960's, the P P P attempted to change the structures in the countryside. When these attempts were obstructed by the Seyfolus and Alkalis, the reforms halted although most likely they were supported by the farmers. The traditional groups maintained their positions.[120]

Among the farmers in the countryside there seems to be a demand for certain structural changes (see pp 141-143),but these are not worked out by the political elite (7,15 in the scheme). The same applies in the case of the workers.

In the beginning of the 1960's, attempts were also made to mobilize the farmers for structural changes in the agricultural section, and education facilities were created, but since then the religious schools have been strengthened anew even though investment in education is given priority in the development programmes (from 11-12 to 15-16 in the scheme).

In beliefs are also implied expectations and perception of one's own value base and changes of this base. Hence, factors

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117) Bachrach & Baratz 1972, p 55 and Berg 1971, p 232-235.
118) Nettl 1968, makes a distinction between stalagmite and stalagtite mobilization, and his discussion can be directly applied to the present context.
119) Deviant behavior like criminality is most often not intended to create structural change. Neither does it change any structures. See Merton 1968, pp 193 ff.
120) Gailey 1964, pp 135 ff, 190 and 199 ff and Worre 1971, pp 5 and 11.

influencing demands and expectations can be taken as indications on the regulative capability. These will, however, be considered when the communicative capability is being analyzed. Another facfor that can be regarded as an indication of regulative capability is the coercive force (police and military).[121] In table "police and prison" has been singled out as a special item in order to illustrate the visibility of the coercive force of the Gambian political elite. The proportion of government expenditure on police and field force is considerably lower in the Gambka than in many other West African countries. It can be added that there is, on the average, one military per 1.000 inhabitants in the Gambia, a number identical to that of several other West African countries.[122]

3.2.2.5 The Communicative Capability.

The communicative capability has two aspects, namely (1) the content of communication, and (2) the capabity of the channels of communication.[123] Both underly all other capabilities. The first is implied when we analyze demands and supports, which have been made in a previous part of this chapter.

When generative, convertive and distributive capabilities are weak, the communicative capability can be of great importance to the political elite. It can be used for long term as well as short term symbolic output. This is a substitute for substantial output. Long term symbolic output implies production of beliefs that legitimate existing structures and distribu-

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121) See Gurr 1970, pp 232-233.
122) It is assumed that the political elite has the latent as well as the manifest support of the military forces. Furthermore, in the case of the Gambia it is assumed that the number of military personnel in the country amounted to 350 in 1966. In Ghana there were 2 soldiers per 1.000 inhabitants in 1966, in Guinea 2, in Liberia 3 and in Nigeria 3. The figures are based on data presented in Post 1968, pp 141 and 196.
123) Deutsch 1966:I, pp 82 ff.

tion of values, while short term symbolic output affect expectations and degree of deprivation directly. Such output includes threat and promises. Threat functions to decrease the level of expectation and promises function as substitute to material output, and the latter tend the create higher expectations. Like threats, promises, can not be used in the long run without complementary utilization of actual value distribution or regulation through the use of physical force.[124]

The content of the communication between the masses and the political elite in the Gambia has been touched upon in previous parts of the present chapter (see pp 83-85). More will also be said on this when the situation of the people in the two samples is considered.

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124) On the credibility of threats and promises, see, for instance, Schelling 1963, pp 177 and passim.

4 THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK II: THE CONFLICT POTENTIAL

4.1 Conflict, Conflict Behavior and Conflict Beliefs

It has been described above how social and political change (change in structures or beliefs or both) can produce new conflicts and intensify and politicize already existing cleavages in a system. [1] Here the factors related to conflict, conflict behavior and a positive evaluation of violence as a means to improve one's own social situation will be dealt with.

There are two kinds of conflict: (1) value conflict, and (2) structural conflict. [2] The former concerns the quantity and quality of values and arises from a situation of scarcity of values; more values are demanded than are available at the time, and those demanding values perceive some group, class or structure as preventing them from receiving what they feel entitled to and act in order to receive the amount of values demanded.

Structural conflicts have their base in opposite evaluations of the relations between groups or classes. One example is a conflict between an elite group and the masses or some class in the latter. Structural conflicts imply that somebody makes effort to change the relations between individuals, groups or classes while somebody else act in order to defend and preserve the status quo.

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1. Deutsch 1961, p 501, Cabral 1969, pp 17 ff, Huntington 1968, pp 36 and passim, Mair 1963, pp 28 ff and 127 ff, Balandier 1965, p 42 in van Berghe, ed 1965, Smelser 1962, passim.
2. Usually a value conflict is termed conflict over values or goals and a structural conflict is termed conflict of interests, see, for instance, Aubert 1963, p 27 and Dencik 1972. Moreover, Coser makes a distinction between realistic and non-realistic conflicts. The former includes conflicts which are based on specific demands and are directed against the source of the conflict and serve as a me ns to fulfill the demands. Non-realistic conflicts function as psychological "tension-releasers", see Coser 1967:I, pp 90 ff. Dencik differentiates conflicts which have a structural base from those which have not, see Dencik 1972. Since we are interested in beliefs about violence and conflict behavior regardless of the aim of the actor, distinctions such as the above mentioned are not necessary here.

Factors connected with or underlying these two kinds of conflicts are termed a conflict potential, CP. The CP comprises the following five factors which will be defined later on: structural contradictions, absolute deprivation, relative deprivation, value inconsistency and contradictory beliefs. As soon as some or all of the factors in the CP are perceived by large groups or classes in the system and they find obstacles to their abolishment, there is a conflict. Individual conflict conditions which have been communicated are social and political conflicts.

The CP varies in scope and intensity. By scope I mean the number of individuals involved and by intensity I mean the degree of presence of each factor, particularly the structural factor.

As has been said above, the CP comprises five factors. It is not necessary that they exist simultaneously, but some of them do, in which case they reinforce each other. Empirically, they are combined, and it is difficult to separate them from each other.

The relation between the two kinds of conflict mentioned, the conflict potential and the capabilities of the political elite is illustrated below:


CAPABILITY
COMPONENT OF CP
KIND OF CONFLICT
GENERATIVE
DISTRIBUTIVE
CONVERTIVE
REGULATIVE
COMMUNICATIVE
ABSOLUTE DEPRIVATION
RELATIVE DEPRIVATION
VALUE INCONSISTENCY
CONTRADICTORY BELIEFS
STRUCTURAL CONTRADICTIONS
VALUE CONFLICT
STRUCTURAL CONFLICT

The generative capability affects the degree of absolute deprivation as well as that of relative deprivation: production of a new and larger amount of values in the system creates, cétéris paribus, higher expectations.

The distributive capability has a direct bearing upon AD, RD, VI and contradictory beliefs. In the latter case it is a long term process. For instance, a feeling of being deprived tend, in the long run, to create beliefs contradictory to those of the elite groups.

All the four components mentioned are affected by the convertive capability of the political elite. The same applies to the regulative and communicative capabilities.

In the long run, all capabilities might reinforce or weaken the structural contradictions; if the structures are changed, the degree of structural contradiction is affected.

Absolute deprivation tends to produce value conflicts. The same applies to relative deprivation, value inconsistency and contradictory beliefs. Furthermore, value inconsistency, contradictory beliefs and structural contradictions might give rize to structural conflicts.

Structural conflicts do usually imply value conflicts; the reverse is possible in the long run but it is not assumed to have the same degree of probability.

4.2 Social Structures and General Background of the two Populations Sampled

In the present work the following characteristics are regarded as structural contradictions (which constitute the first factor in the CP):

(1) structures which prevent the generation of the amount and kinds of values demanded or needed [3] tend to produce value conflicts, and are, therefore, contradictory to the fulfillment of the demands/needs, [4]
(2) structures which institutionalize an unequal distribution of values are contradictory in the same manner as the structures mentioned above,[5]
(3) structures which are negatively evaluated in some belief patterns are contradictory to these beliefs.

The actions (if any) that a political elite selects in order to handle structural contradictions depend on the kind of contradictions, the beliefs pattern of the masses and the beliefs of the elite itself.

In order to prevent the deprivation of groups or classes with a low position in an inegalitarian structure, the elite groups can
(a) produce beliefs that decrease the level of expectation,
(b) increase the total amount of values but preserve the structures,
(c) change the distribution of values, or
(d) change the structures. [6]

In the first three cases mentioned, the individuals keep their positions in the structure, while in the latter the positions and the relations between them are changed. Structural contradictions of the types referred to in points (1) and (2) could

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3. A distinction has to be made between needs, expectations and demands. Needs can be defined from an objective level (the amount of protein, the amount of calories etc that are necessary to ensure life and health), or from a subjective level, in which case the individual´s own feelings are the base. Expectations are defined on page 126. Demands are expectations or needs or both that are communicated from one individual, group or class to another, particularly to the political elite.
4. Which structures are contradictory to the demands or needs can either be postulated a priori or made an objective of an empirical investigation.
5. See, for instance, Russet 1964.
6. There can be a fifth case in which the individuals are deprived of all the values they have (even their lives) so that their demands are neutralized or erased.

be, but are not automatically, neutralized when the structures become differentiated.[7]

Now that the structures have been presented analytically, the framework will be applied to the empirical world of the workers in Banjul and the peasants in Kerewan.

4.2.1 The Workers of the Gambia Workers´ Union

Workers with membership in a trade union were selected for investigation for two reasons: (1) they are expected to be more aware of their social situation than others, and, hence, more conscious of conflict conditions,[8] and (2) it was difficult to find any other way of receiving a sample representative of a certain group of workers.

Gambian trade unionism is unique in many aspects when compared with that of other African countries; it is rather effective and it is, to a great extent, autonomous in relation to the political parties.[9]

However, before I touch upon the contemporary situation of the Gambia Workers´ Union and its members the historical background will be sketched. During the 1920´s and 1930´s, the permanent labour force in relation to the total population in the Gambia was less than in any of the other West African countries.

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7. The distribution of values depends on structures, institutions and prevailing beliefs. According to Smelser, the distribution and redistribution of values are dependent on the social structure and social mobility. Smelser argues that the distribution of values can be changed in the following principal ways: (1) values are brought to fixed personell in fixed positions, (2) personell is brought to values, and here there are three possibilities (a) movement of individuals, (b) movement of strata or collectivities, and (c) movement of structures, see Smelser 1966, p 7, in Smelser & Lipset, eds, 1966. Structural differentiation results in 1 and 2 a, b but not necessarily in 2 c.
8. Cabral 1969, pp 17-18, 24, Mondlane 1969, pp 89 ff and Suffrin 1964, pp 6 ff.
9. See Davies 1964, passim, and Millen 1966, pp 13 ff.

Furthermore, there have always been strong seasonal variations in the labour force, and these variations were larger before than during and after the Second World War.[10]

Despite this small potential for recruitment of members and despite the seasonal variations, E F Small succeeded in organizing a dock strike in 1929, the first in the history of the Gambia. From the forces participating in the strike, Bathurst Trade Union was created, which in 1935 changed name and reorganized. From that year, it was called Gambia Labour Union.

During the 1930´s, trade unionism was of little importance in the Gambia, and in 1939, the colonial authorities established a Labour Office.[11] In the absence of effective trade unions, the office came to fulfill the functions which workers´ organizations took care of in other African countries. The Labour Office regulated the wages and the relations between employers and employees.[12]

The boundaries between the Gambia and Senegal were closed during the war, and the labour force that was needed by the Gambian companies and colonial authorities had to be recruited from the Gambian population itself. A War Department was established in order to meet the new demands of the colonial power. Eventually this department had about 20,000 employees, mainly Gambian farmers who were recruited from the countryside.[13]

After the war many of the functions of the War Department disappeared, and the need of labour, thereby, decreased considerably. Most of the newly recruited farmers had to return to agriculture. The new colonial policy announced before the War was not put into practice, and consequently no new employment opportunities were opened.[14]

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10. Allen 1970, pp 393 ff.
11. Allen 1970, pp 405 ff.
12. Ibid., 406 ff.
13. Ibid., 398 ff.
14. Gailey 1964, p 172 ff.

The 1950´s, thus, started with a decrease in the number of wage earners, but at the end of this decade the number of permanent workers increased anew. This was mainly a result of the changes that the colonial power had announced at the end of the 1930´s, and that now were applied. The Public Works´ Department was established at the end of the 1940´s and was given extended functions. [15]

The emergence of stronger and more effective labour unions at the end of the 1950´s has to be considered in the light of at least three factors, namely (1) a larger permanent labour force than earlier, (2) smaller seasonal variations than earlier, and (3) extended urbanization and an increasing political interest and stronger demands for independence.

The result of the actions worked out by M E Jallow, a young government employee, must be studied with these three factors in mind. In addition to these long-term factors, it should be mentioned that the cost of living had increased while the wages had been held at a constant level. [16] Without these factors, Jallow would, probably, not have been able to raise Gambia Workers´ Union (G W U) to the position it reached in the early 1960´s. (The union was registered in 1958.)

The Gambia Labour Union, which had been the only trade union until then, was ineffective in that it was unable to, and made no effort to, procure higher wages for the workers and that it had a very small membership. [17] Furthermore, the leaders of G L U did not try to create any changes in the relations between the workers and the employers. [18]

When it became clear that G W U and G L U were ready to act independently of each other, efforts were made to unite the two trade unions. I C F T U tried in 1958, and one year later a

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15. Gailey 1964, pp 168 ff.
16. Allen 1970, p 416.
17. Ibid., pp 410 ff.
18. Ibid., pp 412 ff.

Ghanian trade unionist visited the country in order to unite the unions. However, the leaders of G L U found the ideas of Jallow too radical, and trade unionism in The Gambia, therefore, remained divided. [19]

The G W U came to play a more active role not only in the recruitment of members but also in negotiations than the G L U had done. The new trade union received support not only in the Banjul area but also at up-river work places. Jallow and other leading members of the G W U did not regard higher wages for the workers as the only goal; they sought a means to accelerate to the process of liberation from the British colonialism and imperialism. [20]

In February 1960, the wages had been kept at a constant level since 1956, while the cost of living was considerably higher than before. The G W U leaders found that it was the right time for acting: it was at the peak of the period for transportation of groundnuts. It urged the workers at the transport stations up-river to strike. The response from the workers came rapidly: most of the employees at larger work places went on strike. The employers retaliated with a total lock-out. [21] They also employed non-affiliated workers to replace the strikers. The leaders of the G W U found that they could not de-escalate the conflict if the union was to survive, so they announced a general strike. Most of the members, and also many non-members, participated in the strike. [22]

The employers and the colonial authorities (there was, of course, to an extent some overlap between these two groups) were now willing to negotiate and to listen to the demands for higher wages. A committee was established in order to investigate the

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19. Ibid., pp 414 ff.
20. Jallow 1972.
21. Gambia Department of Labour: Register of Trade Disputes 1961, and Sosseh 1972:I.
22. Jallow 1972.

social and economic conditions of the workers and the possibility of creating a machinery for negotiations. [23] The strike, thus, had far-reaching consequences: a Port Labour Board for negotiations between the government and dock workers was established, and work place committees (representing the trade unions) were created at the larger work places and four Joint Industrial Councils for negotiations were established. The establishment of these councils was recommended by the commission as a result of its investigations. It also proposed that the daily wages of three shillings, which had been accepted as the minimum since the middle of the 1950´s, should be raised to five shillings. [24]

The G W U now made new demands. The leaders of the union considered it reasonable that at married worker needed at least 9.4 a day to keep up with the current cost of living. The management disagreed and during the negotiations no proposals were offered that satisfied Jallow and his co-workers. The union had increased in membership, and bearing this in mind, the leaders urged the workers to strike again. [25]

The greatest strike in the Gambian history broke out. 3,000 workers participated and more than 16,000 man-days were lost. The trade union leaders waited for an answer from the employers, but time went on and there was no response from the employers. The streets in Banjul were crowded by demonstrators on strike. One group broke into the Marine Department, where the workers did not participate in the strike. There was a clash between police and workers. [26] The colonial authorities sent for a military police force from Sierra Leone to restore order. Jallow was arrested at a J I C meeting, but he succeded in escaping after having persuaded a prison-warder to strike. On the fifth day of the strike, the colonial government proposed an increase in the minimum daily salary to 8 sh. G W U accepted and the agreement was later confirmed in J I C. [27]

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23. Sessional Paper No 2 of 1961, pp 7 ff.
24. Sessional Paper No 4 of 1964, pp 3 ff.
25. Jallow 1972.
26. Allen 1970, pp 415 ff.
27. Allen 1970, p 419.

The general strike came to have effects not only on the G W U itself but also on the political situation in the Gambia. The number of members of the G W U increased rapidly, and the union received economic support from international labour organizations.[28] The G W U also came to be the principal labour party in negotiations during the 1960´s. At every J I C meeting, the labour party was represented by one or two G W U functionaries. Beside the two larger political parties, the P P P and the U P, the trade union became a third political force in the Gambia. Thus, Jallow participated in the conference where constitutional changes and formal independence were discussed. [29]

The position of the G W U made the political parties compete for its support. This situation seems to have prevented either of the two parties from monopolizing the power of G W U. Until 1962, when P S N´Jie, the leader of U P, was a Chief Minister, the P P P encouraged membership in the G W U, but when the P P P had taken over the most important posts in the government, the party tried to neutralize the actions of the G W U. [30] Since most of the G W U members were employed by the government, every action from the trade union was regarded as a political action directed against the government, a tendency which was common in many African and Asian countries. [31]

Since none of the political parties was able to chanalize or deemphasize the influence of the G W U, they tried instead to infiltrate the two largest unions, the G W U and the G L U by placing sympathizers within the top levels of the unions. The P P P succeeded in making the G L U leaders support the party, while the G W U managed to remain autonomous.[32] Furthermore, the poli-

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28. Ibid., and Sosseh 1972:I. According to Allen, G W U had 1.570 members in 1961, but Sosseh argues that the number of members (including registered supporters) was 8.000 in this year.
29. Republic of the Gambia 1972, p 14.
30. Allen 1970, pp 418 ff and Jallow 1972.
31. Millen 1964, pp 56 ff.
32. According to J C Faye, the leader of G L U in 1972, the top-level members of this union voted for P P P in 1966 and said that they intended to do so in 1972. The interview was made shortly before the 1972 elections.

tical parties founded their own trade unions, whose leaders were loyal to and affiliated with the parties respectively and had leading positions in them. National Farmers´ and Gambia Workers´ Union (N F G W U), founded in 1964, was supported by P P P. Two years later, Gambia National Union (G N U) was established with the support of the U P.[33] The foundation of G N U seems to have been a direct response to the political actions of the G W U.Jallow ran in the 1966 elections as an independent candidate in the same constituency as the leader of U P.[34]

The participation of Jallow in the elections resulted in discontent among those G W U members who supported the U P and the P P P. This participation and the fact that trade union issues had been neglected since 1961 (the cost of living had increased while G W U had not demanded any J I C meeting for discussing the wages) resulted in the loss of hundreds of members.[35] The union also lost its international support from 1965 and for some years onwards.[36]

Before continuing the description of the economic changes in the Banjul area, it would be fruitful to consider the structures and the government activities during the first half of the 1960´s from an analytical perspective. Generally it can be said that the structures had become more differentiated and hierarchical during these years. The government had become able controlling more work places than earlier. Foreign companies had not yet become interested in the area, only a few smaller plants had been established.[37] The number of available jobs

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33. Allen 1970, pp 422 ff and John 1972.
34. According to John 1972. John had been a leading member of the G W U but left the union and was one of the founders of the G N U in 1966 and 1972 he canvassed for the UP. Jallow expected that U P would nominate him as a candidate in 1966, but when this did not happen, he canvassed as an independent. Jallow 1972, did, however, deny that this was the case. "I wanted to demonstrate that the G W U was independent from any political party", he said. In the elections in 1966, N´Jie received 2,449 votes, the P P P candidate 688 and Jallow 115, see G N B 1966: 28th of May.
35. It has not been possible to estimate how many members left G W U for political reasons and joined other unions, see Allen 1970, p 422.
36. Allen 1970, pp 418 ff.
37. The Gambia 1964 and 1965, p 9 and Sessional Paper no 3 of 1964, p 22.

did not increase except at the medium and upper levels in government administration. The increase of income was concentrated to fewer people than before, due to the fact that the high income groups increased their income more than lower income groups. [38]

Government resources increased, since the revenues from taxes were higher than earlier, although the income tax from companies was only slightly higher in 1965 than some years earlier. [39] Also the wages of the workers were unchanged from 1961 to 1966. Only in some special cases, dock workers, for instance, were the wages raised.

The colonial government used oppression as well as repression (through the regulative capability) to lower the demands that were made on it. The political elite that substituted the colonial government did not use open oppression to lower the expectations and demands but made use of repression and value distribution, the latter trough its generative and distributing capabilities.

What, then, about the economy, economic changes and government and trade union actions in recent years? After his unsuccesful attempt to win voters, Jallow returned to trade unionism and made efforts to improve the situation of the workers. Earlier Jallow had also been given international trade union duties, which he now left.

In 1967, the retail price index for Banjul increased to 106 (from 100 at the beginning of 1961), while the wages had been unchanged. The G W U was supported by the G N U in a demand for an increase in the minimum wages from 5.8 to 7.0 a day, an increase of 23 %. [40] The demand was rejected by the employers, and the two unions called the workers for a general strike. Only 315

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38. Sessional Paper No 1 of 1971, p 5.
39. Ibid.
40. G N B 1970 no. 9 and Sosseh 1972:II.

workers participated in the strike, which lasted one day. According to the leaders of the G W U and the G N U, the weak response from the workers was due to a speech which Prime Minister Jawara made on the radio and in which he appealed to the workers not to strike. [41] Later on the government proposed an increase in the minimum wages for daily paid workers. The wage was augmented by 1 d. a day from 1963 until 1971. [42]

The other trade unions did not make any demands and played a passive role. [43] They preferred not to make demands that could change the policy of the government. During the period 1968 - 1972 G N U disappeared from the arena of trade unionism and G W U became the only union to put demands on the political elite. [44]

The government attempted to neutralize not only the potential influence of G W U but also its alternatives of action. It did not use oppression through its regulative capability but utilized its communicative capability on one hand and its distributive on the other. The former was envolved when the Prime Minister held his radio speech to lower the expectations of the workers, and the latter when the wages were increased (the actual economic position of the workers [45]).

In 1969 a special commission (James Nti from Ghana) was appointed by the government to investigate the living conditions not only of the workers but also of the civil servants and to recommend changes in the wages. [46] The result of this investigation was a recommendation for an increase in daily wage to

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41. John 1972 and Sosseh 1972:I. Concerning the number of strikers Department of Labour reports 315 workers (see Report of Trade Disputes, 1967) but according to Sosseh, the number was considerably higher.
42. The Gambia 1966/67, p 22.
43. Other trade unions at this time were Gambia Labour Union, Gambia Traders' and Dealers' Union, Motor Drivers' and Mechanics' Union, National Farmers' and General Workers' Union.
44. G N U was banned in 1971 since it had not fulfilled the demands stipulated in the Trade Unions Act, and most oftenly only the G W U and the G L U participated in the J I C meetings.
45. This is not to say that the real income of the workers was increased in the long run.
46. Sessional Paper No 9 of 1969.

7.2. for the workers and improvements for the civil servants as well. The government estimated that the proposed changes would increase government expenditure by 288,480 pounds, which it would not afford without a higher taxation.[47]

According to Nti, the cost of living had increased more than was revealed by retail price index, and the standard of living could not be judged against the background of the indices alone.[48] However, before the report was published, the government decided in February 1969 to increase the wages and to control the prices of some commodities, for example, some of the most common foods.[49] The minimum wages was raised from 5.8 to 6.8. The decision was made independently of the demands from the G W U, and the government cited the fact that the retail price index had risen to 111.[50] However, despite price control, the prices continued to increase, and when the retail price index had reached 116 at the end of 1970, the G W U demanded that the minimum wages would be raised from 7.0 to 8.3 a day.[51] J I C assembled, but there was no agreement, so the G W U called for a general strike. On the 22nd of January, the Prime Minister made a radio speech warning the workers against "unnecessary strikes", but on the 27th about 80 % of the workers in the Banjul area and many of the up-river workers stayed at home.[52] On the same day, the Prime Minister made a new radio speech and said: "Workers are aware that any one who stays away from work will certainly lose his day's pay and most likely his job as well".[53] The following day some of the workers returned to work although the G W U appealed to them to continue striking.[54]

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47. Sessional Paper No 1 of 1970.
48. Sessional Paper No 9 of 1969, p 21.
49. G N B no 15 1969. The price of rice, groundnut oil and sugar were controlled but not those of meat and fish, for which the workers and their families had a great need.
50. G N B No 13 1969.
51. G N B No 11 1970 and West Africa 1970, p 184.
52. G N B No 11 1970. According to Sosseh 1973, more than 2.000 workers participated in the strike. Department of Labour reports 531 workers, see Report of Trade Disputes, 1971.
53. G N B No 11 1970 and The New Gambia 1970, No 8.
54. The last strikers at the Public Works' Department went back to work after having struck for only three days, see G N B No 13 1970.

Between these more comprehensive actions, the members of the G W U were involved in many smaller strikes during the 1960´s. The dock workers, in particular, stopped work many times, sometimes only one hour. They were the highest paid workers in 1960, and they succeeded in keeping their position throughout the 1960´s. [55] In 1971, the workers at a Swedish owned company struck two days, since the employer had broken a word-of-mouth appointment with the G W U. After negotiations, a contract was written but two months later a part of the labour force was dismissed because the employer had "more workers than needed". This action was in opposition to the contract, and the G W U workers stopped working. When the 300 workers had struck for 29 days, the Swedish company re-employed all of them. [56]

During the period of 1958 - 1972, the minimum wage increased from 3 sh. to 7 sh. a day. The G W U also contributed to improvements in the working conditions. For instance, three weeks´ paid holiday and the right to the half salary for up to 20 days´ sick leave was decided. [57] The minimum wage for general workers was increased by 24 % and the maximum by 17 %. From the first quarter of 1971 to 1972, the retail price index increased by 18 %.

The development of the real income of low paid and high paid workers, the number of strikes and the number of mandays lost during the strikes are presented in the table below.

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55. Sessional Papers No 7 of 1965, No 6 of 1966 and No 9 of 1967. The Gambia Gazette No 33 vol 80, 1963, and Department of Labour, Information 1972 and 1973.
56. Sosseh 1972:II and Memorandum of Agreement 1971 at G W U:s office, Banjul.
57. Sosseh 1972:II and Workers´ Employment Act, chapter 195, The Laws of the Gambia.

	1961	-62	-63	-64	-65	-66	-67	-68	-69	-70	-71	-72
Real income of low paid workers	100	97	93	95	96	95	111	112	107	108	107	106
Real income of high paid workers	100	97	96	99	100	99	98	94	97	102	101	100
No of strikes	9	3	3	-	2	1	3	1	1	2	2	(2)
No of mandays lost	16678	597	930	-	204	105	307	19	121	561 (1650)	550	(5400)

TABLE 4:2:A: The development of real income of low paid and high paid workers number of strikes and number of mandays lost during the 1960´s and the first two years of the 1970´s in the Gambia. Sources: The Gambia Gazette 1961 - 1972, Register of Trade Disputes 1961 - 1972, Gambia Labour Department, and Files at the Gambia Workers´ Union 1961 - 1972. (The figures within brackets are received from the G W U.)

Although the retail price index (on which the estimate of real incomes is based) does not show the total situation of the workers, it has been used here in lack of another source.

The table reveals that the real income of low paid workers has fluctuated and was very low in 1963 and 1966. In 1972 it was 6 % higher than in 1961. During the period investigated, highly paid workers did not have any change in their real income.

The number of strikes and the number of mandays lost in strikes were highest in 1961 and lowest in the middle 1960´s. Thereafter, they have increased.

In the beginning of the 1970´s the number of members of the G W U had reached the same figure as before the crisis, and the union had regained the initiatives in the labour market which it had had in the beginning of the 1960´s. However, after the Gambia became formally independent, the G W U did not succeed in mobilizing the workers in political actions directed against the

government as before 1965. [58] In recent years, the G W U has not only extended the demands for improvements of the workers´ situation but has also started criticizing the Gambian dependence on foreign countries and neo-colonialism. It criticizes the government for elitism and for not planning the economy as well. [59]

M E Jallow participated as an independent candidate in the 1972 elections and was a bit more successful than in 1966 but he was far from being elected. He formulated the reasons for his participation in the elections in the following manner. "I want to show the political parties that G W U is independent of them, and I want to present a third alternative to the existing parties which lack ideologies and a policy based on plans". [60]

The level of stability that the G W U had reached after the crisis in the middle 60´s was not upset by Jallow´s participation in the elections. On the contrary, the number of members increased during the first quarter of 1972. Young and well-educated workers, in particular, applied for membership in the G W U. [61]

Concerning the changes in the economic structures of the Banjul area during the last years, the following can be said: The dependence on foreign owned companies has increased. All of the larger new established companies are foreign owned and are free of taxation according to the Development Act. In 1971 and 1972, the government made efforts to attain some control over new companies through buying stocks, but the control has been rather limited.

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58. It is difficult to distinguish "political" strikes from others but the content of the speeches made by the union leaders when appealing to the workers has changed. Furthermore, many of the workers that are members of the G W U vote for P P P but participate in strikes. So they seem to make a distinction between "party politics" and "politics in general".
59. Jallow 1972.
60. Jallow 1972.
61. Ibid. and Membership Files at the G W U:s office.

Most of the government revenues are derived from import and export duties, but 6 percent comes from taxation of the income of companies. This revenue varies widely from one year to another due to internal budgetary techniques within the firms. [62]

The gross national product increased by 5 % per annum from the middle 1960´s to 1971/72, and the private consumption based on import products (especially rice) increased most. [63] The most important change in the Banjul area was the growth of tourism. It started in 1965, and in 1972 more than 7,000 tourists visited the country. New foreign owned hotels were built, and according to government sources, 600 new jobs have been created due to tourism. [64]

However, the total number of employees in the capital region did not increase at the same rate as the population expanded. Banjul had about 28,000 inhabitans in 1962, and in 1972 it was estimated to 40,000, an increase of 42 %. Employment rose by 23 %. [65] Thus, the urbanization process was more rapid than economic changes. The number of waged and salaried people rose by 6 % from 1963 to 1969. While the number of government employees dropped from 4,400 in 1963 to 3,750 in 1969, the number of those privately employed rose from 2,200 to 3,250 in 1969. [66]

Thus the influx of people into Banjul has superceded the employment opportunities. The number of employed people has increased but not in proportion to the population. More and more people are self-employed, most of them as businessmen selling imported products - a phenomenon very common in African, Asian and Latin American countries lacking a planned economy. Furthermore, the situation of the workers deteriorated more since those who work

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62. Estimates 1972/73, p (V) and 1.
63. Ibid., p 10.
64. Gambia´s Manpower, p 12.
65. Ibid.
66. Census of Population, Gambia´s Manpower and Sessional Paper No 2 of 1971.

have to feed more people on their income than earlier.

In order to control the degree of economic deprivation among the workers and to neutralize the demands they have made through the /G W U, the government has used its communicative as well as its distributive capability.

The patterns and changes described above might also be expected to affect the workers' feeling of power deprivation and respect deprivation. However, since the workers were told to consider their possibility of influencing their own situation, and the activities of other people (members of their family, people in their compound, co-workers at the work place and the people of the Gambian society as a whole), these conditions will also be sketched.

The common worker in Banjul and its surroundings lives in a house of one or two rooms.[67] Generally, the house is situated in a compound of two or more houses. The worker rents his house, and he has to pay from one fourth to one third of his salary in rent. In the whole compound, the yard-owner is the most influential person.

During the last years more and more young people have been able to build their own compounds, which means that they have a stronger voice than before when it comes to making decisions concerning their own compound. Many of the young workers have recently arrived in the capital from the villages in the countryside, where they were bound by kinskip and other ties. In

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67. The housing standard can be illustrated by the following figures which are based on the interviews which were made in the capital and in Kerewan:

	Banjul %	Kerewan %
Grass roof/earth floor	-	20
Grass roof/flooring	-	-
Corrug. roof/earth floor	31	78
Corrug. roof/flooring	39	2
D:o and electricity	16	-
D:o and refrigerator	3	-
No data available	11	-
	100	100

the capital they rent a house or a room, and outside the compound they can choose activities more freely than the youths in the countryside (except at the work place).

Although most of the young workers are unmarried, they spend a large part of their salaries to buy food for their families in the capital or in the country-side.[68] Most of the workers in the sample have jobs in which they cannot exert any influence on their situation. There is a strong hierarchy in the working situation. The worker is responsible to a foreman and the latter is responsible to the superintendent. This structure also prevails in the tourist enterprises, in which some of the workers were interviewed.

The majority of the workers in the sample are daily paid. They are not pensionable, but they have the right to 14-21 days holidays with pay each year. During 28 days sick leave they are paid half of their salary. Furthermore, they are promoted not according to education but to age and seniority.[69] The situation of the workers at the hotels is less secure since most of them lose their jobs during the rainy season when most of the hotels are closed, and they have to apply for a new job when the tourist season starts again. During the period studied (1971-1973), many of them had been dismissed during the tourist season.[70]

What, then, about participation in politics? Nearly half of the people in the Banjul sample answered that they do not vote or

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68. The family patterns of the samples are shown below:

	Banjul %	Kerewan %
No family but people to feed	63	13
One wife, children	27	41
two wives, children	5	27
three wives, children	1	18
No data	5	-
	101	99

69. Employment Act and Sosseh 1972:II.
70. Some of the reasons for their dismissals were "laziness, tardiness" etc. Many unemployed waited for jobs outside the hotels each morning.

otherwise participate in politics.[71] 25 % do not want to participate at all. Those who do not participate, but want to, seem to be highly frustrated. They are young, well educated workers, who believe that they are capable of being politicians or rich businessmen.

The power structure cannot be more than sketched here, since necessary data are not available. At the top of the power ladder are the politicians, the government administrators, the white and black businessmen and the traditional chiefs of the districts (Seyfolus). The politicians and the businessmen control more values per capita than any other groups. The white enterprisers control the larger part of the recently established firms, particularly in the tourist branch. Most of the companies at the lower level are import firms, and the owners are, therefore, dependent on the world market prices. In Banjul and its surroundings there is a large group of people from the Middle East and North Africa who make their income as small businessmen and artisans. They can be said to constitute a middle class just beneath the elite groups.

The workers, then, are subordinate to all other peoples except those lacking employment. 3 % of the workers in the sample did not have any employment at the time they were interviewed.

4.2.2 The farmers of Kerewan

There are two reasons why it will not be possible to give a detailed account of the economic situation of the farmers in Kerewan and changes in this situation. First, there are no statistical data similar to those which are available for a description of the Banjul area. Secondly, I have not made any intensive and long term social anthropological study in Kerewan.

The description below is based on various written

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71. See part 4.7.

government (national and local) sources, unstructured interviews with officials in Banjul and at Kerewan Area Council and with certain persons in the village (the Alkali, the chairman of the P P P village committee, the chairman of the village committee of the co-operative movement and so on) and on my own observations.

The area to the north of the Gambia river was thinly populated when the Mandinkas immigrated in the 16th and 17th centuries. The Wollofs lived there, and they had land enough to feed themselves. The first Mandinka to settle in the village still has descendants there, and the kinship group still bears his name.[72]

Today Mandinkas are in the majority in Kerewan. They constitute 95 % of the population in the village,[73] which is situated on the north bank of the Gambia river about 55 kilometres from the Atlantic Ocean and 70 kilometres from the capital, Banjul. The village is bordered by the Gambia river to the south, the Mini-Minimum Creek to the west and the villages of Jawara and Saba to the west and the north respectively. The geographical situation of the village is shown on the map below.

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72. Gamble 1955, p 1.
73. According to the classification made by Morgan & Puch 1969, p 34 I use the term village, although the Gambian authorities refer to Kerewan as a town.

The main road from Barra (the ferry station opposite Banjul) to the trans-Gambian highway (connecting Casamance of southern Senegal with the rest of the country) passes just outside the village. According to the census taken in 1963, Kerewan had 1,647 inhabitants. Today, the population of the village is probably 2,000. [74] The majority (95 %) of them support themselves through agriculture, while the rest are businessmen or government employees.

The district of Lower Baddibu, to which Kerewan belongs administratively, is, together with Banjul, Kombo and MacCarthy Island, the most densely populated areas in the country. In 1963, there were 122 persons per square mile in Kerewan, compared to 79 per sq. mile in the Gambia as a whole. [75] The population of Kerewan is estimated to increase by 2 % annually. Since there is a lack of arable land, some of the young farmers have moved from the village. There are no data available for Kerewan itself, but in 1963 people in Lower Baddibu were asked in which place they were born and where they lived. It was estimated that Lower Baddibu had lost 14 % of the male and 11 % of the female population through migration. This decrease had, however, been compensated for by a natural growth in the population. Most of the migrants had settled down in Banjul or the Western Division, south of the river. Mandinkas had moved less than the minorities of Fulas and Wollofs. [76] The population of Kerewan was distributed in ethnic groups in the following manner in 1963: Mandinkas 95, Fulas 0,7, Wollofs 0,7 and others 3,6 %. [77].

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74. An increase by 2 % makes 1.930 inhabitants in 1972. According to an estimate that was presented to me by the Statistical Office, Banjul, in 1972, there are, on the average, three people in each hut. In Kerewan there were 688 huts in 1972, which means 2.064 inhabitants.
75. Census of Population 1963.
76. Based on data from Census of Population 1963.
77. Ibid.

Up until two decades ago, the village was still divided between three kinskip groups, each holding a ward or kabilo consisting of several compounds. The names of the kabilos were Fatikunda, Sisekunda and Jawarakunda, and each had two major patrilineages.[78] Today there have been further divisions and the most frequent names are Fatty, Sise, Jawara, Jallow and Drammeh.

The kinship group of Fatty was the first to settle in the village, and since then the village heads have been appointed from this group. Seikou Fatty became Alkali in the middle 60´s when his elder brother died.

In 1972, there were 138 yardowners in the village, and they had 688 huts (535 with corrugated roofs and 153 with grass roofs).[79] On the average there were five huts in each compound, but the distribution was very unequal as can be seen from the table below.

Yardowners		No of huts
No	%	
2	2	0
44	32	1-2
45	33	3-4
15	10	5-6
12	9	7-8
5	3	9-10
3	2	11-12
12	9	13 +

TABLE 4:2:B: The distribution of huts per yardowner in Kerewan in 1972. Source: Tax lists at Kerewan Area Council in 1972.

Most of the yard-owners have 1-4 huts, but nearly 10 % of them have more than 13 huts in their compound. The largest compound contains 31 huts. As has been mentioned above, there are 138 yard-owners, but the number of men over 25 years of age is most

78. Gamble 1955, p 1.
79. Tax lists at Kerewan Area Council 1972.

likely higher than 400, so only a minority (one third) of the farmers are yardowners. Most of them rent a hut from the owner who is very often a relative.

The unequal distribution of huts within the category of yardowners is illustrated in the table below.

% of yardowners	% of huts
10	2
20	5
30	9
40	17
50	25
60	33
70	44
80	58
90	80
100	100

TABLE 4:2:C: The distribution of huts among yardowners in Kerewan in 1972. Source: Tax lists at Kerewan Area Council, 1972.

Half of the yardowners owned only one fourth of the huts, and the fifth owning most possessed 42 % of them. However, there is only a weak correlation between yard ownership and income from groundnuts in the sample. That is to say, a farmer having a large yard does not necessarily have much land for cultivation of groundnuts available to him. Each kinship group has a fixed field and land is allocated within the group. The groups are distributed on a number of compounds, and the head of each compound allocates land available for that compound.

The Fatty have most land. Theoretically, land is distributed according to the Lands Act, [80] but in practice the Alkali and the heads of the compounds decide who shall have land. Today, the fields are knitted to each compound and to a special individual more firmly than earlier. There is a lack of land, and,

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80. See The Gambia 1966/67, p 27.

therefore, it has become necessary to have a firmer control over the fields. [81]

The women produce for consumption within their compounds or within the village, while the men cultivate groundnuts as a cash crop. The women cultivate vegetables, cassava, rice and other cereals.

There have been many disputes over land, particularly among the women who have their rice fields in the swamps near the river and the creek. [82] All the fields outside the swamps are used for fallows, cultivation of groundnuts or for grazing.

The cultivation of groundnuts was introduced in the middle of the 19th century. Until then the village was self-sufficient, but the production of groundnuts and the incorporation of the village into the money economy changed this pattern. More land was taken over for cultivation of groundnuts, the farmers received money in cash and they started buying food from other villages or from Banjul. At the end of the 19th century the British introduced a yard-tax payable in cash. This forced the farmers to cultivate still more groundnuts. [83] Today the village is dependent on rice from other villages (where there are irrigated rice fields) or from the capital (where rice is imported from other countries).

The farmers practice rotational bush fallow. Earlier a field was used for seven to eight years before it returned to fallow of four years. During these eight years, groundnuts were cultivated four to five years, and during the rest of this period millet or sorghum were cultivated. But two changes have taken place: the period of fallow has been shortened and the period for cultivation of groundnuts has been prolonged on the part of other crops. [84] This seems to be a result of the demand for

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81. Fatty 1972:I and Jawara 1973.
82. Gamble 1955, pp 43 ff.
83. Gailey 1964, p
84. Jeng 1973, and Morgan & Puch 1969, pp 100, 104, 119 and 126.

sale of groundnuts which provide money in cash.

In comparison to the farmers in the eastern Fulani regions, the farmers have few domestic animals. Cattle and donkeys are owned by a minority of farmers in the village.

The need of money and the lack of land in combination with the increase of the population has resulted in migration. The young farmers who move from the village can be divided into three categories: (1) farmers who have moved to other places (particularly the capital), (2) farmers who live in the village but have rented fields in neighbouring villages (3-15 kilometres from Kerewan), and (3) those who have a small field and cannot support themselves on the income from groundnuts but take jobs in the capital or at some up-river oil mill during the dry season.[85]

Despite the lack of land the crops increased during the late 60´s. This is a result of the extended use of oxen, oxploughs and fertilizers. The co-operative station in the village lends money to the farmers and some of them have been able to afford to buy oxen and ploughs.[86]

There are no data on the crops in Kerewan itself but figures on the groundnut crops which have been purchased by the co-operative station in Kerewan are available.[87]

Year	Groundnuts, tons	Dalasis per ton	Total income	Estimated income per member
1967/68	881	140	123.340	220
1968/69	897	135	121 095	216
1969/70	912	140	127.680	224
1970/71	858	150	128.700	225
1971/72	812	175	142.000	240

TABLE 4:2:D: The amount of groundnuts purchased by the Kerewan co-operative station and the income of the farmers, 1967-1972. Source: The Co-operative Department. Banjul, 1972.

85. Caramo 1973: "Land is not enough so farmers have to walk to the Jokadus and spend the rains there. More than 50 farmers do so".
86. Caramo 1973 and Jeng 1972.
87. The production area of the Kerewan station comprises the villages of Kerewan, Kintehkunda, Suwarehkunda and Banni. Kerewan is by far the largest of these villages.

The income per member increased by 9 % from 1967 to 1972. However, it should be noticed that the figures above do not show the real income of the farmers in Kerewan. Some of the groundnuts which are purchased by the station in the village are smuggled from Senegal or have been bought there legitimately. This trade has, according to the co-operative Department, decreased during the last years. [88]

For consumption within the village, millet, sorghum, cassava and some rice are cultivated. Millet and sorghum are ancient in the Gambia, while the cultivation of rice was taken up at the end of the 19th century. But only the small swamps near the river and the Mini-Minimum creek are suitable for the cultivation of rice, and during some years they have not been wet enough for rice cultivation. This was the case in 1972 and 1973.

Rice on irrigated fields is cultivated in villages not far from Kerewan. There advisers from Taiwan support some experiments in cultivation of irrigated rice. The farmers in Kerewan are aware of this, and are envious of their neighbours´ situation.

The only course open to the farmers in Kerewan to increase their crop production is to use modern tools and techniques. Many of them seem to be willing to do it, but they do not have incomes large enough to save money for buying machines and tools. Most of them still use the hoe and work the soil by hand.

In recent years the government has started giving loans for the purchase of ploughs and oxen through the co-operative movement, but in Kerewan only a few have been able to take advantage of this.

Ox-ploughing started in the village at the end of the 1950´s.

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88. According to other sources, the smuggling trade is still very large, see West Africa 1964, p 741 and 1967, p 527.

The co-operative movement opened its station there in 1967. At the start it had 559 members and five years later 592. [89]

So far, the scarcity of land, together with the need and will to increase the income, has not resulted in any conflict behavior on the part of the farmers, although there have been a number of smaller disputes over the rice fields and sometimes over cattle.

The farmers demand modern tools and higher income, and they want the government to assist them. But hitherto the structures in the village have not changed in a direction that decreases the probability of conflict behavior. Migration from the village and the use of land in other villages can be seen as a short term solution of the problem. [90]

Since Kerewan is the administrative centre for the Kerewan Area as well as the North Bank Division, there are a number of government employees in the village. The ferry transport over the Mini-Minimum Creek gives jobs to a few, and recently a post office was opened in the village. Government employees have a higher income than that of the average farmer.

I did not plan to investigate the expenditures of the farmers or their consumption pattern, but according to the report of Gamble, most of the income was spent on clothes, household utensils and ceremonies in the middle of the 1950's. [91]

I got the impression that the consumption pattern had not changed radically since Gamble made his investigation in the middle of the 1950's. However, two changes can be noticed. The farmers travel more than they did before. Some of them visit the capital once or twice during the dry season. Furthermore, a school was opened in the village in 1965, and today one fifth of the schoolage children attend the school. Schoolfees and uniforms

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89. Information from Co-operative Department, Banjul, 1972.
90. The Alkali, Seikou Fatty, has said that the disputes, which have been more widesread recently, have nothing to do with the lack of land. But the Alkali's opinion does not mean that the lack of land is not the real cause of the disputes, see Fatty 1972:II. For a theoretical discussion about "conflict displacement", see Berkowitz 1962, p 135 and Coser 1967:I, p 98.
91. Gamble 1955, pp 66 ff.

constitute a large part of the expenditures of those farmers who can afford to send their children to school.

Only a few farmers have an income amounting to a taxable level. The yard-owners do, however, pay a yard-tax. In 1972, the 138 yard-owners in Kerewan paid 3,624 delasis, that is to say 26.20 dalasis per owner. The distribution of the tax burden is shown in the table below.

Dalasis	No. of tax payers
15 - 25.99	96
26 - 35.99	19
36 - 45.99	10
46 - 55.99	7
56 - 65.99	3
66 - 75.99	-
76 -	3

TABLE 4:2:E: The distribution of tax payers among the yard-owners in Kerewan in 1972. Source: Tax lists at Kerewan Area Council in 1972.

In the development programmes during the 1960´s emphasis was placed upon improvement of the roads. In 1972, for instance, the farmers built and improved roads during the dry season and, in return, they received food from the government.

In summarizing the description of the economic situation of the farmers and its relation to the political elite in the capital, the following can be said. The farmers have become strongly dependent on the income from groundnuts.

They must have cash in hand to fulfill not only the new needs imposed but also the primary needs (food, clothing etc). There have not been any structural changes within the village. What has happened is that land has been divided among more hands than earlier. The income is not equally distributed; some receive a high income from the tenants in their compounds. Others

have larger fields and, therefore, have larger crops. Those who have large compounds and large fields are among the richest in the village. Many farmers are also businessmen and money lenders and earn a large income in this manner.

When we come to the cost of living, there are no available data on which the description can be based. All that can be said is that more farmers than before are dependent on the money economy and that this process will continue. The amount of consumer crops cultivated within the village is insufficient to cover the needs of the population. The farmers have to use much of their money to buy, for instance, imported rice. The women are responsible for the cultivation of consumer crops, mainly upland rice and cassava. [92] The harvests have been too small during the last years to cover the need in the village; the rainfall has been far from enough to permit cultivation of these crops necessary.

It is fruitful to study the economic changes in Kerewan against the background of Wolf´s discussion about the farmers´ use of surplus. [93] As soon as production of calories has reached a certain level, there is a surplus which can be divided into a substitution fund and social surplus. The former comprises seed-corn, and the latter is used for ceremonies and for rents. During the last years of the 1960´s, the crops in Kerewan were large enough for the creation of a social surplus. The amount of money spent on ceremonies has decreased, while the amount spent on food and other consumer goods has increased.

Only a few of the farmers rent their land; the majority of them have a part of a field controlled by the yard-owner. So the main

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92. In 1973, an experiment in cultivation of irrigated vegetables was started. The new fields, which had been used for cultivation of rice and groundnuts earlier, were worked by women and young men. It has not been possible to study the results of this experiment here.
93. Wolf 1971, pp 14 ff.

part of the money is not used for rents but for consumer goods. In 1972, when the farmers had received money for their groundnuts, they had to pay debts to businessmen in the village and to the co-operative movement from which they had borrowed money, during the dry season. This seems to reveal that many farmers spend most of their money to pay debts which they have been forced into when in need of consumer goods. It does not even seem to be a substitution fund. [94]

Farmers who are in a better situation send their children to school. Fifteen years ago only a few children in Kerewan had the opportunity to get primary education. This was due mainly to the fact that there was no school in the village; only the "wealthiest" people in the village could afford to send their children to a school in another village or in the capital. Today about 20 % of the schoolage children are registered in the school in the village. [95]

At the end of the 1960's, it was revealed that the farmers' debts to the co-operative movement were not repaid at the rate and to the extent agreed upon, and that the farmers in debt had been allowed to borrow still more money. [96] The situation in Kerewan was not described in particular in the report, but according to the chairman of the village committee of the co-operative movement, the farmers in Kerewan also had large debts to the co-operative movement. The leaders of the village committee had been dismissed and the committee had been reconstructed. [97]

The changes mentioned above we can add the answers given by many of the farmers interviewed when asked whether their coun-

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94. Farmers have to borrow money for buying seed-corn each year. According to Caramo 1973, the farmers had borrowed money from the co-operative movement to buy food during the hungry season, particularly in July.
95. Based on data from Education Department: "Annual Report and Statistics 1971-1972". The figures do not show how many pupils leave school after only a short period but only the number registered.
96. Sessional Paper No 2 of 1972.
97. Caramo 1973.

try was better of worse than it had been some years earlier. Many of them said: 'Nowadays we don´t have to go to the bush to find græn leaves to eat during the hungry season. The government helps us...' (This question and others concerning the beliefs about the country and the political institutions will be discussed in another part of this chapter).

The government has not made any efforts to change the structures in the village. Instead, it has attempted to heighten the actual economic position of the farmers within the existing structures. This seems to have raised the level of expectation of the farmers (which will be discussed later on). The generative and distributive capabilities of the political elite have been used. By extending credit towards machinery, oxen and building compounds, distributing foods and expanding education the government has attempted to raise the economic position of the farmers. However, the cost of living has been out of control of the political elite. The communicative capability seems to be very weak; the few demands made by the farmers do not reach the political elite in the capital. On the other hand, the political elite has not relied on the regulative capability either. However, the Alkali seems to be an agent through which the national government uses its regulative capability indirectly.

Now over to the structural background of the distribution of power values. In Kerewan, the old family pattern has not changed as fast as in Banjul. Most of the farmers have two or more wives, but among the younger the core family is very common. This might be due to changed preferences (they invest in education for their children rather than having many wives and children), but it can also be a result of scarcity of land.

The same housing pattern as in Banjul is prevalent although the housing standard is considerably lower in Kerewan; most of the farmers live in compounds of two or three grass huts (see footnote 68 in the present chapter).

The yard-owner does not only own the compound, but often he is also the "elder", and most of the people living in the compound are family members or employees over whom he presides. Therefore, the decisions made by a particular man control the family life of more people in Kerewan than they do in Banjul.[98] Thus, age is a factor related to power (as well as respect). It is not uncommon that the yard-owner is the leader of the kinship group and the oldest man in his compound. If so, he is often also a member of the informal council of the "elders" in the village. The oldest men meet the Alkali almost every day and they discuss the situation in the village and advise him before he makes his decisions.[99]

The Alkali and his relatives have a strong influence on the actions of the people in the village. He decides not only who shall have land and how much land they shall have but also who shall or shall not be permitted to settle in the village.[100]

In the beginning of the 1960's a local government consisting of directly elected people was established. The area councils are staffed by educated officials appointed by the national government. In practice, there seems to be a division of functions so that the Alkali can exert influence within some domains and the officials in others. Thus, the Alkali has a greater influence than is intended in the Gambian constitution. However, this influence seems to vanish; young people are likely to listen more to the officials at the council than to the Alkali.

At about the same time as the local government was established, the P P P established a party committee in the village. However, the committee does not include the elders and the Alkali and, therefore, has little influence on the activities in the village.

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98. This pattern has not changed very much during the last 20 years. See Gamble 1955, pp 1-3, 42-43.
99. Fatty 1972:I and 1973.
100. It can also be mentioned that an independent candidate from another village visited the village to campaign there before the elections in 1972, but the Alkali sent him out of the village.

When, for instance, the dry season was followed by a poor rainy season in 1972, and there was a food shortage in the village, people did not ask the chairman of the party committee or the party for help but went to the Alkali. The chairman of the committee made attempts to assemble the farmers to a meeting but he did not succeed. [101]

Before the elections to the House of Representatives in 1972, the Alkali talked to the people and demanded that they vote for P P P (he openly supported the party). He also told the people not to vote for independent candidates. However, about ten percent of the farmers in the sample voted for an independent candidate. [102]

Other factors than kinship affiliation on which power and respect are based, are economic position, religious position and age. Schematically three groups of "rich" people can be distinguished in the village. Rich, of course, in terms of the general living conditions in Kerewan. These are (1) yard-owners, (2) farmers controlling more land than others, and (3) farmers who are also businessmen and/or religious teachers. The control of economic values and the economic stratification seems to cut across kinship groups.

Yard-owners are respected not only because they own the huts but also because they feed their relatives and make them work the fields. The same applies to those controlling more land than others. In those cases where the yard-owner also controls much land, he is highly respected.

Some farmers are richer than others although they are not strongly engaged in agriculture; they are businessmen who sell to

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101. Fatty 1973 and Jawara 1973.
102. It was not possible to get any information concerning the voting figures for Kerewan itself but only for the whole constituency. In this, 40 persent voted for independent candidates. In the sample only about 10 percent said that they had voted for an independent candidate. However, there are reasons to presume that this figure should be higher.

other farmers on credit. In their shops they sell rice, kola nuts, smaller tools and utensils.

A few religious teachers / - Marabouts - live in the village. They train young people in Koranic texts and for this service the youths are expected, even obliged, to work the fields for the Marabouts. This has made some of the Marabouts richer, more influential and more respected than ordinary farmers. Marabouts engaged in business and agriculture are particularly influential and respected. [103]

However, among many younger villagers education is evaluated highly since it is believed to carry a person to a high position. Therefore, the few educated people in Kerewan (government employees) receive high respect from the young farmers.

Now that the structural component of the conflict potential of the farmers in Kerewan and the workers in the G W U in Banjul has been sketched, the other components will be dealt with.

4.3 Absolute Deprivation

There are two types of absolute deprivation: one that is subjectively felt and one that is constituted by the difference between the potential and the actual value position (see 2.2)

The latter is termed structural violence by some authors and it belongs to the category of structural contradictions.[104]

Absolute subjective deprivation (hereafter referred to as "absolute deprivation"), then, is the difference between expec-

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103. I was not able to explore the relationship between the Marabouts and the Alkali but as far as I could understand, the Marabouts who are also elders and yard-owners met the Alkali almost daily and the latter took advice from them. See Fatty 1972:II.

104. Neither subjective deprivation nor the resulting frustration are conflicts themselves. Only when some person, group or structure is an obstacle to the eliminiation of the deprivation or frustration, is there a conflict.

ted [105] and actual level. [106] Two principal methods might be used to explore AD. Here the individuals' own estimates have been used, although some of the structural conditions are sketched and their relations to the subjective deprivation of the individuals are touched upon. The individuals themselves have pointed out what they felt to be their actual position and also the positions they felt entitled. [107]

A gap between expected level (EL) and actual level (AL) can result from two different processes: (1) progressive deprivation, in which AL is kept at a constant level in time, or increases moderately, while EL increases strongly, and (2) regressive deprivation, in which AL decreases while EL is constant. [108]

As had been said before, an EL-AL-gap is not a conflict per se but it is assumed to contribute to conflict, since it is frustrating to the individual, and it also includes cognitive dissonance. [109] If EL is seen as a goal (or a need), and the individual is prevented from attaining it, a typical frustrating situation is present. [110] Furthermore, if one assumes that EL

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105. "Expectation" should be differentiated from aspiration as well as "role expectation". Aspirations are what an individual hopes to attain, while expectations in the present sense are what the individuals feel entitled to. "Role expectations" are "points of view on proper behavior" or "norms".
106. One can assume a priori that the individuals have a certain EL (since urbanization, literacy etc of their society have reached a certain level) and use statistical data on GNP per capita, calory intake per capita etc as indices on the AL. Another method is to ask the individuals directly about their AL and EL. The former has been used by, among others, Gurr 1970. Different measures on value deprivation might be used: (1) the quantitative distance between AL and EL, (2) AL in proportion to EL, and (3) actual objective position (income, for instance) in proportion to expected position (e.g. expected income). The two latter have been used here.
107. This is termed the self-anchoring striving scale, see Cantril 1965.
108. Gurr 1970, pp 46-47.
109. Festinger, On the Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, see Lindsey & Aronson 1968, The psychological balance models also apply to such a situation, see Schwartz 1971, in Davies, ed, 1970.
110. Berkowitz 1962, p 26.

is positively evaluated by the individual and that he evaluates himself (or his efforts) positively and his AL negatively, there is a situation of cognitive dissonance. [111] Positively evaluated "elements" are connected with a negative one.

What factors, then, create changes in AL, EL or both? Broadly speaking, there are structural factors as well as factors implied in beliefs, but since structures and beliefs are assumed to be mutally influencing, we can differentiate these factors only analytically. Following the line that was taken up on page concerning crises and social change, it can be argued that crises produce regressive deprivation (lowering AL) while progressive deprivation is a result of certain changes in beliefs and/or structures.

The perception of AL and EL, thus, has its basis not only in the beliefs but also in structural positions. [112] If a belief system changes from a positive evaluation of hierarchical structures to a rejection of such structures, while the individual is still in a low position, it can be predicted that he will make effort to change the structures. If the process continues, and if somebody or something is seen as an obstacle to change, a structural conflict is present. Furthermore, in the example mentioned, there might also be a value conflict.

Below a tentative list of the relations between the capabilities and the actions of the political elite on one hand and different AL:s, EL:s and degrees of deprivation on the other will be presented. But first, some comments are in order. In the list only "simple" expectations and events influencing these expectations are taken into account. It should be emphasized that a long term production of beliefs (through the communicative capability) can result either in a belief system sanctioning status quo whatever such a situation implies to the individuals or a belief system in which improvements through changes are emphasized.

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111. Consistent or balanced patterns are those including only negative or only positive elements, see, for instance, Schwartz 1971, in Davies, ed, 1971.
112. Peil 1968, pp 71 and 77.

The list, then, apperars as shown below. [113]

Actions of the political elite	AL	EL	Degree of absolute deprivation
(1) Long term increase of values in the system: generative and distributive capabilities Long term improvement	High	High	Low
(2) Short term d:o	Low/moderate	Moderate/high	Moderate/high
(3) Long term decrease of values in the system: generative and distributive capabilities Long term deterioration	Low	Low	Low
(4) Short term d:o	Low/moderate	High	Moderate/high
(5) Communication and regulation affecting only EL			
(a) promises	High	Higher	Low/moderat
(b) promises	Low	Higher	Moderate/high
(c) threats	High	Lower	Low
(d) threats	Low	Low	Low

According to Deutsch and many other political scientists and sociologists, education, urbanization and exposure to elite styles of life create higher expectations. [114] Furthermore, if we follow the arguments of Davies and the frustration-aggression analysts, the deprivation patterns illustrated above might be predicted from the different changes mentioned in the list. [115]

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113. Some more comments should be made upon the list. First, a simple trichotomization of the degree of deprivation, AL and EL has been made, although these should be regarded as continious scales. Secondly, no distinction has been made between the effects in different groups or classes in the system. Thirdly, nothing is said about the effects of deprivation in different value categories. Nor do I take the findings of reference group theory into account. Thus, I I do not consider the social frames of reference of the individuals. This will be done in another part of this chapter.
114. Davies 1962, Deutsch 1961, p 498-501, Feierabend & Feierabend 1972, pp 140-143, Gurr 1970, pp 51-54 and Nesvold 1964, pp 18 and 37.
115. Barkowitz 1962, pp 64 ff, Davies 1961, pp 6, 9, 13 and 15 and Gurr 1972, pp 191 ff.

Variations in importance of the three value categories can be directly measured and weighed accordingly, if a subjective scale, the self-anchoring striving scale, is used. [116] It can be assumed that the prevention of the attainment of a value that has a higher weight than others produces a higher degree of deprivation than the prevention of the attainment of the latter. [117]

Before absolute deprivation among the workers in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan will be dealt with, some hypotheses will be discussed.

Since the values have been classified into three categories, absolute deprivation can be experienced within three spheres or dimensions: economic, power and respect.

An urban variable (itself containing several partial variables which have not been measured in the present work), together with education, essentially contribute to differences in beliefs and preferences. [118]

The findings of many investigations have been combined in the following principle hypotheses, which have guided this part of the research project in the Gambia: [119]

Individuals in an urban environment feel more deprived than individuals in rural areas, if they are members of a rapidly changing political system. [120]

Two corollary hypotheses of the principal one are:
(a) the workers in Banjul feel more deprived on the three value

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116. Cantril 1965, passim.
117. Berkowitz 1962, pp 43 ff and 57 ff.
118. Coleman: "Introduction: Education and Political Development" p 13, in Coleman, ed, 1965, Huntington 1968, pp 36, 54 and 278 ff, Tumin & Feldman 1961, pp 109 and 124.
119. In all of these indirect indices have been used. See, for instance, Gurr 1968, Midlarsky & Tanter 1967, and Nesvold, 1964.
120: It was supposed that the structures and the allocation of values change at various rates in different areas of the country and in different groups and classes.

categories than the farmers in Kerewan do, and
(b) the higher degree of deprivation among the workers is mainly due to a higher EL.

4.3.1 Absolute Economic Deprivation

In line with the discussion above, the workers in the capital area ought to feel more deprived than the farmers in the village. Education itself creates higher expectations, and many workers, particularly the young ones, have more than six years of education, while only two people in the Kerewan sample have any education. [121]

Another factor, affecting the expectations is change in real income. As we have seen in another part of the present chapter (pp 105-106), the real income of most of the workers has not changed to a large extent. Only some young workers have been able to improve their situation a little.

Furthermore, the presence of tourists spending money and the elite groups living in luxury in the capital is assumed to heighten the expectations of the capital´s population. [122]

The farmers in Kerewan are heavily dependent on money economy, since most of their income is derived from production of groundnuts, the sales for which they are paid in cash. They do, however, still exchange many goods and services without using money.

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121. The distribution of education in the Banjul sample was:

None	Some - 2,9 years	3,0 - 6,9	7,0 - 8,9	9,0 -	
30	5	10	22	23	= 100 %

122. According to reference group theory, there must be some similarities between the comparer and the compared group, if the former is to be capable of feeling deprived in relation to the latter. There is no reason to assume that the poor, unemployed people in Banjul compare themselves with tourists and the indigeneous elite groups, but the highly educated workers can be supposed to do so. Many young workers employed in the hotels, for instance, make effort to save money in order to go to Europe. Concerning reference group behavior, see Merton & Kitt 1968, pp 46 in Hyman & Singer 1968.

It was, thus, predicted that the absolute economic deprivation would be hihger in Banjul than in Kerewan. The workers' and the farmers' view on their degree of deprivation is presented below.[123]

Deprivation	Actual position in % of expected	Banjul workers % of all	Kerewan farmers[124] % of all
High	10	43	74
Medium	11 - 50	46	24
Low	51 - 100	11	2
		100	100
N =		134	128

TABLE 4:3:A: The distribution of economic deprivation measured by the actual level in proportion to expected among the G W U workers in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan.

The hypothesis made earlier, that the degree of deprivation would be higher among the workers than among the farmers, is not supported by the findings in the table. Nor are the corollaries supported; the workers do not have higher expected levels than the farmers and educated workers do not feel more deprived than uneducated workers, a phenomenon which will be com-

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123. Ladders with ten steps were presented to the workers and the farmers and they were asked to point out were they "stand today", "some years ago" and were they felt entitled to stand.

The raw figures gave the following distribution:

											Average	St. dev.
BANJUL WORKERS												
Position	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
Number	87	12	9	9	10	4	-	-	1	2	2,07	1,85
KEREWAN FARMERS												
Position	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
Number	106	4	6	3	7	1	1	-	-	-	1,50	1,24

Here arithmetical mean values and standard deviation have been estimated although the requirements for using such estimates are not fulfilled. However, in the absence of another, better measure, it will be used. On the require ments, see Siegel 1956.

124. From now on, N = 134 and 128 respectively if no other number is mentioned.

mented upon below.[125] In order to do this some background variables will be considered.[126] Among the workers the youngest feel least deprived, since they perceive their actual level to be higher than the older thinks of theirs. They also have a low EL. Workers with high indomce feel that their actual and expected levels are higher than what the poorer workers think of theirs.

The less educated workers feel more deprived than the more educated due to the fact that they have (1) a low actual level, and (2) a high expected level.[127]

Among the farmers the young, unmarried people feel more deprived than the old married. High income farmers are more satisfied than low income farmers.

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125. The expected level among the workers and the farmers are:

Expect.	BANJUL WORKERS										Average:	St. deviation:
position	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
Number	2	1	2	3	9	9	3	9	12	84	8,67	2,16
	KEREWAN FARMERS											
Position	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
Number	-	-	-	-	5	-	2	3	-	118	9,71	1,07

126. The actual income distribution, for instance, in the two samples is:

Dalasis yearly	Workers %	Dalasis yearly	Farmers %
0 - 600	21	0 - 150	30
601 - 750	24	151 - 300	34
751 - 900	25	301 - 600	16
901 -	27	601 -	19
No answer	3	No answer	1

The income of the workers has been estimated on the monthly salary although the majority of the workers are daily paid. The income of the farmers has been estimated on their groundnut production in the dry season 1971-1972.

127. It is obvious that a complex urban variable is implied, since low income and low educated workers deviate more from farmers than from high income and high educated workers.

If we apply the frustration-aggression theory to the present findings, the following can be said. The higher degree of deprivation among the farmers can be a result of short term progressive changes; the farmers feel that their situation has improved in a short term and, hence, they expect further improvements, while most of the workers have experienced status quo or long term deprivation. The changes pointed out on the ladders by the farmers and workers themselves are presented below: [128]

Change from economic position "before" to "now"	Banjul workers %	Kerewan farmers %
Status quo	54	78
Improvement	30	16
Deterioration	16	6
Index change	+0.04	+0.28

TABLE 4:3:B: Change in economic position of the G W U workers in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan.

The index takes into account the degree of change (in both negative and positive direction), and it shows that the degree of change is greater among the farmers than among the workers, but the number of changed positions is greater among the latter. That is to say, many workers feel that their situation has improved a little, while a small number of farmers feel that their position is much better than before. Furthermore, a detailed analysis of experienced changed and expected levels shows that those feeling that their economic situation has improved have higher expected levels than others.

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128. An index has been used to estimate the changes. It is constructed in the following manner. The net of changes has been divided by the number of respondents. Another index taking the "ceiling-effect" into account can also be used, see Hovland, Lumsdaine & Sheffield 1955, p 79 in Lazars- x/

$$\frac{\text{Position now - position before}}{\text{Maximal possible (10) - position before}} = \text{index}$$

This measure gives the change among the workers the value of 0.003 and among the farmers 0.032.

x/ feld & Rosenberg, eds. 1955.

However, the difference between the changes of the workers and farmers is not so great that we could suppose the former to have a much lower EL than the latter. It can be argued that the perception of expected as well as the actual levels of the workers and the farmers are dependent on the social context within which they consider their own situation, that is to say the positions of the individuals, groups or classes whose situation they know and want to reach.[129] In other words, the boundaries of reference group theory and the concept of relative deprivation are reached. However, these phenomena will be analyzed later on.

A second measure of absolute deprivation has been used, namely the difference between what a person actually has and what he says that he wants. This second measure has been applied to the economic deprivation of the farmers and workers below. They were asked what income they had and what amount they felt entitled to.

Degree of economic deprivation	Banjul workers %	Kerewan farmers %
High	25	44
Medium	50	37
Low	15	10
NA	10	9
	100	100

TABLE 4:3:C: Degree of economic deprivation among the G W U workers and the farmers in Kerewan as measured by the actual income in percentage of expected.

First it should be mentioned that there is a great difference between the two samples in actual and expected income; the farmers have a considerably lower income. What the table reveals, however, is that the farmers feel more deprived economically than the workers do. The decisive factor underlaying the degree

129. Gurr 1970, p 105 ff and Runciman 1966, p 33.

of deprivation is level of income. Low income farmers and workers feel more deprived high income farmers and workers respectively.

The results above correspond to the pattern of deprivation among the workers and the farmers as subjectively measured. However, the correlation between the two measures is very low.

The workers and the farmers were also asked whether they believed that it was possible for them to improve their situation in the future and, if so, how this improvement could occur. If they answered negatively, they were asked why they believed that their sitaution would not improve. As can be expected from the experienced changes, the farmers are more optimistic than the workers since they have a higher expected level.

Belief in economic improvement	Banjul workers %	Kerewan farmers %
Yes	78	86
DK	19	14
No	2	-
	99	100

TABLE 4:3:D: Beliefs about future economic improvement among the G W U workers and the farmers in Kerewan.

Among the workers education is the variable that has the strongest relationship to the beliefs about further improvements in value position. High educated workers are more optimistic than low educated workers. [130]

We also find a significant difference between the ethnic groups in Banjul in the beliefs about future improvement. If age, education and income are held constant one by one, we find that Wollofs are more optimistic than other groups. Mandinkas

130. Almond & Verba 1965, pp 181 and 189, and Tumin & Feldman 1961, pp 108-112.

are second and then come the other groups. [131] This demands an explanation. The Wollofs have, in general, a higher income than Mandinkas, because the latter are late arrivals to the capital. Those Mandinkas (and other gorups) who arrived in the 1950´s and early 1960´s had to take the lowest paid jobs if they wanted to have any jobs at all. Most of the Mandinkas in the sample or low paid and low educated workers which arrived in the capital ten to fifteen years ago or are born there. The rest are highly educated youths.

Among the farmers, a combination of low age and low income seems to have the strongest relationship to a positive belief in the possibility of further improvement.

The most frequent answers concerning the ways in which the economic situation could improve were:

BANJUL WORKERS		KEREWAN FARMERS	
Through personal effort	38 %	By the help of Allah	26 %
Assistance at work place	13 %	Through personal effort	24 %
By the help of government	10 %	By the help of government	19 %
By the help of Allah	9 %	By modernizing farming techniques	11 %
By the development of the country	6 %	Others	20 %
Others	24 %		
	100 %		100 %

TABLE 4:3:E: Mentioned ways of improving the own economic position among the G W U workers in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan.

131. The number of individuals is too small to permit a breakdown along more than three variables at the same time, but an index that makes the ethnic groups comparable regardless of level of education, income and age shows the difference mentioned above and many others which will be discussed later on. The groups have been classified in the following manner. (1) Mandinkas, (2) Wollofs, and (3) Others (most of whom are Akus and Fulas).

The table shows different belief patterns. Divine forses are given great importance among the farmers, while the workers believe more in personal effort.

An analytical classification showing the beliefs about structural and other changes has not been made, since the answers have been given freely and not according to structured questions. Instead, further comments will be given on the simple categorization made above.

Among the workers "personal effort" is mentioned more frequently by those with high education than others, while "assistance at work" is mentioned by those with high age and low education. "Government assistance" is answered most frequently by those with high age and high income.

Farmers with high income and low age mention "personal effort" more than others do, and "government assistance" is believed to improve the situation of particularly those with high age and low income. Beliefs in the help of Allah are also most frequent among the latter.

In summarizing the degree of economic deprivation among the workers and farmers, then, the following can be said:

(1) the farmers feel more deprived than the workers do,
(2) this higher degree of deprivation is due to a higher EL as well as a lower AL,
(3) the farmers, more than the workers, feel that their economic situation has improved, and, hence, they are more optimistic about future improvements.

4.3.2 Absolute Power Deprivation

What has been said concerning experienced actual and expected levels in economic position also applies to the discussion on power deprivation. The workers were predicted to feel more deprived than the farmers.

People were asked how much they could decide, and they were told to consider the situation in their compound, at their work place, in the town/village and in the country as a whole - all taken together. So what has been measured on the power ladder is not identical to the degree of actual or desired participation in formal political institutions but has a larger context. [132]

The table below reveals that the hypothesis stated in the beginning of this part of the chapter is not supported. The difference in the degree of power deprivation is more striking than that of economic deprivation.

Deprivation	Actual position in % of expected	Banjul workers %	Kerewan farmers %
High	10 - 30 %	48	91
Medium	31 - 50 %	15	6
Low	51 - 100 %	36	2
		99	99

[133)]

TABLE 4:3:F: The distribution of power deprivation measured by the actual level in proportion to the expected level among the G W U workers in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan.

In Banjul highly paid workers feel less deprived than the low paid. Workers of medium age are less deprived, while the oldest feel the highest degree of deprivation. Married workers feel more deprived than unmarried, and those who have a medium level of education are most content with their power position.

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132. The actual questions were: "Now, if you think about the chances that you have to decide in matters concerning your own life and the activities of other people - Where on the ladder do you stand in deciding things? Where do you think that you have the right to stand? Where did you stand some years ago?

133. The actual distribution of perceived power positions is:

BANJUL WORKERS

Position	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Average	St. dev.
Number	61	7	10	9	11	11	3	2	2	18	3.71	3.23

KEREWAN FARMERS

Number	115	2	-	4	4	1	1	-	-	1	1.39	1.32

It should be noted that the distribution among the farmers is more homogeneous than that among the workers. In Kerewan, only one person (the Alkali) placed himself at the top position.

Among the farmers the oldest with the highest income are most content. The degree of power deprivation decreases with family size (which is related to income).

What, then, are the workers' and farmers' subjective experience of change in their power positions? In a previous part of this chapter (pp 108-110) we have seen that the workers are incorporated in a hierarchical relation at their work places, that they are relatively free in their compounds, and that they are not able to attain positions in the administration even if they are highly educated. The farmers are tied in kinship groups and they are subordinated to the Alkali and his kinship group. The table below shows the perceived change in power positions.

Change in the power position from "before" to "now"	Banjul workers %	Kerewan farmers %
Status quo	49	88
Improvement	38	9
Deterioration	13	3
	100	100
Index change	+0.93	+0.09

TABLE 4:3:G: Changes in power positions of the G W U workers and the Kerewan farmers.

About half of the workers and 88 percent of the farmers feel that they have not had any change in their power positions. More than one third of the workers and less than ten percent of the farmers experience progress. The change in Kerewan is much less than that in Banjul.

According to the frustration-aggression theory, progressive change creates higher expectations.[134] Hence, the workers ought to have a higher EL than the farmers, but the reverse relationship is revealed by the figures. Probably, the expla-

134. Gurr 1970, pp 113 ff.

nation to this phenomenon lies not within the domain of micro analyses (such as those presented in social psychology) but in macro variables of stratification, social mobility etc. [135]

The background variables reveal that:
(1) Workers with high income have experienced greater changes than those with low income. They also feel less deprived although they have a higher EL. The same pattern prevails also among the farmers. [136]

(2) Middle aged workers perceive more of an improvement in their power positions than other workers do. They also feel less deprived. In Kerewan the oldest farmers feel that they have had the greatest improvement and they are also most content.

(3) Unmarried workers have experienced more improvement and feel less deprived than married workers. The larger the farmer's family is, the more powerful and less deprived he feels.

(4) Workers with medium education have experienced the greatest improvement, and they also feel least deprived, while those with the lowest and highest education experience least change and feel most deprived.

The second measure of power deprivation has been based on the relation between actual and desired participation in poli-

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135. See, for instance, Okigbo 1965, pp 419 ff in Van Berghe, ed. 1965.

136. The expected power position among the workers and the farmers:

	BANJUL WORKERS											
Position	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Average	St. dev.
Number	3	2	1	1	6	10	6	5	8	92	8.79	2.21
	KEREWAN FARMERS											
Number	1	-	1	1	4	4	3	3	1	111	9.39	1.65

tics. [137] The workers and farmers were asked how much they participated in politics and how much they would like to participate.

Degree of power deprivation	Banjul workers %	Kerewan farmers %
High	9	-
Medium	10	1
Low	79	99
No answer	2	-
	100	100

TABLE 4:3:H: Deprivation of power as measured by the actual and desired participation in politics among the G W U workers and the farmers in Kerewan.

Here we find a great difference between the workers and the farmers. 9 % of the workers want to be an M.P., a Minister or president, and, therefore, can be said to be highly deprived. In Kerewan there is one farmer who does not participate in politics but wants to be a member of the ruling party, the P P P.

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137. The degree of deprivation has been estimated in the following manner:

Participation	Desired participation	Degree of deprivation
(1) Not at all	Not at all	Low
(2) Not at all	Voting	Low
(3) Not at all	Advise, talk to people	Low
(4) Voting	Voting	Low
(5) Voting	Advise, talk to people	Low
(6) Member of a party	Member of a party	Low
(7) Member of a party	Member of a committee	Low
(8) Member of a committee	Member of a committee	Low
(9) Not at all	Member of a party	Medium
(10) Not at all	Member of a committee	Medium
(11) Voting	Member of a party	Medium
(12) Voting	Member of a committee	Medium
(13) Advise, talk	Member of a party, a committee	Medium
(14) Not at all	Be an M.P., minister or president	High
(15) Voting	d:o	High
(16) Advise, talk	d:o	High
(17) Member of party	d:o	High
(18) Member of a committee	d:o	High

Power deprivation of the present kind is strongly related to age and education. The young, well-educated workers feel most deprived. Particularly those with 9 or more years of education say that their level of education is higher than that of many politicians and that they are more entitled to have political posts than "old and rich people who now are politicians". Some of these workers are employed by Swedish hotel managers and have a salary that is lower than that agreed upon in the J I C meetings.

So much for the degree of power deprivation. Now the beliefs about future improvement in the power positions will be dealt with. The workers have seen greater improvement and feel less deprived than the farmers, but the former have a lower EL than the latter. However, since the workers have experienced greater improvement, they also can be supposed to be more optimistic.

Belief in power improvement	Banjul workers %	Kerewan farmers %
Yes	80	69
DK	16	23
No	4	9
	100	101

TABLE 4:3:I: Beliefs about future power improvement among the G W U workers and the farmers of Kerewan.

First it should be recalled that the farmers were more optimistic about economic improvement than the workers. The reverse applies when it concerns power values.

The pattern of stratification (described on pp 108-110, 123-125) seems to have influenced the workers' and the farmers' perception of the possibility to attain more power values. The farmers are tied in kinship groups and the kinship group of the Alkali is the most influential. This pattern does not seem to have changed during the two last decades. The P P P made efforts to decrease

the influence of the Alkali in the early 60´s but since then nothing has been changed.

Among the workers beliefs in improvement are most strongly related to high education and high income. There is, also, a difference between the ethnic groups in the capital, and this can be explained by the same factors with which I have dealt concerning belief about economic improvement. Wollofs are more optimistic than Mandinkas, who, in turn, believe more in improvements than "other" ethnic groups.

The most frequent answers about the manner in which the power situation can improve are:

BANJUL WORKERS		KEREWAN FARMERS	
Through personal effort	32 %	By the help of Allah	27 %
Assistance at work place	19 %	Through my children	12 %
By the help of Allah	11 %	By the help of the gov:t	10 %
Through my children	5 %	If we, the people, co-operate [138]	9 %
Others	33 %	Others	42 %
	101 %		100 %

TABLE 4:3:J: Mentioned ways of improving own power position among the G W U workers in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan.

As was the case of beliefs in economic improvements, there are, also here, great differences in the belief patterns of the workers and the farmers. More than half of the workers believe that they can improve their power position by personal effort or through changes at their work place, while most of the farmers think that they will be better off through the help from Allah or because they have children.

Those farmers who do not believe that their power situation will improve give the following reason for this: "I am not a son of a Seyfolu", "My father does not belong to the Alkali´s" etc. This indicates that these farmers regard the traditional

138. In this category are answers such as "We, the people will work together", "I trust the people and they will trust and cooperate with me" etc.

structure as the obstacle preventing them from getting more to decide in their village.

Personal effort is mentioned most frequently by high educated workers, and work place conditions by those with high age and high income.

Middle aged and low income farmers mention Allah more than others, and old farmers take the number of children as an assurance of more power in the future.
In summarizing the degree of power deprivation the following can be said:

(1) the farmers feel more deprived than the workers, since they have a lower actual level as well as a higher expected level
(2) the farmers feel that their power positions have not change while the workers have experienced improvements, and
(3) the workers are more optimistic than the farmers about future improvements.

4.3.3 Absolute Respect Deprivation

The hypotheses made in the beginning of this chapter will also be tested here: the workers are assumed to feel more deprived than the farmers owing mainly to a higher expected level.

The distribution of respect deprivation is presented in the table below: 139

Deprivation	Actual position in % of expected	Banjul workers %	Kerewan farmers %
High	10 - 50	35	21
Medium	51 - 70	8	10
Low	71 - 100	57	69
		100	100

TABLE 4:3:K: The distribution of respect deprivation measured by the actual position in proportion to the expected among the G W U workers in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan.

35 % of the workers feel that they have very little of the amount of respect to which they feel they are entitled, while 21 % of the farmers are in the same situation. 56 % of the workers and 69 % of the farmers are almost or completely satisfied with the respect that they receive from other people in their social environment.

Highly paid workers are more satisfied than low paid workers although the former have a higher EL. Feeling of respect is also related to age: middle aged workers are most satisfied while the youngest are least content. Satisfaction with received respect increases with education up to 12 years of education and thereafter it decreases.

Among the farmers those with high income, low age and no family are least content with the respect they receive, while old, low-income farmers with large families are the most content.

The people in the two samples were also asked to consider what they believed to be most important for receiving respect, and they were told to give weight to "education, age and tribe". The distribution of their answers is shown below.

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139. The actual distribution of perceived respect positions is:

BANJUL WORKERS

Position	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Average:	St. dev.:
Number	27	3	4	5	13	9	3	6	6	58	6.62	3.63

KEREWAN FARMERS

Number	7	-	-	3	22	9	4	2	-	84	8.24	2.68

It should be noted that respect position is perceived to be higher than other positions among the workers as well as among the farmers.

	Banjul workers %	Kerewan farmers %
Education > age > tribe	57	87
Education > tribe > age	19	-
Age > education > tribe	13	11
Age > tribe > education	1	2
Tribe > education > age	5	-
Tribe > age > education	1	-
Not logical	1	-
No answer	4	-
INDEX: [140]		
Education	2.78	2.89
Age	1.89	2.09
Tribe	1.33	1.02

Education is given the greatest importance among the workers as well as among the farmers, but is more emphasized among the latter. Age is second in both samples but it is given a much heavier weight among the farmers than the workers. Tribe [141] is near the possible minimum value in Kerewan but is given some importance among the workers in the capital. [142]

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140. The index is constructed in the following way: All factors have been compared to one another in pairs. Factors receiving only first choice have been given the value of 3, second choice 2 and third choice 1. The total amount has, then, been divided by the number of individuals in the sample. Thus, the maximum possible value of one category is 3.00 and the minimum value 1.00.
141. In Mandinka and Wollof there are terms denoting the meaning of "tribe". However, the farmers had never heard the word. Instead, the names of the ethnic groups ("being Mandingo, being Fula, being Wollof") were used. The fact that they do not use the word shows that "tribe" has no relevancy in the village.
142. It can be argued that "tribalism" has no social meaning to people until two ethnic groups confront each other and one of them has social, economic and/or political advantages over the other. See, for instance, Wallerstein 1965, p 477 in van Berghe, ed, 1965.

In a previous part of this chapter (p 112) it was shown that Kerewan is ethnically homogeneous and, therefore, there can be no relevance in pointing to tribe as a factor upon which respect can be based. [143]

What about the experienced changes among the workers and the farmers? The table below is intended to answer this question.

Change in respect position from "before" to "now"	Banjul workers %	Kerewan farmers %
Status quo	40	17
Improvement	52	83
Deterioration	8	-
	100	100
Index change	+0.44	+0.83

TABLE 4:3:L: Changes is respect position of the G W U workers and the Kerewan farmers.

The perceived changes are much greater among the farmers than among the workers. None of the farmers experience a negative change, while about 8 % of the workers feel that their position is lower than before. It should be noticed that 22 people in Banjul and 10 in Kerewan are included in the category of "status quo", although they have an unchanged top position (that is from 10 to 10 on the ladder). If they are excluded from this category, 25 % in Banjul and 9 % in Kerewan have seen no change at all.

The EL of the farmers is slightly higher than that of the workers. [144] This corresponds to the frustration-aggression argument: the farmers have experience greater progressive change and, hence, expects more than the workers.

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143. This assumes that the farmers do not consider the social context outside Kerewan and the neighbouring villages. Outside these villages there are many different ethnic groups.

144. The expected respect positions among the workers and the farmers:

	BANJUL WORKERS											
Position	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Average:	St. Dev.:
Number	1	2	-	1	3	3	2	4	3	117	9.56	1.37
	KEREWAN FARMERS											
Number	-	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	-	125	9.88	0.80

High income workers have experienced greater change than low incom workers and they also feel less deprived. Middle aged workers have seen greater improvement than old workers and feel less deprived.

Among the farmers high income is related to a feeling of improvement but a higher degree of deprivation. The older the farmer is, the more improvement he experiences and the less deprived he feels.

The second measure of deprivation (a combination of actual structural position and a subjectively indicated) gives a result different from the first, [145] which can be seen from the table below.

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145. Among the workers respect has been constituted by two factors, namely housing standard and occupation. Housing standard has been divided into three categories: (1) renting a low standard house, (2) renting a high standard house, and (3) owning a house. Occupation has been divided into (1) low paid manual, (2) high paid manual, and (3) white collar.
In Kerewan the following classification has been used. Occupation: (1) small farmer, (2) big farmer, and (3) businessman, government employee, Marabout, or white collar. Housing standard: (1) grass hut with grass roof and earth floor, (2) grass hut with corrugated roof and floor, and (3) other.
The actual level is that of the interviewee as observed. Expected level is that of the person, group or class which the interviewee wished to be alike.
The degree of deprivation has been estimated in the following manner:

Deprivation	Own occupation	Own house	Expected occupation	Expected housing
High	L	L	H	H
	L	L	H	M
	L	L	M	H
Medium	L	L	M	M
	L	M	M	H
	M	L	H	M
	M	M	H	H
Low	L	L	L	L
	M	M	M	M
	L	M	M	M
	M	L	M	M

Degree of respect deprivation	Banjul workers %	Kerewan workers %
High	8	6
Medium	67	70
Low	15	20
No data	10	4
	100	100

TABLE 4:3:M: Degree of respect deprivation as measured by actual and expected occupation, and housing standard among the G W U workers and the farmers in Kerewan.

I we accept the indices on respect which have been used here, we have to conclude that the workers seem to feel more deprived of respect values than the farmers. Among the workers those with low income, of middle age and with the lowest level of education seem to be most deprived. This is certainly a function of the indices used, since occupation and housing standard, for instance, correlate with income.

Among the farmers low age and low income is closely related to a high degree of deprivation, and here, too, the indices used are directly connected to income.

What, then, about the improvements in respect positions? Since the farmers have experienced the greater improvement, they should be expected to believe more than the workers that their respect position shall increase in the future.

Beliefs in respect improvement	Banjul workers %	Kerewan farmers %
Yes	88	95
DK	10	5
No	2	1
	100	101

TABLE 4:3:N: Beliefs about future respect improvement among the G W U workers and the farmers of Kerewan.

Differences in income do not change the beliefs about respect improvement, but among the workers as well as the farmers an optimistic view on future changes is related to low age. Among the workers, education seems to be the variable that is most strongly related to beliefs in changes: the higher the level of education, the more optimistic the worker is.

The ways of improving respect position most frequently mentioned by the workers and by the farmers were:

BANJUL WORKERS		KEREWAN FARMERS	
Through personal effort	31 %	By the help of Allah	30 %
By the help of Allah	14 %	We, the people	26 %
We, the people	13 %	Through personal effort	17 %
Through my children	10 %	By the help of the gov:t	8 %
Others	32 %	Others	19 %
	100 %		100 %

TABLE 4:3:0: Mentioned ways of improving own respect position among the G W U workers in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan.

Low age and high education are strongly related to beliefs in personal effort among the workers, while the low educated, more than others, mention Allah.

In Kerewan, Allah is mentioned most frequently by those with low age and low income and least frequently by young farmers with high income.

The discussion about respect deprivation can be summarized in the following manner:

(1) the hypothesis made in the beginning of the chapter is supported by the findings; workers feel more deprived than farmers do,
(2) this higher degree of deprivation does not depend on a higher EL but a lower AL,
(3) farmers, more than workers, believe that education strongly

146. See footnote 138.

contributes to respect,

(4) farmers, more than workers, feel that their respect position has improved, and

(5) farmers, more than workers, also believe that their respect position will continue to improve.

Finally a comparison between the three categories of values and the weight given to them in the two samples of people is presented below.

Economic value position	Banjul workers	Kerewan farmers
	Mean values	
Past	2,05	1,23
Present	2,07	1,50
Expected	8,67	9,71
Index change	+ 0,04	+ 0,28
Power value position		
Past	2,78	1,23
Present	3,71	1,39
Expected	8,79	9,40
Index change	+ 0,93	+ 0,09
Respect value position		
Past	4,53	2,85
Present	6,62	8,24
Expected	9,56	9,88
Index change	+ 0,44	+ 0,83

Some comments regarding to above figures are in order, viz: (1) the difference between the two samples, (2) the configuration of experienced change and expected within each sample, and (3) the preference pattern within each sample.

(1a) The farmers have a lower "before-level" than the workers in all three categories.

(1b) The farmers have a lower "present-level" on the economic and power dimensions but it is higher than that of the workers

on the respect dimension.
(1c) In general the farmers have a higher EL than the workers.
(2a) The farmers experience a greater positive change than the workers except on the power dimension.
(2b) Among the workers and the farmers the order of the value categories in different phases are:

	WORKERS	FARMERS
PAST:	respect > power > economic	respect > power > economic
PRESENT:	respect > power > economic	respect > economic > power
EXPECTED:	respect > power > economic	respect > economic > power

(2c) Aside from the one exception, i.e. power/respect in Banjul, the higher the degree of improvement, the higher is the level of expectation.
(3a) The preference pattern has not yet been discussed, but before it is done, it should be mentioned that respect is the most preferred value category in both samples, and it is the particular category about which the workers and the farmers alike have experienced the greatest changes and where they feel least deprived.

The various categories of values can be weighed and analyzed according to the preferences and the relationship between the weighed categories and degree of deprivation can be studied. This will be done in another chapter, but here we will reveal that no clear and unambigious patterns emerge.

Then, what about the preference pattern itself? Some comparisons are made between the two samples in next part of this chapter.

4.3.4 Preference Pattern

The particular kind of value deprivation which is most frustrating and contributes most to conflict cannot be identified *a priori*. It has to be investigated in different social contexts and at various times. The workers and farmers were asked

to weigh the importance of values in three categories, and as a result, the following pattern emerged:

	Banjul workers %	Kerewan farmers %
Economic > power > respect	10	4
Economic > respect > power	11	9
Power > economic > respect	4	1
Power > respect > economic	10	16
Respect > economic > power	27	29
Respect > power > economic	28	37
Not logical	7	5
No answer	2	
	100	101
Weight according to index values:		
Economic	1,81	1,57
Power	1,74	1,78
Respect	2,45	2,65

The workers place more stress on economic values and less stress on power and respect values than the farmers do, and the farmers give more weight to power than to economic values.

In previous parts of this chapter it has been shown that the workers as well as the farmers feel least deprived of respect values, which are, also, most preferred. This could be taken as an indication showing that the component "absolute deprivation" of the conflict potential is not very strong. What will be decisive in the future is, however, the changes that occur to the farmers and the workers and how they perceive these changes.

Some comments will also be made upon the relation between the preference patterns and background (structural) variables. Differences in education, age, income etc can be assumed to contribute to differences between the samples in regard to preference pattern.

Among the workers economic values are most preferred by those with high age, low income and low education. Power values are - in comparison to other categories - most preferred by those with low age, low income and high education. Respect values are most emphasized by those with low income, low education and low age.

In Kerewan economic values are most stressed by people with low age and low income and least stressed by those with very high age and low income. Power values are given the greatest importance by those with low age and low income, but the difference between various age and income groups is not significant. Respect values are most stressed by old farmers with low income.

In summarizing the discussion of the preference pattern we can say that (1) the older the worker and the higher his income is, the more he stresses economic values and the reverse holds in Kerewan, but the trend in Banjul is related to education; the older and high income workers have low education, (2) the older the worker and the higher his income the less he stresses power values, and, also here, the reverse holds among the farmers and, (3) there does not seem to be any differences between the workers and the farmers in the weight given to respect values other than that the farmers give respect greater importance in comparison to other values.

4.3.5 Social Frames of Reference and Deprivation

In previous parts of this chapter it has been shown that the quantitative degree of deprivation was greater among the farmers than among the workers, which - in many cases - is contrary to the hypothesis made in the beginning of the chapter.

Nor was the corollary hypothesis (that education and urbanization produces higher degree of deprivation) supported by the findings. Two factors can be assumed to explain the unpredicted

results: (1) a frustration-apathy sequence present among the workers but not among the farmers, and (2) differences in social frames of reference (a qualitative aspect of the measures on the scales). The first factor has been analyzed in the previous part of this chapter, and it was found that it could explain some, but not all, of the unexpected results.

The second aspect of the patterns of absolute deprivation will now be analyzed namely the social frames of reference of the farmers and the workers. A social frame of reference is the cognitive, evaluative and affective field of an individual. That is to say, the social context that he knows, evaluates positively or negatively and to which he has positive or negative feelings. It is within this context that he judges his personal effort, his situation and so on.

It can be assumed that the workers have wider frames of reference than the farmers. That is to say, the workers think about their positions in relation to those of the elite groups and the groups just below the elites in the capital, while the farmers have the most influential and wealthiest people of the village in mind, when they consider their positions.[147]

The workers have a quantitatively smaller degree of deprivation than the farmers, but the gap between EL and AL has different meanings among the former than among the latter. Which gap (quantitative or qualitative) implies the highest degree of frustration is not possible to say at this stage. I would propose that people with wider frames of reference put their EL lower than those with narrower frames of reference, since, for the former, a top position on the ladder means an elite position while it is a top position within a smaller segment of the population for the latter. Hence, the quantity of deprivation tends to be larger for the latter.

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147. Deutsch 1961, argues that urbanization, education and many other factors implied in a situation indentical to that of the workers of Banjul widen the social frames of reference. See also Almond & Verba 1965, pp 15-26 and Warshay 1962, pp 156 ff in Rose, ed. 1962.

4.3.5.1 Economic Deprivation and Social Frames of Reference

The social frames of reference are here taken to be indicated by the sources of deprivation that the workers and farmers have mentioned spontaneously when asked whom or what prevented them from attaining the position to which they felt entitled. Some sources were mentioned more often than others and can be grouped into the same category, which has been done in the table below.

Perceived source of deprivation	Banjul workers %	Kerewan farmers %
National government	32	10
Work conditions/village	37	4
Allah, fortune, etc [148]	24	77
Various sources [149]	4	9
NA, DK, ND	3	1
	100	101

TABLE 4:3:P: The G W U workers' and Kerewan farmers' social frames of reference in regard to economic deprivation.

148. There is a contradiction in the answers. The interviewees were asked what position they thought that they had the right to attain and then they were asked whom or what prevented them from reaching this position. Many, particularly among the farmers, said that it was the will of Allah that they had not reached a higher position. They seem to say "According to Allah I have the right to attain this and that position but it is the will of Allah that I do not reach it". Two interpretations can be made: (1) the higher position pointed out is the position they aspire to and not the one that they feel entitled to, and (2) it is just a manner of speaking when referring to Allah and, hence, it is not very important for people to attain the higher position they pointed out on the ladders presented to them.

149. Placed in the category "various sources" are answers such as: "I have no education", "My parents have no education", "We are poor people" etc. The "work condition" category includes answers such as "My foreman does not recognize me", "People at my work do not know my capacity", "You are promoted according to age and not to skill". "Village conditions" are mentioned by the farmers and includes answers such as "People in Kerewan do not recognize me", "I am not a son of the Alkali", "There are no opportunities in Kerewan" etc. NA = no answer, DK = don't know, and ND = no deprivation.

There are considerable differences between the answers received from the workers and the farmers. Nearly a third of the workers mention the national government as the source of their deprivation and still more point to their work conditions. Three fourths of the farmers say that it is the will of Allah that they have not attained the economic position to which they felt "entitled".

Analytically it would be possible to find out two dimensions of the sources mentioned, each directly related to the effects of deprivation. One concerns space and the other the continuum of secular/sacred. A social frame of reference including, for instance, the national government and a secular component can be assumed to have a stronger bearing on the conflict potential than other combinations on these two dimensions. If the two dimensions are taken as a point of departure, we find that the workers have wider and more secular frames of reference than the farmers.

Among the workers the mentioning of the national government is related to the combination of high education/low income. Low income workers with low education think that their work conditions prevent them from rising on the ladder. Old and low educated workers mention work conditions and Allah most frequently.

Middle aged farmers with high income mention the national government as the source of their deprivation more than other farmers do. The likelihood of referring to Allah is equally distributed among different age and income categories of the farmers.

Now, how are the social frames of reference related to the degree (the quantity) of deprivation?

Degree of deprivation	Banjul workers			Kerewan farmers		
	Source of deprivation 150					
	Gov:t	Work	Allah	Gov:t	Various	Allah
High	74	72	53	75	77	73
Low	26	28	47	25	23	27
	100	100	100	100	100	100 %
N =	43	50	32	12	12	99

TABLE 4:3:Q: Social frames of reference and the quantity of economic deprivation among the G W U workers and the Kerewan farmers.

There are no great differences between the degree of deprivation against the background of sources mentioned or between the two samples except in one case: workers referring to Allah feel much less deprived than others. The assumption that the workers have wider frames of reference is supported. But contrary to the second assumption, workers with wider frames of reference feel more deprived quantitatively than those with narrower frames of reference. Among the farmers some of the categories include too a small number to permit any conclusions.

4.3.5.2 Power Deprivation and Social Frames of Reference

The workers and the farmers were also asked to mention the source of their power deprivation, and their answers are assumed to reveal their social frames of reference within the "power sphere".

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150. Categories including only a small number of answers have been excluded from the tables illustrating the relationship between sources mentioned and degree of deprivation and, thus, the number of cases does not reach 134 and 128 respectively. The classification of "low" and "high" degree of deprivation is not done in the same manner as in 4.3.1, 4.3.2 and 4.3.3.

Perceived source of power deprivation	Banjul workers %	Kerewan farmers %
National government	22	6
Work conditions/village	34	4
Allah, fortune etc	20	72
Various sources	5	16
NA, ND, DK	19	3
	100	101

TABLE: 4:3:P: The G W U workers´and the Kerewan farmers´ social frames of reference in regard to power deprivation.

There are also, in regard to power deprivation, great differences between the farmers and the workers. The former mention Allah and the latter national government and work conditions to a large extent.

20 % of the answers of the farmers fall within the categories of "village conditions" and "various sources". Most of them read "I am not of the Alkali´s family".

The answers can be compared to those on economic deprivation. A smaller proportion feel deprived of power values than of economic values.

The relationship between sources mentioned and the degree of power deprivation is illustrated in the table below.

Degree of power deprivation	Banjul workers Source of deprivation			Kerewan farmers		
	Gov:t	Work	Allah	Gov:t	Various	Allah
High	83	76	67	100	81	80
Low	17	24	33	-	19	20
	100	100	100	100	100	100 %
N =	29	46	27	8	20	92

TABLE 4:3:S: Social frames of reference and the quantity of power deprivation among the G W U workers and the Kerewan farmers.

Obviously there is a relationship between sources mentioned and degree of deprivation. Those mentioning the government experience a higher degree of deprivation than those referring to Allah (but in the case of Kerewan the figures are too small to function as a basis for conclusions).

Workers with a combination of high education and low income mention the national government as the source of deprivation more often than other workers do. Work conditions are mentioned most frequently by middle aged workers with low income, and Allah by old and low educated workers.

In Kerewan the national government is seen as the source of deprivation particularly by the middle aged farmers with high income. Allah is most frequently mentioned by farmers with high age and high income.

4.3.5.3 Respect Deprivation and Social Frames of Reference

Finally respect deprivation will be considered in connection with social frames of reference. In previous parts of this chapter it has been discovered that farmers and workers feel less deprived of respect values than of other values.

Perceived source of respect deprivation	Banjul workers %	Kerewan farmers %
National government	16	1
Work conditions/village	22	2
Allah, fortune, etc	14	23
Various sources	2	7
NA, ND, DK	45	68
	99	101

TABLE 4:3:T: The G W U workers´ and the Kerewan farmers´ social frames of reference in regard to respect values.

Again, we find great differences between the two samples. The workers refer to the government and to work place conditions, while the farmers say that their deprivation is the will of Allah. We also find that there are more farmers than workers who do not feel deprived.

The relationship between sources mentioned and degree of deprivation is illustrated in the table below.

Degree of respect deprivation	Banjul workers			Kerewan farmers		
	Source of deprivation					
	Gov:t	Work	Allah	Gov:t	Various	Allah
High	73	68	58		100	100
Low	27	32	42		-	-
	100	100	100		100	100
N =	22	29	19	1	9	30

TABLE 4:3:U: Social frames of reference and the degree of respect deprivation among the G W U workers and the Kerewan farmers.

Again, those referring to the government as the source of their deprivation feel more deprived quantitatively than those mentioning Allah, but the number of cases in each category is too small to permit any conclusions. However, it can be said that the workers have wider frames of reference than the farmers as measured by the sources of deprivation mentioned.

A certain pattern appears: the wider the social frames of referance, the more deprived people in both samples feel. Although the farmers have a high degree of quantitative deprivation, they have more narrow frames of reference than the workers.

The relationship between quantity and quality of AD on one hand and the capabilities and actions of the political elite on the other will not be discussed in detail here. Only a few comments will be made. Most of the workers are government employees, and they are aware of that. They also regard many social events and phenomena as a result of government action

or "non-action". Only a small proportion of the farmers feel that the actions of the national government affects them, although a large part of the life in the village actually is affected by the capabilities of the government in the capital.

4.3.5.4 Relative Value Deprivation

Analytically it is possible to distinguish a second kind of deprivation, namely relative deprivation. That is, deprivation in relation to the amount of values others have or receive.[151] The EL is here substituted by the level others are perceived to have. Empirically, however, it is difficult to differentiate absolute deprivation from relative deprivation, since it can be assumed that individuals do not base their expectations in a social vacuum but rather upon the situations of some other individuals, groups or classes.[152] Thus, there is a qualitative as well as a quantitative component of deprivation. The former can be considered from two aspects: the source of deprivation and what deprivation is felt in relation to. The source of deprivation has been taken as an indication of social frames of reference in regard to absolute deprivation, while the compared individuals, groups etc will be taken as the basis for a classification of the qualitative aspects of relative deprivation.

The individuals, groups or classes whose position seems to be similar to their own in some aspect might be taken as a point of comparison. If their own position is perceived to be unjustly inferior to that of the compared groups, relative deprivation RD, is present.[153]

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151. Merton 1968, pp 283 ff.

152. Berger & Luckmann 1971, pp 43 ff.

153. If there are, for instance, two dimensions in the social situation of all individuals and some individuals are lower on one dimension, it can be assumed that they will find this lower position injust, see Galtung 1964, pp 98 ff, and Patchen 1968:I,pp 167 ff in Hyman & Singer, eds, 1968.

Individuals, whose social frames of reference are narrow, are able to take only isolated social and geographical groups into account; qualitatively they experience a small degree of RD, while nothing can be assumed concerning their quantity of RD. Thus, RD is connected to changes in the political system, particularly in the beliefs, during the mobilization process. [154]

There are two kinds of reference groups, namely comparative and normative. [155] In the case of the former, one´s own value position is compared, while in the latter case the reference group functions as a guide for the formation of one´s own beliefs. These two aspects are not always possible to distinguish empirically, but the aspect that is of interest here is the comparative one.

Patchen makes a distinction between perceived and objective comparisons (both can be either consonant or dissonant), [156] and this distinction is relevant in the present context. The perceived comparison is that which the individual makes against the background of his own judgments, while the objective is that which is just according to cultural values and norms. The former is used in the subjective measurement of relative deprivation. [157]

There is no total agreement among the sociologists on which groups might be taken as reference groups. However, it is assumed that any group can be taken as a reference group if it has some characteristics similar to one´s own situation.

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154. Mobilization is here used in the same manner as by, for instance, Deutsch 1961. Mobilization implies a widening in the social frames of reference.
155. Runciman 1968, p 12.
156. Patchen 1968:I,pp 169, 170, in Hyman & Singer, eds, 1968.
157. This does not mean that the beliefs and expectations of the individuals are independent of the prevailing beliefs and expectations in the political system but only that the latter are not investigated here, or if it is, this is done indirectly when the individual himself makes his judgments.

It has been empirically demonstrated that education, urbanization, presence of groups on welfare and other factors influencing the beliefs, produces crucial levels in the social frames of reference and, hence, in the quality of relative deprivation. That is to say, the pattern of RD seems to include more frustrations in societies that are changing than those maintaining the status quo.

The degree of relative deprivation in different groups or classes is related to the actions of the political elite; in some regards this relationship is identical to that between the actions of the political elite on one hand and absolute deprivation on the other (see p 128), in other regards the relationship is more complicated.

The scheme below can be taken as point of departure for an analysis of this relationship. However, the scheme will not be used or commented upon in its totality but only some hints will be given.

The perceived position of one´s own group or class	Perception of one´s own position	The perceived value positions of other individuals, groups or classes Decreasing Unchanged Increasing
Decreasing	Decreasing unchanged increasing	
Unchanged	decreasing unchanged increasing	
Increasing	decreasing unchanged increasing	

First, the general social frames of reference have to be considered the crucial factor. There are, for instance, differences between the social space within which an individual com-

pares his situation: people at the same work place, people in one´s own ethnic group, one´s own class, the nation as a whole and so on.

Secondly, when the social frames of reference have been laid down, we have to explore the perceived changes of own situation and that of relevant others. [158]

4.4.1 Relative Economic Deprivation

The self-anchoring striving scales have been used to indicate the individual´s own positions as well as that of relevant others. Who these relevant others are has also been measured; first the farmers and workers have been asked to place other individuals, groups etc, whose positions they want to reach, on the scales, and then they have been asked to mention whom these individuals, groups or classes are.

First the quantitative degree of relative deprivation will be estimated and then the qualitative aspect will be introduced. The latter has been based on the categories of people that are mentioned by the workers and the farmers as their reference groups.

From previous parts of this chapter we have seen that the farmers feel more economically deprived than the workers (assuming that only the quantitative aspect is taken into consideration). Thus, they can also be expected to feel a higher degree of relative deprivation, which they actually do (see the table below).

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158. By "relevant others" I mean the individuals, groups or classes whose situation is well-known to the individual and with which he compares his situation. The basis for the comparison has been commented upon on page 162.

Degree of relative economic deprivation [159]	Banjul workers %	Kerewan farmers %
High	61	84
Medium	22	13
Low	6	1
DC	10	2
	99	100

TABLE 4:4:A: Relative economic deprivation (quantitatively) among the G W U workers and the Kerewan farmers. DC = don't compare. Those experiencing no RD are included in the category of "low".

There is obviously a higher degree of RD among the farmers (the patterns does not change even if another classification of low and high degree of deprivation is used).

What, then, about the qualitative aspects? The groups in comparison to which the workers and the farmers feel deprived are presented below. [160]

Compared reference group or class	Banjul workers %	Kerewan farmers %
High-high	13	2
High	46	59
Own	28	37
ND	3	-
DC	10	2
	100	100
N =	134	128

TABLE 4:4:B: Relative economic deprivation as indicated by reference group or class among the G W U workers and the Kerewan farmers.

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159. The classification of various degrees of RD has been based on the number of steps on the ladders. A difference between the comparer and the compared of 1-3 steps has been classified as low RD, 4-6 as medium and 7-9 as high.

160. The following classification has been used for qualitative degree of RD:
High-high: "politicians", "big businessmen", "civil servants"
High: "businessmen", "foremen", "Marabouts", "big farmers"
Own: "workers like me", "people at my work place", "farmers like me", "people like me" etc.

The table shows that a larger portion of the workers than the farmers mentions high-high groups as their reference group. More farmers than workers mention their own group, and 10 % of the workers reject the idea of comparing themselves with others.[161] Thus, the workers seem to have wider social frames of reference than the farmers. They place themselves within a wider social and political space when they compare their own situation with that of others. Which pattern of deprivation (that of the workers or that of the farmers) is the most frustrating is not possible to say on the basis of data that have been collected.

Among the workers, level of education is crucial but age and income also play a certain role. Among the low-educated workers 5 % mention high-high groups, while 29 % of those with the highest level of education do so.

Among the farmers, those with high income and low age mentioned high-high groups more than those with low income and high age.

4.4.2 Relative Power Deprivation

It has been shown that the farmers experience a higher degree of absolute power deprivation (quantitatively) than the workers. Consequently, they also should feel a higher degree of relative deprivation.

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161. To reject the idea of comparing one´s own situation with that of others seems to imply that the person reject the social structures and the criteria according to which the values are distributed. The answers on other questions concerning the political objects and the use of violence seem to support this argument.

Degree of relative power deprivation[162]	Banjul workers %	Kerewan farmers %
High	41	86
Medium	24	9
Low	25	4
DC	10	2
	100	101

TABLE 4:4:C: Relative power deprivation (quantitatively) among the G W U workers and the Kerewan farmers. ND included in the category of "low".

The degree of deprivation is considerably higher among the farmers than among the workers. However, the pattern is radically changed, if we take the qualitative aspect into consideration.

Compared reference group or class	Banjul workers %	Kerewan farmers %
High-high	11	1
High	34	58
Own	29	38
ND	16	2
DC	10	2
	100	101

TABLE 4:4:D: Relative power deprivation as indicated by selection of reference group or class among the G W U workers in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan.

Also in power regards are there great differences between the workers in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan. The workers have politicians and big businessmen as their reference groups to a larger extent than what the farmers have. However, the latter mention a higher group (businessmen, big farmers etc) more

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162. A difference of 1-8 steps between one´s own position and that of the compared group is classified as "low" and 9 steps as "high" degree of RD. Those experiencing no degree of deprivation have been included in the "low" category.

than the workers do. There are reasons to assume that the farmers have local businessmen and tradesmen in their minds, when they mention the high group. Only a few say "higher government employees", and if they do, they mean the government employee (ferry men, drivers etc) in their own village.

The relationship between the agglomeration of structural variables and variations in RD in economic regards are also present here: highly educated workers and farmers with high income and low age mention high-high groups more than others do.

4.4.3 Relative Respect Deprivation

The farmers experience a lower degree of absolut respect deprivation than the workers. The same pattern also applies in the case of relative deprivation (quantitatively).

Degree of relative respect deprivation [163]	Banjul workers %	Kerewan farmers %
High	23	23
Medium	19	72
Low	48	4
DC	10	2
	100	101

TABLE 4:4:E: Relative respect deprivation (quantitatively) among the G W U workers and the Kerewan farmers. ND included in "low".

163. See footnote 162.

Farmers do feel a lower degree of relative respect deprivation than the workers. If we compare their deprivation in qualitative regards, the difference is still more striking.

Compared reference group or class	Banjul workers %	Kerewan farmers %
High-high	9	-
High	25	21
Own	19	12
ND	36	65
DC	10	2
	99	100

TABLE 4:4:F: Relative respect deprivation as indicated by selection of reference group or class among the G W U workers in Banjul and the Kerewan farmers.

First, it should be noted that no farmers compare their own situations with that of a high-high group, while 9 % of the workers do so. Secondly, a considerably larger portion of the farmers than workers feels no relative deprivation of respect values at all.

In Banjul, a high degree of deprivation is connected with high education and low age. In Kerewan, those farmers with medium income and low age feel more deprived than others.

When summarizing this part of the chapter, it can be said that the farmers experience more deprivation than the workers when economic and power values are concerned but less deprivation of respect values. If selection of reference group is taken into account, another pattern emerges: the workers compare themselves with elite groups to a larger extent than the farmers do. The latter have local businessmen in the countryside in mind when they consider their own situation.

4.5 Value Inconsistency

Johnson, Smelser and many others argue that more than a few factors are necessary for imbalance in a system, a number of factors have to be taken into account for an explanation.[164] In previous parts of this chapter structures, absolute deprivation and relative deprivation have been regarded as components of the conflict potential. The fourth component is value inconsistency. It means that an individual, a group or a class has different positions in the three categories of values.[165]

Value inconsistency is assumed to imply status inconsistency as well as cognitive dissonance and frustration.[166] Status inconsistency means that an individual has different statuses within different spheres. If he has high status in politics,

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164. See, for instance, Johnson 1964, pp 8 and passim and Smelser 1962, pp 14-22.
165. An inconsistent value base is, for instance, low economic position, high power position and low respect position.
166. Status inconsistency is a certain combination of structural variables. On this concept and the effects of status, inconsistency, see Goffman 1957, pp 279-280, Himmelstrand 1969, pp 97-98, Jackson 1962, pp 476-477 and Lenski 1954, p 411. Cognitive dissonance and frustration are social psychological concepts. On the former see Patchen 1968 :II and on the latter Berkowitz 1962, and Gurr 1970.

he interacts with people in elite groups, and if he, at the same time, has low economic status, he interacts with people of lower groups or classes in the economic context.

Only clustered inconsistencies are of interest here. Groups and classes which are in a situation of identical inconsistency patterns are likely to communicate their discontent to each other.[167] The discussion about the relation between deprivation and conflict applies here also: if some group or structure is perceived to prevent the attainment of a consistent pattern, there is a conflict.

According to the assumptions that were made on page 26 every down-ward movement is against the will of a person. Therefore, it follows that a person evaluates the lower position negatively. He wants to change it, but in order to attain consistency he is not willing to lower his higher position(s). The possibilities that remain are (1) denying the relevancy of the low position(s), (2) avoiding interaction in the "lower" group or class, (3) trying to change the low position to a higher or (4) rejecting the structures altogether and the criteria according to which values are distributed.[168]

Denying of the lower position(s) is not always possible. If the position is, for instance, connected with race in a strongly race discriminating society, it is impossible to escape the lower position. Or, as in many parts of Africa, if the lower position is linked to ethnicity, the individual is not able to avoid it. Avoiding interaction with one group or class is easier, but the individual has the bear the low position for himself in any case. If he tries to change the low position to a higher one, he can either "climbe the ladder" within the existing structures or make efforts to destroy them. Alone he can climbe the ladders, which has often been the case in many of

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167. Galtung 1964, p 99 and Lipset 1968, pp 160 ff.
168. Himmelstrand 1969, pp 85-89.

the industrialized countries, but he alone cannot destroy the structures, because he will be defined as a deviant and controlled accordingly by those interested in status quo. If he is to be succesful in destroying the structures, he has to join others. [169]

The value categories themselves can not be rejected. They are postulated to exist in very empirical system and are essential characteristics of social life. However, the criteria according to which the distribution of values occur, and the content of the value categories can be rejected. If an individual rejects the content of the categories, then it is a belief contradiction in the system. A trivial example can be given to illustrate this. The individual can, for instance, change his beliefs and begin to demand more money to spend on education for his children instead uf using his present amount on clothes for himself.

When discussing the effects of value inconsistency, we also have to take into consideration the ways in which high value positions are reached. The individuals´ reactions seem to be different if he has achieved his high position himself rather than if it has been ascribed to him. [170]

Since three value categories have been postulated, there are three dimensions on which individuals can experience value inconsistency. But what about the number of positions on each dimensions? It does not seem to be fruitful to point out a certain number of positions a priori; it has to be explored in every empirical case.

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169. Galtung 1964, p 109, Smelser 1962, pp 73-74, 332-333.
170. Jackson 1962, pp 476-477. A high position ascribed in combination with a low position achieved is said to result in intrapunitive aggression while a low position ascribed combinel with a high position achieved produces extra-punitive aggression.

Value inconsistency can be measured in two different ways: (1) it can be estimated from the actual positions on the subjective scales, and (2) it can be indicated by structural variables.[171] The first method is ambiguious, since we are not certain whether the three scales are comparable; the can be indications of three different social spaces or social frames of reference, the one wider or narrower than the other.

If the second method is used, certain variables have to be postulated as indications on values of certain categories (income as an indication on economic values, for instance). Furthermore, certain combinations of variables or values of variables have to be taken as indications on value inconsistency. It can be difficult to find variables that are relevant and valid as measures on values of a certain category in a changing society. For exemple, one cannot postulate that education is an indication of, for instance, respect in the African countryside; religious position might be more important. On both methods could be argued that the categori tion of values that has been made earlier seems to be difficult to use as a basis for measurement of value inconsistency. Furthermore, we will not easily find variables indicating each value category separately.

In the case of the first method it is obvious that the three scales representing economic, power and respect values do not imply an identical social context. When it concerns the structural variables, they will not be used as indications on values of a certain category except in one case: income seems to be a good measure of economic value position.[172] Combinations of structural variables will be used as measures on value inconsistency and, hence, we receive the following patterns in the two samples.[173]

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171) The following variables have been used to indicate, structurally, the value inconsistency: in Banjul - income, education and age, and in Kerewan - income and age.

172) It can be added that the relevancy of education, tribe and age to respect has been measured and weighted. In both samples, education received greater importance than the others (see 4.3.3).

Value inconsistency on the subjective scales can be presented in different ways. Here I use a simple product

BANJUL

INCOME	AGE			EDUCATION		
	LOW	HIGH		LOW	HIGH	
LOW	37	8	= 45	17	27	= 44
HIGH	29	27	= 56	28	28	= 56
	66	35	=101%	45	55	=100

EDUCATION	AGE LOW	HIGH	
LOW	19	26	= 45
HIGH	45	9	= 54
	64	35	= 99%

TABLE IV:5:A: Age/income, education/income and age/education as measures on value consistency/inconsistency among the G W U workers in Banjul. Inconsistent patterns are underlined.

KEREWAN

INCOME	AGE		
	LOW	HIGH	
LOW	17	35	= 52
HIGH	23	24	= 57
	40	57	= 99%

TABLE IV:5:B: Age/income as measure on value consistency/ inconsistency among farmers in Kerewan. Inconsistent patterns are underlined.

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moment correlation between the actual positions on the three scales. The higher the negative value of the coefficient, the greater the inconsistency. The inconsistency pattens have been measured only for two variables at a time:

	BANJUL WORKERS		KEREWAN FARMERS	
	Economic	Power	Economic	Power
Economic	-	+ 0.27	-	+ 0.41
Respect	+ 0.23	+ 0.28	+ 0.14	+ 0.11

The inconsistency between economic position and power position is higher among the workers than the farmers, while the latter have a higher inconsistency between economic position on the one side and power and respect on the other. The inconsistency among the workers and the farmers can be said to be moderate, since r_{xy} = -1.00 when it is maximum and + 1.00 when at minimum.

First, one cannot assume that inconsistent patterns of age and education in themselves are conflict laden to the individual but in combination with income, for instance, they should be.[174)]

Secondly, 8 % of the workers are old but have a low income and they can be assumed to find themselves in conflict laden situations. The inconsistent pattern of low age/ high income (29%) should not be harmful to the individual. 27 % of the workers have a high education but a low income and such a pattern can be assumed to imply the most stressing situation.

Third, 35 % of the farmers have high age but low income, which is a much larger proportion than among the workers.

Quantitatively, then, the value inconsistency is higher among the farmers than among the workers, but we are not able to take the qualitative aspects into account, since we do not know which patterns are most stressing to the individual. It could, perhaps, be argued that workers with high age, high education and low income find themselves in the most inconsistent patterns, but their number is very low.

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173) The variables used are not intended to indicate any particular value category, although income, education and age could be used as measures on economic position, power position and respect position respectively.

174) The averages of income, age and education in the samples have been used as the basis for classification in "low" and "high". These averages do not say anything about the social context and the social consequences, but can only function as crude guide-lines.

A high position in the samples might mean a low position in the wider social context. If we dichotomize the positions, the following scheme can function as an illustration:

	POSITION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CAPITAL OR THE VILLAGE			
	LOW		HIGH	
Position in the sample	Position in the context of only the workers and farmers respectively			
	Low	High	Low	High
Low				
High	x	x		

(cont.)

4.6 Belief Patterns.

Belief systems are the individual sets of beliefs, while belief patterns are the conglomerations or structured clusters of belief systems in a larger group, a class or in the society as a whole.

4.6.1 General Beliefs.

The term "values" has been given a great number of definitions, and very often the authors use the term and take its content for granted.[175] Therefore, the term beliefs has been and will be used in the present work. Beliefs have four elements and have been divided into five dimensions. The four elements (cognition, evaluation, feeling and action) will not be discussed here.[176] However, with these elements included, the definition of the term is rather similar to that of attitude systems (as defined by some authors[177]), and, hence, beliefs are possible to analyze in five dimensions: orientation to time, space, relation, energy and social reality. All dimensions should be regarded as continuous scales but here they have been trichotomized.

(cont note 174)

A high position in the sample might imply a low position among the workers in Banjul/farmers in Kerewan as well as a low position in the context of the capital (including elite groups and other) and the village (including chiefs and Marabouts).

175) The problem is more complicated by the fact that the term "values" also has different translations into the Swedish language. Different meanings of "values" are "values as a cluster of attitudes" (Galtung 1961, p 25): "cultural goals" (Merton 1968, pp 180, 193), "modes of normative orientation of action.." (Parsons 1951, p 171), "patterned... principles which give order and direction to the ever-flowing stream of human acts and thoughts.." (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck 1961, p 4), The definition of beliefs above is similar to that of "values" as defined by Galtung and Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck. "Ideology" has been avoided for the same reason as "values". Examples illustrating the disagreement on the term can be found in Apter 1964:"Introduction", pp 16-17, in Apter, ed 1964, and Sartori 1968, p 398.

176) Krech, Crutchfield & Ballachey 1961, pp 139-140.

177) Ibid.

Dimension:	Perception:
(1) time	(a) contemporary situation as linked to the past or anchored in the past
	(b) contemporary as isolated from past or future situations
	(c) contemporary as linked to future (perhaps imagined) situations
(2) space	(a) particularism
	(b) mixed
	(c) universalism
(3) relation	(a) hierarchical
	(b) mixed
	(c) egalitarian
(4) energy	(a) passive
	(b) mixed
	(c) active
(5) social reality	(a) social events directed by divine forces
	(b) some events directed by divine forces, some by actions of human beings
	(c) social events directed by the actions of human beings

The first dimension concerns the perspective of time emphasized by the individual. He can give priority to the present or the past or to future conditions.[178] The social sphere included in the cognitive field of an individual is particular if it includes only, for instance, those living in the same village, while it is universal if it includes groups in a whole nation.

Relations between individuals and groups in society can be perceived as hierarchical at one extreme and egalitarian at the other.[179]

By energy I mean the beliefs about the relationship between man and his environment. It is passive if man is considered unable to manipulate the environment, and for a native belief the opposite applies.[180]

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178) Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck 1961, pp 10-11.
179) Krech, Crutchfield & Ballachey 1961, pp 139-140.
180) Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck 1961, pp 10-11.

Social reality is taken to mean the orientation towards non-empirical phenomena. At one extreme, the individual perceives everything as directed and ordered by divine forces; at the other, all events are thought to be explainable in terms of empirically testable laws.[181)]

Above only the cognitive element in the five dimensions have been described. However, the evaluative element has been measured among the Gambian workers and farmers, and it can be said here, that also this element has been trichotomized into positive, neutral and negative.

The beliefs determine which objects an individual knows and how he evaluates them. In other words: the three value categories and their content is determined by, or is based in, the belief patterns.[182)]

Belief systems vary from one individual to another but in general they are patterned according to subcultural, religious, class and other lines.[183)] In most empirical political systems there is some degree of contradiction between different belief patterns. We can, for instance, talk about a unimodal belief pattern if there is a complete consensus in the political system, bimodal if there are two opposite belief patterns and multimodal if there are many different belief patterns.[184)] Belief patterns can be either contradictory in themselves or in relation to other belief patterns. In the first case there is a low degree of correspondence between beliefs of the same individual. In the second case a belief pattern is contradictory only when confronted by another, dissimilar, belief pattern.[185)]

Below only four dimensions will be analyzed. The cognitive element will be considered in some, the evaluative in others. It will be done in the following manner.

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181) Berger & Luckmann 1971, pp 13-15, 27, 34 and passim.
182) One can distinguish between instrumental and goal beliefs as well as between instrumental and goal values. This has not been done here, since we have no interest in knowing whether individuals seek values per se or in order to attain other values. See Crocket 1966, pp 289-290, in Smelser & Lipset, eds, 1966.
183) Converse 1964, pp 240-242, in Apter ed, 1964, Lipset 1959, pp 106-108, 115-120.

Relations:	cognition, evaluation
Energy:	cognition
Social reality:	cognition
Time	evaluation

Space is not analyzed here but has been considered when social frames of reference were analyzed (see IC:3:5).

The analytical classification of dimensions will not be used when we come to political beliefs, which are beliefs about the political objects. Furthermore, no explicit account for contradictions between belief patterns will be given although the problem is touched upon when I deal with comparisons between belief patterns in the tables below.[186)]

The beliefs of the elite groups, particularly those of the political elite have not been explored and, hence, the contradictions between the belief patterns of the elites and the masses respectively will not be considered here.

The beliefs are assumed to either decrease or increase the conflict potential. A belief that, for instance, human beings can change their social situation and that the political leaders are not very powerful is presumed to strengthen the conflict potential.[187)]

Beliefs are affected by the capabilities of the political elite in many ways. The distributive capability directly affects the beliefs about the power of the political elite. The same applies to the regulative capability, while the communicative capability affects the allocation of and distribution of new belief patterns (through education, for instance) or maintain and strenghthen existing, often status quo,beliefs.[188)]

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184) Edelman 1964, pp 175-177.
185) Structures which do not synchronize with the beliefs of the members of the system are in contradiction to these beliefs. See Johnson 1966, pp 64 ff.
186) These aspects are dealt with implicitly on many occasions, for instance, when the workers and farmers were asked what prevented them from attaining the position they felt entitled to. Data necessary for a systematic analysis of the relation between structures and beliefs are not available.
187) Gurr 1970, pp 170 and 232, Huntington 1968, pp 34 ff and 59 ff.
188) Bachrach & Baratz 1972, p 55, Berg 1971, pp 232 ff.

Finally, a distinction should be made between more complicated beliefs on one hand and beliefs about value positions on the other. In the first case it concerns beliefs about, for instance, the society and components of the society. In the second we focus only on perception of actual value position and expected value position.

Now over to the beliefs of the G W U workers in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan. First, beliefs about the power structure (relations) will be analyzed. There are two aspects implied here: (1) the belief in the existence of a power hierarchy and (2) an evaluation of the fact that there is/is not a hierarchy.[189]

PRESENCE OF POWERFUL PEOPLE	BANJUL WORKERS %	KEREWAN FARMERS %
AGREE	96	99
NEITHER/NOR	3	1
DISAGREE	2	-
	101	100
N =	134	128

TABLE IV:6:A: The G W U workers' and the Kerewan farmers' beliefs about the power structure in the Gambian society.

There is a great difference between the farmers in Kerewan and the workers in the capital.

BETTER OBEY	BANJUL WORKERS %	KEREWAN FARMERS %
AGREE	53	76
NEITHER/NOR	16	24
DISAGREE	31	-
	100	100

TABLE IV:6:B: The evaluation of the G W U workers and the Kerewan farmers of their relation to the power structure.

Among the workers the evaluation of the power structure varies particularly with age and education. Those with low age and

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189) The actual statements were: "There are many powerful and strong people in this country" and "You had better obey powerful people whatever they say and do."

high education agrees least and those with high age and low education most. There are also differences between the ethnic groups. The minority groups agree more than Wollofs and Mandinkas regardless of age, education and income.

Farmers of middle age agree more than others, while those with low age and low income seem to be least likely to do so.

Most of the workers and farmers also agree that there are great economic and other social differences between people in the Gambia. 95 % of the workers and all the farmers say that there are such differences.[190)]

Another dimension in the belief pattern is that of activity/passivity: can human beings change their social and physical environment?[191)] On that dimension there is a considerable difference between the farmers and the workers. We know from other investigations that a passive orientation is related to the belief in divine forces, while an active orientation corresponds to secularization, particularly if this secularization is achieved through education.[192)]

HUMAN BEINGS CAN CHANGE	BANJUL WORKERS %	KEREWAN FARMERS %
AGREE	55	1
NEITHER/NOR	8	19
DISAGREE	38	81
	101	101

TABLE IV:6:C: The G W U workers' and the Kerewan farmers' beliefs about the ability of people to change their economic and social situation.

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190) The actual statement was: "There are great economic and other differences between people in this country."In some cases the statement was divided and given the following reading: "Some people in this country are very rich and some are very poor, some can decide much and some can decide only a little - do you agree or disagree to this?"

191) The actual statement was: "Human beings can change the great differences between people in this country." In some cases this statement was divided in the following manner: "We have said earlier that some people are powerful and rich and others are powerless and poor. Can the peoples themselves change this""

192) Converse 1964, pp 231-232, in Apter, ed 1964 and Tumin & Feldman 1961, passim.

Among the workers an active belief is strongly related to high education and low age. Among the farmers some of those with high income think that human beings can change their environment; none of the other farmers believe so.

Another dimension of the belief pattern is the perception of social reality, particularly in the beliefs about the relation between people and their environment.

THINGS DEPEND ON ALLAH	BANJUL WORKERS %	KEREWAN FARMERS[193] %
AGREE	81	97
NEITHER/NOR	4	2
DISAGREE	15	2
	100	100

TABLE IV:6:D: The G W U workers' and the Kerewan farmers' beliefs about the world as influenced by divine forces.

The belief that life is influenced by Allah is related to education; the higher the level of education, the less likely is the individual to agree to the statement. Even if the distribution of values of background variables are taken into account there is also a difference between the ethnical groups in Banjul: minority groups believe most that the world is influenced by Allah, the Mandinkas least. The belief in divine forces is related to age among the farmers: younger farmers believe less than older that the situation in the social world is dependent on Allah.

Another statement was intended to reveal the time orientation. Analytically it is possible to distinguish this dimension from other ones, but in the real social world many dimensions of beliefs or beliefs themselves go hand in hand. The response to the actual statement in this case ("The most important is not what happens in this world but what will happen in the life after this") is shown in the table below:

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193) The actual statement was: "That things are as they are depends on Allah". When people wanted a further explanation before giving an answer the following version was presented to them: "Some have more power and more money than others in this country. Does this depend on Allah or not".

LIFE AFTER MOST IMPORTANT	BANJUL WORKERS %	KEREWAN FARMERS %
AGREE	61	84
NEITHER/NOR	19	15
DISAGREE	20	2
	100	100

TABLE IV:6:E: The G W U workers' and the Kerewan farmers' beliefs about life in another world and its importance.

Here, too, do we find the predicted difference between the two samples: the farmers agree more than the workers. As was expected, workers with low age or high education or both, believe to a less extent than others believe that another life is more important. The belief is also strongly related to income: the higher the income the more do the workers agree.

With background variables constant one at a time, Mandinkas disagree more than other ethnic groups.

Among the farmers, the young, particular young farmers with high income, agree more than others.

Thus, it has been shown that the belief component of the conflict potential is stronger among the workers than among the farmers. Now the second kind of beliefs will be analyzed, namely political beliefs.[194)]

4.6.2 Political Beliefs.

It is common in political science to make an analytical distinction between political and general beliefs or cultures.[195)] This distinction has also been made here, but it is assumed that it is not very useful when we study relationships between certain kinds of beliefs and structures on one hand and beliefs about violence as a means to change the social situation on the other. The reason for making this distinction here is that I want to explore further the differences between the workers' and the farmers' perception of their social world.

194) "Political" does not correspond to the definition that has been made earlier (see p 8). Here I use the term in a narrow sense.

195) See Almond & Coleman 1960, Almond & Powell 1966, and Almond & Verba 1965.

First the beliefs about the political objects (the political system, the regime[196] and the political elite) and changes in these objects will be dealt with. The concept of "political system" has been operationalized in a crude (but empirically suitable) manner: the farmers and workers have been asked about their views on the country and their perceived changes of the country. I have not found any other more fruitful way to operationalize "political system".

The evaluation of the political system is presented in the table below.[197]

CHANGE THE SYSTEM	BANJUL WORKERS %	KEREWAN FARMERS %
AGREE	91	86
NN/DK	9	2
DISAGREE	-	12
	100	100

TABLE IV:6:F: The G W U workers' and the Kerewan farmers' evaluation of the political system.

The workers are more positive than the farmers to changes in the political system. Among the former, the likelihood of agreeing to changes is related to high education. No other structural variable is so strongly related to the evaluation of the political system as is education. Among the farmers, younger people are more likely than others to prefer changes.

The interviewees have also been asked to suggest what kinds of changes they wanted, and the most frequent answers were as follows.

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196) As defined by Easton, see Easton 1965, pp

197) "There must be great changes if the Gambia shall be a good country to live in" was the statement presented to the workers and the farmers.

BANJUL WORKERS	KEREWAN FARMERS
(1) We, the people must cooperate	(1) There must be economic improvements
(2) Change the system, change the structures, abolish tribalism etc.	(2) We, the people, must co-operate
(3) There must be economic improvements	(3) The government must help the farmers (give them tools for farming)
(4) There must be more social service (health, education etc)	(4) There must be more social service
(5) We must have assistance from foreign countries	(5) We must have assistance from foreign countries

The workers say that there is too much competition and struggle between people. They want more cooperation and unity. This seems to be related to the fact that they, recently or long ago, have left their kinship groups in the countryside and now are links in a capitalistic economy, where individualism is demanded if the individual is to survive.

The farmers want economic changes more than anything else. Earlier, we have seen that they also feel more economically deprived than the workers. Cooperation comes second among the farmers. This seems to be related to the same factor as in the case of the workers who suggest this kind of change. Some of the cooperation that existed earlier in the kinship groups now is waning and more farmers than earlier seek to increase their productinn of groundnuts for their own sake.

A comment should be made upon the fifth category of answers. The workers talk about technical and economic assistance from other countries, while the farmers say that there ought to be foreigners in the government, the administration or in the co-operative movement. Most probably they did have the Taiwanese advisors in neighbouring villages in mind,when they answered.

Next, what about the experienced changes of the political system?[198)]

198) The actual questions were: "Is this country better or worse to live in than some years ago?" and "In what manner is it better/worse?" (If the interviewed people asked how many years, they were told to consider the changes during the last four, five years.

The distribution of the answers is presented in the table below.

IS THIS SYSTEM BETTER OR WORSE	BANJUL WORKERS %	KEREWAN FARMERS %
BETTER	68	91
NN/DK	4	2
WORSE	28	7
	100	100

TABLE IV:6:G: The G W U workers' and the Kerewan farmers' evaluation of experienced changes of the political system.

The feeling that the country has improved is, in the case of the workers, most extended among those with high education and high income and least among those with high age and low income. Among the farmers the feeling of improvement is related to middle age and high income.

In Banjul, there is also a significant difference between the ethnic groups. The minorities feel, to a greater extent than Mandinkas and Wollofs, that the country is worse than earlier (even if the variables of education, income and age are taken into account),

The workers and farmers have also been asked in what manner the country has become better or worse than earlier. The most frequent answers are listed below.

BANJUL WORKERS	KEREWAN FARMERS
(1) The country is developing	(1) Things are easier now, we have enough to eat now etc.
(2) Higher income, more employment etc.	(2) The president is good.
(3) Our country is independent	(3) We have more tools for farming, the harvests are better etc.
(4) Things are easier now, people do not suffer	(4) Income is higher
(5) We have more education, more roads, more buildings etc now	(5) The country is developing
Worse:	
(1) Cost of living is high	(1) The harvests are worse
(2) Lack of employment	
(3) This is a class country, capitalist country etc.	

The difference in social frames of reference that has been described earlier (VI:3:5) is also manifested here. The workers refer to changes of the country as a whole and to the situation of the country on the international arena, while the farmers talk about the situation in their own village. However, they do also mention a national politician, the president. They seem to know the background of the president (he is a Mandinka and has grown up in a up-river village) but they do not know the functions of the presidency.

Young workers mention that the country is developing, but in general they do not specify in what manner. When asked to do it, they said, for instance, that "there are many modern facilities now".

Those workers who found that the country was worse answered to a great extent: "People are suffering. You cannot even have a salary enough to feed your family". "You are lucky if you can borrow money". "If you are sick you cannot go to the hospital, you cannot afford it".

Many farmers said: "Earlier we often had to go to the bush to find something to eat during the hungry season. Now the government sends cous to us". "We have an own president. He is one of us". "Now you can borrow money and buy moderns tools from the co-operative movement". "We have ox-ploughing and rice farming now".

Thus, the farmers had experienced more positive changes and wanted less future changes than the workers. Next the evaluation of the regime[199] will be considered.

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199) The regime is usually defined as the constitution or the rules that the political authorities have to follow or both. See Easton 1966, pp

The operationalization of the concept of "regime" is given in the statement that was presented to the workers and the farmers. It read as follows: "The rules and laws that the central government has to follow must be changed if the government shall be able to act better. When the persons did not understand the question, it was given the following construction: "The central government in Banjul must follow some rules and laws. Can the central government rule better than now if these rules and laws are changed?"

CHANGE REGIME	BANJUL WORKERS %	KEREWAN FARMERS %
AGREE	61	12
NN/DK	25	20
DISAGREE	14	69
	100	101

TABLE IV:6:H: The G W U workers' and the Kerewan farmers' evaluation of the regime.

There is a striking difference between the two samples. This difference will be commented upon below. First, the distribution of the answers will be studied against the background of structural variables.

Among the workers as well as the farmers the tendency to agree to changes is related to low age and low income. There is no linear relationship between evaluation of the regime on one hand and level of education on the other, but those with the highest level of education are most positive to changes.

The most frequent answers among workers agreeing to changes were: "The laws are for the benefit of the rich people". "The laws prevent workers from having their rights". "The laws prevent justice" etc. Thus, many workers do not take the constitution of the country into consideration but administrative and other laws of similar character.

When asked whether the regime was better or worse than earlier, the people in the two samples answered in the following manner.

REGIME BETTER/WORSE	BANJUL WORKERS %	KEREWAN FARMERS %
BETTER	55	90
NN/DK	19	6
WORSE	27	5
	101	101

TABLE IV:6:I: The G W U workers' and the Kerewan farmers' evalutation of the perceived changes of the regime of the Gambia.

The most frequent answers in both groups are that "we have justice now", "we have freedom now", "we are independent now", "it is better but I cannot say how".

Among the workers a common answer is: "We have laws that give you a chance to work and earn money", and many of the farmers said: "We have our own people in the government" or "The commissioner is black and we can talk to him in our own language" or "Now there is no forced labour under the chiefs".[200]

The workers who feel that the regime is worse than earlier say that "many things are banned", "you can be taken to court for criticism", "there is no freedom now", "we should have laws preventing increase in prices", "we should have laws garanting a minimum wage".

A relatively large proportion of the workers are of the opinion that there have not been any changes in the rules and the laws. They are very well informed about the laws and the constitution, and they can mention many smaller amendments to the constitution which have been made since 1965.

Education and age are the variables which have the strongest relationship to variations in the beliefs about the rules and laws. Young and highly educated workers want changes to a greater extent than do old and low educated workers. Among the farmers, those of middle age and with high income are most likely to prefer changes in the rules and laws.

Next the workers and the farmers have been asked what they feel about the political elite of the country and its actions. On the statement that "The Gambia must have other persons in the central government if things are to improve in this country" the answers were distributed in the following manner:[201]

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200) The commissioner is a government official and the administrative head af the division. The commissioner of the North Bank Division lives in Kerewan.
Concerning the answers about "forced labour", the following comments are in order. Earlier the Seyfolus, Alkalis, Marabouts or Commissioners could force certain age groups of the population to public works. Today they are neither able nor allowerd to do so. Instead, food and other necessities are distributed to the farmers if they participate in public works. For instance, in 1972 the farmers in Kerewan improved the roads in the village and received food distributed by the Area Council.

201) The statement was presented in the following way if the respondent were not able to decide what to answer:"The persons in the central government in Banjul rule this country - do you think or do you not think that there must be other persons in the central government if things are to improve in this country?"

CHANGE THE POLITICAL ELITE	BANJUL WORKERS %	KEREWAN FARMERS %
AGREE	65	61
NN/DK	13	13
DISAGREE	22	27
	100	101

TABLE IV:6:J: The G W U workers' and the Kerewan farmers' evaluation of the political elite in the Gambia.

First it should be noticed that there is not a great difference between the workers and the farmers. The tendency to agree is related to low age and medium level of education among the workers and middle age and high income among the farmers.

The statement was followed by the following question: "Who do you think could be better rulers?" From the answers given to this question it was revealed that the proportion of workers and farmers agreeing to changes of the political elite would be less than it is, since many said "People like these we have now" or "People like the President". If these answers are excluded from the category that agrees to changes in the political elite, 56 % of the workers and 55 % of the farmers still agree.

The most frequent answers from those agreeing to changes are:

BANJUL WORKERS	KEREWAN FARMERS
(1) Good persons	(1) Good persons
(2) Politicians from the opposition mentioned (P S, N'Jie, M E, Jallow)	(2) Foreigners
(3) Educated people	(3) Educated people
(4) Peoples like these we have now	(4) Peoples like these we have now

The most frequent answer is "good persons". The workers and the farmers were asked to specify what people or what kind of people they had in mind. Some of them were not able to do so, while others said "People who know our problems" or "People that are willing to help you".

Among the farmers "foreigners"were mentioned frequently, and this demands an explanation. When asked what foreigners they meant , the farmers answered "the white men from China".

The farmers in Kerewan have seen or heard about the Taiwanese advisers who assist farmers in neighbourhood villages in their cultivation of rice. These were the foreigners that the farmers had in mind. However, many also said that the Gambia was better ruled when the English were responsible for the political machinery.[202)]

What, then, about the changes of the rule of the political elite? The perceived changes of the workers and the farmers are presented below.[203)]

POLITICAL ELITE BETTER/WORSE	BANJUL WORKERS %	KEREWAN FARMERS %
BETTER	63	92
NN/DK	11	3
WORSE	26	5
NA	1	-
	101	100

TABLE IV:6:K: The G W U workers' and the Kerewan farmers' evaluation of their perceived changes in the rule of the political elite.

In previous parts of this chapter it has been explained that the farmers perceived the change of their value positions (except for power values) to be greater than the workers thought of theirs. As can be seen from the table above, the farmers also feel to a greater extent than the workers that the political elite rules better than before.

A combination of high age and low income makes the workers feel that the government rules worse, and high age and high income that it rules better. There are also differences between the ethnic groups in the capital. Minority groups are more negative to the government than Wollofs and Mandinkas are. Old Mandinkas with low education are more positive than Wollofs in the same situation, while the reverse applies for young and well educated Wollofs and Mandinkas.

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202) This seems to be a common characteristic of farmers in underdeveloped countries experiencing the dependence on the world market, see Huntington 1968, passim.

203) The actual question was: "Does the national government rule better or worse than some years ago?"

The workers and the farmers have also been asked in what manner they felt that the rule of the government has changed:

BANJUL WORKERS	KEREWAN FARMERS
Better	Better
(1) The gov:t makes effort to develop the country	(1) The government helps the farmers
(2) The income of the workers is higher than before	(2) We are happier now
(3) We are independent now, it is our government etc	(3) We are independent now, it is our government etc
(4) We are happier now	(4) They build roads, they build ox-ploughing stations etc
Worse	
(1) Cost of living is higher now	
(2) Everything is difficult now, opposition not permitted etc.	

To summarize the discussion on the beliefs about the political system, the regime and the political elite, it can be said that the farmers are more positive than the workers to the changes that have occurred, and they also want fewer changes. The changes that the farmers want seem to be of the same kind as those hitherto, while the workers seem to want changes in another direktion or of another kind. It could possibly be argued that the farmers want changes within the system, while the workers want changes of the system, that is, structural changes.

To find out this, further breakdowns of the tables have been made.

CHANGE THE COUNTRY	THE COUNTRY IS BETTER/WORSE			
	BANJUL WORKERS		KEREWAN FARMERS	
	BETTER	WORSE	BETTER	WORSE
YES	60	31	77	9
NO	8	2	14	-
	= 101 %		= 100 %	

CHANGE THE REGIME	THE REGIME BETTER/WORSE			
	BANJUL WORKERS		KEREWAN FARMERS	
	BETTER	WORSE	BETTER	WORSE
YES	32	29	9	3
NO	21	18	81	7
	= 101 %		= 100 %	

The workers and the farmers have also been asked in what manner they felt that the rule of the government has changed:

BANJUL WORKERS	KEREWAN FARMERS
Better	Better
(1) The gov:t makes effort to develop the country	(1) The government helps the farmers
(2) The income of the workers is higher than before	(2) We are happier now
(3) We are independent now, it is our government etc	(3) We are independent now, it is our government etc
(4) We are happier now	(4) They build roads, they build ox-ploughing stations etc
Worse	
(1) Cost of living is higher now	
(2) Everything is difficult now, opposition not permitted etc.	

To summarize the discussion on the beliefs about the political system, the regime and the political elite, it can be said that the farmers are more positive than the workers to the changes that have occurred, and they also want fewer changes. The changes that the farmers want seem to be of the same kind as those hitherto, while the workers seem to want changes in another direktion or of another kind. It could possibly be argued that the farmers want changes <u>within</u> the system, while the workers want changes <u>of</u> the system, that is, structural changes.

To find out this, further breakdowns of the tables have been made.

CHANGE THE COUNTRY	THE COUNTRY IS BETTER/WORSE			
	BANJUL WORKERS		KEREWAN FARMERS	
	BETTER	WORSE	BETTER	WORSE
YES	60	31	77	9
NO	8	2	14	-
	= 101 %		= 100 %	

CHANGE THE REGIME	THE REGIME BETTER/WORSE			
	BANJUL WORKERS		KEREWAN FARMERS	
	BETTER	WORSE	BETTER	WORSE
YES	32	29	9	3
NO	21	18	81	7
	= 101 %		= 100 %	

CHANGE THE POLITICAL ELITE	THE POLITICAL ELITE BETTER/WORSE			
	BANJUL WORKERS		KEREWAN FARMERS	
	BETTER	WORSE	BETTER	WORSE
YES	35	30	56	5
NO	28	8	37	2
	= 101 %		= 100 %	

TABLE IV:6:L: Experienced and preferred change of the political objects among the G W U workers in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan. Those answering "neither/nor" concerning experienced change have been included into the category "worse" and those answering "neither/nor" on preferred change have been included into the category "no".

First some analytical aspects will be considered. Those experiencing improvement and wanting change can be assumed to prefer change within the system, while those experiencing deterioration and wanting change can be assumed to prefer change of the system.

The political system: More farmers than workers have experienced improvement but prefer further changes, while more workers than farmers have seen deterioration and prefer changes.

The regime: Most of the farmers feel that the regime has improved and they do not want changes, while a large proportion of the workers think that the regime has deteriorated and prefer changes.

The political elite: More farmers than workers say that the political elite has improved and want further changes, while many workers feel that the elite has deteriorated and want changes.

The pattern that emerges would permit us to conclude that more workers than farmers want changes of the system.

4.7 Contextual Aspects Outside the Conflict Potential.

Now that the components of the conflict potential have been described, some other aspects relevant to the social context of the workers and the farmers will be presented. These aspects will be classified in accordance with the input-output scheme.

4.7.1 Input Aspects: Voting and Beliefs.

Input can, analytically, be divided into several categories.[204] Easton denotes two principal categories: demand and support.[205] When dealing with demands, the division of values into three categories is the guiding principle for the analysis. Thus, demands have to be divided into three categories. People want higher income, more social security etc, and they want extended and more effective participation in politics.

Furthermore, the distinction made earlier between frustration, deprivation and discontent on one side and demands on the other is relevant here. Demands are partly articulated discontent or feeling of deprivation and partly result of satisfaction (the political elite has proved its ability and willingness to fulfill demands made earlier).[206]

The support category includes economic support in the form of tax paying, fees to the political parties etc, support in the form of membership in parties, voting and a positive evaluation of the political objects. Since the political elite is being studied is the agent in the input-output process, the primarly concern here has to be the support and demand it receives. Since demands and supports have been described in 3.2.2.3 the input will not be dealt with analytically here. Instead, the general components of input will be described.

Only three input aspects will be dealt with here: (1) voting, (2) participation in politics, and (3) beliefs about the effects of talking to a politician about the problems with which one is concerned. These aspects will not be analytically classified into different categories of input, although voting could be considered support and talking to a politician could be viewed as demands.

It is assumed that the workers participate less in politics than the farmers do. The workers, although organized in a trade union, are assumed to be more apathetic than the farmers, since they have experienced repeated frustrations and unfulfilled

204) It could be argued that Easton would regard the evaluations of the political system, the regime and the political elite as diffuse support or lack of such support, see Eastnn 1965, pp 111, 124-125.

wants more than the farmers. The structures in the capital are also such that they tend to keep some workers away from politics. For instance, watchmen and many workers at the hotels have low education and a low wage and they work during the night and spend the days resting in their homes.

Furthermore, the social pressure for participating in elections should be stronger on the farmers than on the workers, since the former are tied to kinship groups and social controls of various kinds (see 4:2.2).

First voting in the 1972 elections will be presented. The distribution in the samples will be compared to that of the constituencies in which the samples are included, namely Banjul constituencies and the Lower Baddibu constituency.[207]

	G W U WORKERS	BANJUL CONST:S	KEREWAN FARMERS	LOWER BADDIBU CONSTITUENCY
P P P	42	23	92	46
U P	13	25	-	-
Independents	3	2	6	33
Not decided	13	-	-	-
Don't know	2	-	-	-
No	28	50	2	21
	101	100	100	100

TABLE IV:7:A: Voting of the G W U workers, people in the Banjul constituencies, Kerewan farmers and people of the Lower Baddibu constituency in the 1972 elections. Those workers (N = 12) who were too young to vote have been excluded from the table. The percentage distributions for the total populations have been estimated with the figures of 1963 census as a basis. The assumtion was made that eligible voters had increased by 2 % annually since 1962. Sources: Census of Population 1963 G N B No 37, 1972 and the interviews made in 1972.

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205) Easton 1966, pp

206) That is to say that demands also can be a result of positive experiences (progressive deprivation) and trust in the politicians. And, besides, some demands imply that the issue presented has support from those making the demands, see Easton 1966, pp

207) Lower Baddibu constituency comprises the villages of Kerewan, Kinthe-Kunda, Suwarekunda, Jawara, Saba and Toro. The workers in Banjul were interviewed before the elections which took place at the end of March 1972. Therefore, some answered that they were going to vote but they had not decided for what party. Some also said that they did not know whether they would vote or not. The farmers were interviewed during and after the elections. I met some farmers who were too young to vote but who said that they had voted.

The figures in the table show that the workers of the G W U and the farmers of Kerewan vote to a greater extent than the total populations. Furthermore, they vote more than the total populations for the P P P. At least two comments are in order here. First, it should be mentioned that the workers as well as the farmers might have directed their answers on party choice against the P P P. They can have done it in fear for sanctions. Secondly, it is known that Mandinka workers vote for P P P too a greater extent than the Wollof population as a whole. The same applies to the farmers in Kerewan in relation to the constituency as a whole.

The farmers participated much more than the workers. The P P P was also supported much more by the farmers than by the workers.[208)]

The figures on voting can be compared with those representing stated participation in politics in general.

PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS	BANJUL WORKERS %	KEREWAN FARMERS %
Not at all	46	2
Vote	54	98
Vote and discuss politics	12	6
Vote and is a member of a party	4	-
Vote and is a member of a committee	4	2
No answer	1	-

TABLE IV:7:B: The G W U workers' and the Kerewan farmers' participation in politics. The figures surmount 100% since those who vote and participate otherwise have been included twice.

The farmers engage more in elections than the workers do, but among the latter those who participate do so to a higher degree than the farmers. They are more often than the farmers members of a party or a party committee.

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208) The turnout among the farmers is incredibly high. It is possible that many farmers said that they had voted although they, in fact, had not. However, Election Office Banjul, was not able to present voting figures for Kerewan itself but only for the whole constituency.

The people in the two samples have also been asked what effects they thought it would have, if they presented their problems (things that worried them) to a politician. Furthermore, they were asked whether or not they had talked to a politician. Their answers are shown in the table below.

EFFECTS OF TALKING TO A POLITICIAN	HAS TALKED TO A POLITICIAN					
	BANJUL WORKERS			KEREWAN FARMERS		
	YES	NO		YES	NO	
GREAT	11	19	= 30	19	38	= 57
DK	7	10	= 17	2	27	= 29
SMALL	32	19	= 51	6	8	= 14
NA	-	1	= 1	-	-	
	50	49	= 99	27	73	= 100

TABLE IV:7:C: The G W U workers' and the Kerewan farmers' effort to make demands by talking to a politician and their beliefs about the effects of doing so.

Half of the workers have talked to a politician, while only 27 % of the farmers had done so. Two comments are in order here: (1) it is easier for the workers than the farmers to meet a politician, since the village is visited by a politician only a few times a year, and (2) the workers seem to be more concerned about their problems.

The table also reveals that the farmers believe to a greater extent than the workers that talking to a politician would have great effects on the solution of their problems. Particularly those who have not talked to a politician tend to believe so.

Again, the higher expectations among the farmers seem to be mirrored also in the beliefs about own influence on the political life.

4.7.2 Output Aspects: The Political Elite and the Value Positions.

The beliefs about the effects of the actions of the political elite on the value position in the three categories (economic, power and respect) will not be considered in relation to the actual effects and the actual output of the political elite. Instead, the workers and the farmers have been asked: "How do you think that the actions of the central government in Banjul can affect your economic/power/respect situation?" No structured alternatives were given, so the interviewees answered freely and the answers were classified afterwards.[209)]

POLITICAL ELITE AFFECTS	BANJUL WORKERS ECONOMIC %	POWER %	RESPECT %	KEREWAN FARMERS ECONOMIC %	POWER %	RESPECT %
Can,positively	34	23	29	84	87	91
Can,neutrally	11	11	11	-	1	-
Can,negatively	37	35	30	11	3	1
Cannot	9	16	16	5	6	2
Don't know	6	9	7	-	3	5
Other	2	6	7	-	-	1
No answer	-	-	-	-	1	-
	99	100	100	100	101	100

TABLE IV:7:D: The G W U workers' and the Kerewan farmers' beliefs about the effects of government output on their economic, power and respect positions.

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209) First, a distinction was made between those ansering that the government could affect their situation and those answering that it could not. Some of the answers were not possible to classify in this manner and they were placed under the heading "other", Answers such as "Yes, it can give me a higher wage", "Yes, it makes efforts to increase my salary", "Yes, they have done a lot", "Yes, the prices of groundnuts have increased" were classified as "Can, positively". Answers such as "Yes, the politicians can decide so that my situation will be affected", "Yes, they can increase the salary or increase the taxes" were classified as "Can, neutrally". Answers such as "Yes, they hold me down", "Yes, they raise the prices and taxes", "Yes, they force me to do things that I don't want" etc have been classified as "Can, negatively".

Some have answered that the government cannot affect their situation or that they do not know whether it can or not. These answers have been classified as "Cannot" and "Don't know" respectively.

Between 23 and 34 % of the workers believe that the actions of the political elite can affect them positively, while 84 to 91 % of the farmers believe so. More workers believe that the government can affect them negatively than it can positively. Furthermore, a larger proportion of the workers than of the farmers formulated their beliefs about government action in "neutral" terms. A larger part of workers than farmers also believe that the actions of the government do not affect their situation.

Thus, there are great differences between the workers and the farmers not only in beliefs about input effects but also about output effects.

In conclusion, then, the farmers are more optimistic than the workers in input as well as in output regards. The former vote to a larger extent, believe that they can exert influence on a politician, and believe that the political elite can affect their situation positively more than the latter do and believe respectively.

4.7.3 Communication Among the Workers and among the Farmers.

The workers in the G W U sample and the farmers in the Kerewan sample have also been asked whether they discuss their daily problems with others, and, if so, how often they do so. In general it can be said that if people communicate their discontent to each other, the conflict potential will be strengthened. Furthermore, peoples in the two samples have been asked whether they discuss politics (in its narrow sense) or not. The answers to these two questions are presented in the two tables below.

TALK TO OTHERS ABOUT PROBLEMS	BANJUL WORKERS %	KEREWAN FARMERS %
Yes, nearly every day	32	16
Yes, one a week	7	4
Yes, from time to time	32	49
No	29	31
No answer	1	-
	101	100

TABLE IV:7:E: The frequency of discussing problems with others among the G W U workers in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan.

The differences in proportion of people discussing their problems is not very great between the workers and the farmers. But among the former, those discussing their problems, do it more often, than among the latter. Thus, the communication of discontent seems to be much more intense among the workers than among the farmers.

What, then, about politics? Before the table will be presented, a comment is in order. The workers were interviewed some weeks before the national elections and the farmers during and after the elections. Most probably, the proximity of the elections had influenced the frequency of discussing politics.

DISCUSS POLITICS	BANJUL WORKERS %	KEREWAN FARMERS %
Yes, nearly every day	19	16
Yes, one a week	3	2
Yes, from time to time	18	34
No	60	49
	100	101

TABLE IV:7:F: The frequency of discussing politics among the G W U workers in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan.

More farmers than workers in proportion, discuss politics at all. But the frequency of talking about political matters is a little higher among the workers than among the farmers.

Finally, the workers' and the farmers' beliefs about the strength of the political elite or its ability to regulate the

behavior of people will be discussed. These beliefs have a direct bearing not only on the beliefs about the use of violence but also on how the questions about violence are answered to.[210]

GOVERNMENT CONTROL	BANJUL WORKERS %	KEREWAN FARMERS %
MANY	71	95
DK	13	3
FEW	16	2
	100	100

TABLE IV:7:G: The beliefs of the G W U workers and the Kerewan farmers about government ability ot control people's behavior.

A much larger proportion of the farmers believe that the central government is able to control the behavior of people in the country.

GOVERNMENT STRENGTH	BANJUL WORKERS %	KEREWAN FARMERS %
STRONG	78	98
NEITHER/NOR	9	1
WEAK	13	1
	100	100

TABLE IV:7:H: The beliefs of the G W U workers and the Kerewan farmers about the government strength.

The farmers also believe more than the workers that the government is strong.

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210) The actual questions were: "Do you think that the central government can control many or few things among people in the Gambia" and "Do you think that the government is strong or weak?"

5 THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK III: THE CONFLICT POTENTIAL AND VIOLENCE.

The social, economic and political background, the preference patterns, the degree of deprivation (absolute and relative), value inconsistency and beliefs of the workers and the farmers have been sketched in previous chapters. That is, the postulated conflict potential and its intensity has been analyzed, and the general social context G W U workers in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan has been described. It was shown that the "subjective" components of the conflict potential were stronger among the farmers in Kerewan than among the workers in Banjul (if measured quantitatively), while the workers were find to have wider social frames of reference and to be incorporated into structures in which the contradictions are more intense than among the farmers.

Now the assumed relationships between the components of the conflict potential on one hand and political and violent beliefs on the other will be analyzed. It is assumed that the stronger the components of the conflict potential are, the more positive are people to, for instance, the use of violence as a means to improve their own social situation.

The components will be dealt with one by one in relation to various questions about violence.[1)]

5.1 Evaluation of Disobedience to the Political Elite.

First the belief about disobedience[2)] (its evaluative element) to the political elite and its relationship to the components of the conflict potential will be analyzed. The intention is to find out whether the components are related to evaluation of violence, and, if so, to what degree.

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1) The number of people in each sample is not large enough to permit breakdowns along more than three variables at a time, and, hence, no detailed multivariate analysis has been made. See Galtung 1969:I, p 60.

2) The following question has been used in order to find out the evaluation of disobeying the political elite: "We can say that you want to do something special. Will you still do it if you know that the government in Banjul does not like it?"

5.1.1 Absolute deprivation and Disobedience

Absolute deprivation has been defined as the difference between expected and actual position in the three value categories (see pp 125-129). The following hypothesis will be tested here:

People experiencing a high degree of absolute deprivation are more likely than those experiencing a low degree of AD to evaluate disobedience to the political elite positive.y.[3)]

Bince none of the farmers have given an affirmative answer to the question, the Kerewan sample has been excluded from the discussion in this part of the chapter.[4)]

DISOBEY THE POLITICAL ELITE	DEGREE OF ABSOLUTE DEPRIVATION[5)]					
	ECONOMIC		POWER		RESPECT	
	LOW	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW	HIGH
YES	8	14	14	10	11	15
NO	92	86	86	89	89	85
	100	100	100	99	100	100
N =	49	85	49	85	60	74

TABLE V:1:A: Economic, power and respect deprivation and evaluation of disobedience to the political elite among the workers in the G W U sample.

There is a relationship (although not very strong) between degree of deprivation on all the categories of values and evaluation of disobedience to the political elite.[6)]

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3) The hypothesis is based on findings of many authors who have investigated the relationships mentioned in underdeveloped countries. See, for instance, Feierabend & Feierabend 1972, pp 179-180, Gurr 1970, passim and Nesvold 1964, p 22.

4) It has been shown that the farmers had a higher degree (quantitatively) of absolute deprivation (except for respect deprivation) than the workers, but none of the former express willingness to disobey to the political elite. This could be taken as an indication that the hypothesis made is unconfirmed. However, at least three arguments are relevant here, the first more theoretical than the two others: (1) the evaluation of disobedience is embeddied in a larger context of belief systems sanctioning status quo and obedience, (2) various forms of social pressure and social control are more effective in Kerewan than in Banjul, and, hence, the farmers do not dare to express their true point of view, and (3) it is possible that quality rather than quantity of deprivation counts (see pp 152-163).

The second measure on absolute deprivation (a combination of actual income and desired income and so on) gives the following result:

DISOBEY THE POLITICAL ELITE	DEGREE OF ABSOLUTE DEPRIVATION					
	ECONOMIC		POWER		RESPECT	
	LOW	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW	HIGH
YES	15	10	8	26	9	16
NO	85	90	92	74	91	84
	100	100	100	100	100	100
N =	40	80	100	31	56	64

TABLE V:1:B: Absolute deprivation (as measured by a combination of objective and subjective indices) and evaluation of disobedience to the political elite. (The number of individuals is lower than 134, since data on income, participation in politics etc are not available for all the interviewees.)

The hypothesis is confirmed in regard to power and respect deprivation but not to economic deprivation. Particularly high deprivation of power values is connected with positive evaluation of disobedience. Young, well-educated workers who do not participate in politics or who cast their vote but want to be politicians are the most likely to evaluate disobedience positively.

In conclusion to the analysis of the relationship between absolute deprivation and evaluation of disobedience, we can say that power deprivation is more closely related to a positive evaluation than other value deprivations are.[7)]

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5) A high degree of economic deprivation is 10-20 % of expected amount and a low degree 21-100 %. A high degree of power deprivation is 10-50 % and a low 51-100%. A high degree of respect deprivation is 10-50 % and a low 51-100 % of expected amount.

6) All the tables have been chi-square tested at the 5% level of significance. When there is no significant difference this will be mentioned in the text.

7) The relationship between social frames of reference (quality of absolute deprivation) and disobedience is illustrated below.

DISOBEY THE POLITICAL ELITE	ECONOMIC				POWER				RESPECT			
	GOV:T	WORK	ALLAH	ND/VAR	GOV:T	WORK	ALLAH	ND	GOV:T	WORK	ALLAH	ND
YES	21	10	3	11	17	13	4	15	23	14	11	8
NO	79	90	97	89	83	87	96	85	77	86	90	92
N =	43	50	32	9	29	46	27	26	22	29	19	61

5.1.2 Relative Deprivation and Disobedience

A certain relationship between relative deprivation (RD) and evaluation of disobedience to the political is assumed. RD has been defined as the amount of values the individual feels he possesses in comparison to the amount he feels are possessed by other individuals with whom he compares his situation. Since there are three categories of values, there are also three kinds of RD.

As has been shown earlier (pp 167-171), not only the quantity of RD but also qualitative aspects count. That is, the kind of groups/classes with which and individual compares his situation crucial. Therefore, two hypotheses will be tested here:

(V:1:C) people experiencing a high degree of RD are more likely than those experiencing a low degree to evaluate disobedience to the political elite positively, and

(V:1:D) people comparing their value positions with that of higher reference individuals/groups/classes are more likely to evaluate disobedience to the political elite positively than are those who compare their value positions to that of lower reference individuals/groups/classes.

DISOBEY THE POLITICAL ELITE	RELATIVE DEPRIVATION (QUANTITATIVELY)[8]								
	ECONOMIC			POWER			RESPECT		
	L	M	H	L	M	H	L	M	H
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
YES	9	17	11	13	16	9	10	20	10
NO	91	83	89	87	84	91	90	80	90
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N =	22	30	82	47	32	55	78	25	31

TABLE V:1:C: Relative deprivation (quantitatively) with regard to economic, power and respect values and evaluation of disobedience to the political elite among the G W U workers in Banjul. (Those who say that they do not compare themselves with others have been included in the category of "low".

First, the small number of workers mentioning "various" sources have been excluded. Secondly, the numbers of cases in some of the columns is very low. Third, ND means no deprivation. There is a relationship. Those mentioning the government as the source of their deprivation are assumed to have wider social frames of reference than others. They are also more likely to evaluate disobedience positively.

There is no clear relationship between quantity of RD and evaluation of disobedience to the political elite. ~~applies for RD of respect values.~~ Thus, the first hypothesis stated above is not supported by the findings. Generally, it can be said that the quantity of RD does not seem to be related to evaluation of disobedience, or, rather, that we are not able to draw any conclusions about this relationship.

What, then, about the qualitative aspects of RD?

DISOBEY THE POLITICAL ELITE	RELATIVE DEPRIVATION (QUALITATIVELY) ECONOMIC			POWER			RESPECT		
	LOW %	HIGH %	ND/DC %	LOW %	HIGH %	ND/DC %	LOW %	HIGH %	ND/DC %
YES	8	14	11	8	15	11	11	18	8
NO	92	86	89	92	85	89	89	82	92
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N =	38	78	18	38	61	35	27	45	62

TABLE V:1:D: Relative deprivation (qualitatively) with regard to economic. power and respect values and evaluation of disobedience to the political elite.
Low = own group/class
high = high and high-high
ND/DC = no deprivation/don't compare

The figures support the second hypothesis. The amount of deprivation has not been considered here. Low degree of RD simply means that the reference individual/group/class belongs to the same category as the comparer himself, while a high degree indicates that the individual, group or class compared has a higher income, a more attractive job etc than the latter has.[9)]

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8) The following classification has been used:

	Economic	Power	Respect
Low	1 step	1-8 steps	1
High	2-9 steps	9 steps	2-9 steps on the ladder

9) Concerning the classification here, see footnote 160.

Thus, the degree of RD, as measured by the self-anchoring striving scale, does not seem to be related to evaluation of disobedience, while the choice of reference unit higher than that of the interviewees does seem to be so related.[10)]

5.1.3 Value Inconsistency and Disobedience

Value inconsistency, which is the third component of the conflict potential, has, in short, been defined as unequal distribution of values in the categories. At first, it was assumed that there was an interdepence between the three categories, even it measured subjectively on the scales, but however, it was found that the ladders measuring the subjective component meant different social contexts in different value categories. Thus, the measures based on the subjective scales have been excluded (see pp 174-175).

Instead, structural variables of age, education and income will be used.[11)] The hypothesis that will be tested has the following reading:

(V:1:E) people in inconsistent patterns are more likely than those in consistent patterns to evaluate disobedience to the political elite positively.[12)]

DISOBEY THE POLITICAL ELITE	AGE				AGE				EDUCATION			
	LOW		HIGH		LOW		HIGH		LOW		HIGH	
	INCOME				EDUCATION				INCOME			
	LOW	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW	HIGH	LOW	HIGH
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
YES	15	18	18	-	8	20	6	-	9	5	19	14
NO	85	82	82	100	92	80	94	100	91	95	81	86
N =	48	39	11	36	26	61	35	12	23	38	36	37

TABLE V:1:E: Age/income, age/education and education/income as measures on inconsistency on the one hand and evaluation of disobedience to the political elite on the other among the G W U workers in Banjul. Inconsistent patterns are underlined.

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10) Quantity of RD has no relationship to any questions whatsoever and will, therefore, be omitted from further analysis.

11) Such variables have been used in other investigations from which ideas guiding the present work have been borrowed. See Goffman 1957, Jackson 1962 and Lenski 1954.

12) I have not taken into consideration which the consistent/inconsistent patterns are, how they have emerged (if they are achieved or ascribed), if they are visible or not etc. For comments upon this see pp 171-173.

First, it should be mentioned that all inconsistent patterns do not have identical effects (see pp 171-173). Low age and high income, for instance, should be an inconsistent pattern that is positive to the individual. The table shows that the combinations of which education is one variable have the strongest relationship to evaluation of disobedience. High education/low age, for instance, is strongly related to a positive evaluation of disobedience. Consistent patterns of high-high can be assumed to have the lowest degree of relationship to disobedience but it does not have in all cases. This shows that education alone is the crucial variable.

5.1.4 Belief Patterns and Disobedience

Beliefs constitute the fourth component of the conflict potential. A distinction between general beliefs and political beliefs has been made earlier (4.5). This distinction will be used here also.

However, only four of five the dimensions of general beliefs presented earlier will be considered here, namely relation, energy, social reality and time.[13)]

No explicit hypotheses will be presented here, but it is assumed that the following categories of people are positive toward disobedience to the political elite, (1) individuals rejecting obedience, in general, (2) individuals believing that they can change their social situation,[14)] (3) individuals emphasizing the present life instead of the past or an imagined life in the heaven. Furthermore, individuals believing that social life is influenced by divine forces are less positive than others to disobedience to the political elite.

DISOBEY THE POLITICAL ELITE	GENERAL BELIEFS: BETTER OBEY POWERFUL PEOPLE		HUMAN BEINGS CAN CHANGE		THINGS DEPEND ON ALLAH		LIFE AFTER IMPORTANT	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
YES	10	14	15	8	9	24	10	19
NO	90	86	85	92	91	76	90	81
N =	71	63	73	61	108	25	107	27

TABLE V:1:F: General beliefs and evaluation of disobedience to the political elite among the workers in Banjul. Workers answering "don't know" have been included in the category answering "no" when the tendency of both these groups has been identical. Other-

wise "DK-answers" have been included into the category of "yes".

There is a relationship between general beliefs and evaluation of disobedience. Particularly those believing that the human being can change his environment and not believing that the events of social life are directed by Allah are likely to be positive to disobedience.

Now over to the political beliefs, which include people's opinion about their country, their government etc and changes in those. Although political beliefs in the narrow sense do not necessarily correspond to beliefs in general, they often do.

It is assumed here, that people who have experienced an occurence of deterioration of the country, the laws and the government are more likely to evaluate disobedience positively than are people who feel that the political objects have improved.[15)]

Furthermore, people who want to change the political objects are assumed to regard these objects as deplorable, and, hence, they are more positive to disobedience. Those who do not want such changes can be assumed to regard the political objects as legitimate and good and to be less positive to disobedience.

The following hypothesis have been formulated, and the result of the test is shown in the table below:

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13) Relation: "better obey", energy: "human beings can", social reality: "things depend on Allah", and time: "life after more important", for the complete reading of the statements see pp 181-184.

14) The second assumption could be contradictory, since people believing that they can change things do not necessarily believe that they have to use violence to get things changed. Here it is presumed that they are more positive to violent behavior than to no behavior causing change.

15) The basis of the assumption is the frustration-aggression theory, see Berkowitz 1962, pp 118 ff.

(V:1:G) people who feel that the political objects have deteriorated are more positive to disobedience to the political elite than are people who feel that the political objects have improved, and

(V:1:H) people who want to change the political objects are more positive to disobedience to the political elite than are people who do not want such changes.[16)]

DISOBEY THE POLITICAL ELITE	POLITICAL BELIEFS: COUNTRY BETTER/WORSE B	N/W	LAWS BETTER/WORSE B	N/V	GOV:T BETTER/WORSE B	N/W
YES	12	12	7	18	8	18
NO	88	88	93	82	92	82
N =	91	43	71	63	84	49

	CHANGE COUNTRY YES	NO	CHANGE LAWS YES	NO	CHANGE GOV:T YES	NO
YES	12	8	15	8	16	4
NO	88	92	85	92	84	96
N =	122	12	82	52	87	47

TABLES V:1:G and V:1:H: Political beliefs and evaluation of disobedience to the political elite among the workers in Banjul. ("Don't know" answers have been includes in the category of "worse" and "no" respectively. N = 133 in one table since one individual who has not answered the question has been excluded.)

Hypothesis (V:1:G) is supported by the findings in two cases but not in the third; people who feel that the laws and the government have deteriorated are more positive to disobedience than those who feel that these objects have improved. The relationship between feeling of changes in the country and evaluation of disobedience deviates from the assumed pattern. Those who feel that the country has improved are more positive to disobedience than others are. Some comments will be made in order to explain this deviation, but first hypothesis (V:1:H) will be discussed.

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16) It could be argued that another assumption is implied here, namely that those wanting changes can see no other way of creating these changes than through actions that lie outside the domain of actions sanctioned by the government.

This hypothesis is supported by the findings, although the number of people in some categories are too small to permit any firmer conclusions.

Now, if we follow the argument in the theory of frustration/aggression it should be possible to set up four categories of people in the following manner and to study their evaluations of disobedience and violence.

		POLITICAL OBJECTS	
CHANGE THE		BETTER	WORSE
POLITICAL	YES	1	3
OBJECTS	NO	2	4

(1): the political objects are perceived to have improved but further changes are desired - we can assume that this is a case of progressive deprivation (see p 126).

(2): the political objects are perceived to have improved and no further changes are preferred, the individuals are content.

(3): the political objects are perceived to have deteriorated and further changes are desired - we can assume that changes in another "direction" than these hitherto are desired and that regressive deprivation is present.

(4): the political objects are perceived to have deteriorated but no further changes are preferred - we can assume that it is a case of apathy; people have experienced deterioration and have resigned.

What relationships would we propose to hold, then, between these four patterns and the beliefs about disobedience, violence etc? I would propose that people in category (3) are most positive to disobedience and violence and that (1) comes next. Nothing will be assumed concerning (2) and (4). The new hypothesis (implicit in the text above) has been tested and the result is presented in the table below.

DISOBEY THE POLITICAL ELITE	COUNTRY BETTER/WORSE				LAWS BETTER/WORSE				GOV:T BETTER/WORSE			
	BETTER CHANGE COUNTRY		WORSE		BETTER CHANGE LAWS		WORSE		BETTER CHANGE GOV:T		WORSE	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
YES	12	10	12	-	5	11	26	4	11	5	23	-
NO	88	90	88	-	95	89	74	96	89	95	77	-
N =	81	10	41	2	43	28	39	24	47	37	40	10

TABLE V:1:I: Beliefs about changes of the political objects and preferred future changes of the political objects on one hand and evaluation of disobedience to the political elite on the other among the G W U workers in Banjul.

The relationships proposed are present to a large extent. The number of individuals in some of the columns is too small to permit any conclusions, but a tendency emerges: those feeling that the political objects have deteriorated and preferring changes of them are most positive to disobedience. For the other categories no unambigious relationship appears.

5.1.5 Structural Position and Disobedience.

It has not been possible to measure directly the relation between structural contradictions and the beliefs about violence and disobedience, since no investigation has been made of belief patterns and their relation to the structures in the Gambia as a whole. Neither have the beliefs and degree of deprivation etc among the elite groups been explored.

Instead, I will rely on the description of the structural background that has been given in 4.2. Furthermore, some more characteristics will be added. (This additive description of the structures will, in the case of Kerewan, be given later on, since the sample of the village has been omitted from the present part of this chapter.)

Most of the low income workers are young and well educated. They are employed mainly in the tourist branch (most of them

17) Sosseh 1973. However, in some cases the young workers join in actions against the employers. This occurred in two cases in the Spring of 1972 when some workers were dismissed for reasons that the workers themselves did not accept. All the employees at a hotel stopped working and staged a "sit-down" until the dismissed workers were re-instated.

by Swedish employers). Some of them have arrived from the countryside rather recently after having left school; other have been born and educated in Banjul. Many of the young workers in the tourist branch have a salary far below that agreed upon in negotiations between the Gambia Workers' Union and the employers, although they have a high level of education. According to the trade unionists this was allowed to occur because there are many unemployed waiting for jobs in the tourist branch and the employees themselves do not sooperate in order to influence the wages or the working conditions.[17)]

The classes in the Gambia are only potential,not actual, since most of the workers and farmers do not seem to be aware of their common situations respectively. Only a few, young workers seem to perceive themselves as being part of a class which is aparted from the political elite and from the economic elite and the rich businessmen.

Most of the high income workers are old and they have been employed for five years or more. The majority of them are government employed and work as painters, carpenters, electricians, smiths, drivers etc. Only a few of them are educated. They have, however, participated in most of the strikes that their union, the G W U has called for during the 1960's. Some of them formulate their demands and points of views in terms of class structure and government actions, but most of them perceived their situation in the context of their work place or as directed by Allah.

Having made this sketchy description, I will deal with the relationship between the structural positions of the workers and their answers to the statements and questions about violence and political objects that were presented to them.[18)]

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18) Since the number of individuals is two small to permit any extensive break-downs of the tables not all the structural variables have been related to the answers about beliefs about violence at the same time.

The relation between the structural variables (income, education and age) and beliefs about violence will be analyzed one by one. The following hypotheses have been tested:

(V:1:J) low income people are more likely than high income people to evaluate disobedience to the political elite positively,

(V:1:K) people of low age are more likely than those of high age to evaluate disobedience to the political elite positively, and since education in underdeveloped countries tend to correlate with age,

(V:1:L) people with high education are more likely than those with low education to evaluate disobedience to the political elite positively.

DISOBEDIENCE TO THE POLITICAL ELITE		INCOME		AGE			EDUCATION		
		LOW	HIGH	LOW	MED.	HIGH	LOW	MED.	HIGH
		%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
	YES	15	9	16	9	7	8	11	19
	NO	85	91	84	91	93	92	89	81
	N =	59	75	70	34	30	40	63	31

TABLES V:1:J,K,L: Income, age and education and their relationships to evaluation of disobedience to the political elite among the workers in Banjul.

All hypotheses made are supported by the findings in the tables above. Education seems to have the strongest bearing on the beliefs discussed, but the three variables reinforce each other, workers with low age tend to have a high education and a low income.

A fourth structural variable, ethnic background, has also been studied but no particular hypothesis has been made in this case. Before the project started in the Gambia, I assumed that the minority groups (Akus, Fulas, Jolas and others) would be more positive than others to violence and more negative to the government, since they do, in general, have a lower income, lower standard of living etc, and the government is run mainly by Mandinkas.[19] The assumption made was not supported by

19) Worre 1971, p 19.

the findings; on the contrary it is disproved: Mandinkas are most likely to evaluate disobedience positively.[20)]

DISOBEDIENCE TO THE POLITICAL ELITE	ETHNIC GROUP MANDINKA %	WOLLOF %	OTHERS %
YES	15	13	6
NO	85	87	94
N =	46	35	33

TABLE V:1:M: Ethnic group and evaluation of disobedience to the political elite among the workers in Banjul.

This phenomenon seems to be explainable in the context of the pattern of deprivation; the Mandinkas have experienced a progressive deprivation and they believe,to a greater extent than other groups, that their situation will improve in the future.

The minority groups in the capital (except for Akus) have always had a situation inferior to that of other groups. Wollofs (and sometimes Akus) had first a privileged situation, and the Mandinkas who settled in the city were obliged to take low paid jobs. However, later arriving Mandinkas have, to some extent, been able to get the same kind of jobs as those held by Wollofs.

As a summary of the relationship between the conflict potential and evaluation of disobedience to the political elite, the following can be said. Most of the components of the conflict potential have a relationship to evaluation of disobedience; the strongest relationship was found between value inconsistency and structural variables on one hand and disobedience on the other.

5.2 Violence as a Means to Improve One's Own Situation.

Now the relationship between the components of the conflict potential and the belief that violence can be acceptable in improving one's own social situation will be analyzed.[21)]

20) Even if the variable of ethnic group is weighted by the other structural variables one by one, and even if a weighted index (taking the differences in other structural variables into account) is used, the relationship prevails.

5.2.1 Absolute Deprivation and Violence.

People who feel deprived are assumed to be frustrated. Hence, deprivation of the three categories of values should be linked to a positive evaluation of violent means. The hypothesis that highly deprived people(quantitatively and qualitatively) are more positive to violent means than are less deprived people (V:2:A,B) has been tested and the findings are presented in the tables below.[22)]

USE OF VIOLENCE	DEGREE OF ABSOLUTE DEPRIVATION					
	ECONOMIC		POWER		RESPECT	
	LOW %	HIGH %	LOW %	HIGH %	LOW %	HIGH %
YES	20	18	20	18	17	21
DK	4	2	2	4	5	3
NO	76	80	78	78	79	77
N =	49	85	49	85	87	47

TABLE V:2:A: Economic, power and respect deprivation and evaluation of violence among the workers of the G W U sample in Banjul.

The findings in the table do not support the hypothesis: those experiencing a high degree of deprivation are not more positive to violence than others are. In the case of economic and power deprivation the relationship is reverse to that proposed, but the differences are not significant. This would compel us to conclude that there is no relationship between absolute deprivation and evaluation of violence. In a previous chapter it was revealed that there were great differences in social frames of reference among the workers. The relationship of the frames to evaluation of violence will be analyzed later on. The analysis will perhaps explain more than quantity of deprivation.

However, before this will be done, the second measure of absolute deprivation will be considered.

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21) The actual question was: "Even if other people do not use violence to get a better life situation - would you do so?"

22) Again, there are only two farmers answering affirmative to the question about violence, and it is, thus, meaningless to analyze the sample of the farmers in the present part. On the conclusions that might be drawn from this, see p 2 note 4.

USE OF VIOLENCE	DEGREE OF ABSOLUTE DEPRIVATION					
	ECONOMIC		POWER		RESPECT	
	LOW %	HIGH %	LOW %	HIGH %	LOW %	HIGH %
YES	25	16	14	36	9	28
DK	3	1	3	3	2	5
NO	73	83	83	61	89	67
N =	40	80	100	31	56	64

TABLE V:2:B: Absolute deprivation (as measured by a combination of objective and subjective indices) and evaluation of violence among the G W U workers in Banjul.

When the second measure of AD is used, we find a relationship between deprivation and evaluation of violence. Those feeling a high degree of deprivation are more likely than others to evaluate violence positively except in one case: the reverse applies for economic deprivation. It has been found earlier that those expecting a high political position said that they did not seek a high income, and, hence, they do not feel very deprived economically.

What, then, about the relationship between social frames of reference and evaluation of violence:(V:2:B)?

USE OF VIO-LENCE	MENTIONED CAUSE OF DEPRIVATION											
	ECONOMIC				POWER				RESPECT			
	GOV:T	WORK	ALLAH	ND	GOV:T	WORK	ALLAH	ND	GOV:T	WORK	ALLAH	ND
YES	37	8	9	21	31	11	11	27	46	14	16	13
DK	2	-	6	13	3	-	4	8	-	-	16	2
NO	61	92	84	67	66	89	85	65	55	86	68	85
N =	43	50	32	9	29	46	27	26	22	29	19	61

TABLE V:2:C: Social frames of reference (as measured by the causes of deprivation mentioned of the G W U workers in Banjul and evaluation of violence.

Those referring to the government as the source of their deprivation are assumed to have wider social frames of reference than others. They also are the most positive to the use of violence. But next comes those experiencing no deprivation quantitatively, and this shows that the quantity of deprivation does not count as much as other factors, i .e. frames of reference and belief contradictions. Thus, if the category of workers feeling no deprivation is to fit into the arguments presented earlier, they must be assumed to have rather wide social frames of reference.

5.2.2 Relative Deprivation and Violence.

In 5.1.2 it was proposed that there is a relationship between relative deprivation and evaluation of disobedience to the political elite. Since the same mechanisms are assumed to be implied here, RD is also proposed to be connected with evaluation of using violence. The quantity of RD was demonstrated to have no relationship to beliefs about violence, while the choice of reference group had such a relationship (see 5.1.2).

USE OF VIOLENCE	RELATIVE DEPRIVATION (QUALITATIVELY)								
	ECONOMIC			POWER			RESPECT		
	LOW	HIGH	ND/DC	LOW	HIGH	ND/DC	LOW	HIGH	ND/DC
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
YES	5	25	17	5	21	29	7	31	15
DK	5	-	11	5	-	6	7	-	3
NO	90	75	72	90	79	66	85	69	82
	100	100	100	100	100	101	99	100	100
N =	38	78	18	38	61	35	27	45	62

TABLE V:2:D: Relative deprivation (qualitatively) with regard to economic, power and respect values and evaluation of violence among the G W U workers in Banjul.

There is a relationship between choice of reference individual/group/class on one hand and evaluation of violence on the other; the richer, the more powerful etc the individuals/groups/classes with which one compare one's own social situation, the stronger the tendency to evaluate the use of violence positively.

However, those feeling no deprivation or rejecting the idea of comparing themselves with others are rather positive to violence; in the case of RD of power values they are the most positive. Again, it seems to be confirmed that quantity of deprivation does not count.

5.2.3 Value Inconsistency and Violence.

As in the case of value inconsistency and disobedience, the existence of a relationship between VI and evaluation of violence is proposed: people in inconsistent patterns are more likely than those in consistent patterns to evaluate violence posi-

5.2.3 Value Inconsistency and Violence.

N =	38	78	18	38	61	35	27	45	62
	100	100	100	100	100	101	99	100	100
NO	90	75	72	90	79	86	85	89	82
DK	5	-	11	5	-	6	7	-	3
YES	5	25	17	5	21	29	7	31	15

deprivation does not count.

tively (V:2:E). For the structural background I rely on what has been said earlier (pp 11-12). The result of the test of the hypothesis is presented in the table below.

USE OF VIOLENCE	AGE				AGE				EDUCATION			
	LOW		HIGH		LOW		HIGH		LOW		HIGH	
	INCOME				EDUCATION				INCOME			
	L %	H %	L %	H %	L %	H %	L %	H %	L %	H %	L %	H %
YES	38	13	9	3	4	36	3	8	9	-	47	16
DK	2	5	9	-	8	2	3	-	4	5	3	-
NO	60	82	82	97	89	62	94	92	87	95	50	84
N =	48	39	11	36	26	61	35	12	28	38	36	37

TABLE V:2:E: Age/income, age/education and education/income as measures of inconsistency on the one hand and evaluation of violence on the other among the G W U workers in Banjul. Inconsistent patterns are underlined.

The combinations will be discussed one by one. The hypothesis is not supported in the case of age/income; those in inconsistent patterns are not more likely than others to evaluate violent means positively. Instead, workers with low age and low income are the most positive, and the explanation of this is to be found in education. Those with low age and low income tend to have a high level of education.

In the case of age/education the hypothesis seems to be supported, but it is obvious that it is not the combination itself that is crucial. Education is not, in itself, something negative to the individual. It has been accounted for earlier that the young, well educated workers have a very low salary and an occupation that they do not like, and all these factors explain the high proportion answering affirmatively to questions about violence.

The figures in the third table support what has been stated: the inconsistent pattern of high education and low income has a crucial effect on the evaluation of violence. It is also obvious that education in combination to other variables count more than age or income or combinations of age and income.

Thus, the hypothesis is supported but the relationship is spurious in some cases. Only when education is combinded with income is there a real relationship to evaluation of violence.

5.2.4 Belief Patterns and Violence.

First the relationship between general beliefs and evaluation of violence will be analyzed and than that between political beliefs and violence. The four dimensions mentioned on p 7 will be applied here also, that is to say, orientation to relation, energy, social reality and time. The proposed relationships presented on p will not be repeated here but it is proposed that beliefs including (1) disobedience, (2) capability of acting, (3) non-divine influence, and (4) emphasis of the present social life are linked to a positive evaluation of violence as a means to improve one's own social situation.

USE OF VIOLENCE	GENERAL BELIEFS							
	BETTER OBEY POWERFUL PEOPLE		HUMAN BEINGS CAN CHANGE		THINGS DEPEND ON ALLAH		LIFE AFTER MORE IMPORTANT	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
YES	9	30	21	16	15	36	12	29
DK	3	3	1	5	3	4	2	4
NO	89	67	78	79	82	60	85	67
N =	71	63	73	61	108	26	107	27

TABLE V:2:F: General beliefs and evaluation of violence as a means to improve one's own social situation among the G W U workers in Banjul.

According to the findings in the table above, the proposed relationships are present among the workers in Banjul. It should be added that the beliefs mentioned above are strongly related to structural positions; highly educated workers believe less than low educated workers that they have to obey powerful people, that human beings cannot change their environment,that social life is influenced by Allah and that another, imagined, life is more important than the present social life.

Beliefs about the political objects are also assumed to be connected with evaluation of violent means. What has been said in 5.1.4 (pp 10-11)also applies here. First the relationship between beliefs about the political objects and violence will be dealt with and then beliefs about changes in these objects and violence will be taken up.Finally, a combination of experienced changes of the political objects and preferred changes on one hand and evaluation of violence on the other will be analyzed.

Hypothesis (V:1:G) and (V:1:H) stated on p 9 will also be tested here. The hypothesis are to be taken as stated except that "disobedience to the political elite" has been substituted by "use of violence". So, people wanting changes in the political objects are proposed to be more positive than others to violence. The same also applies to people who have seen deterioration in the political objects.

USE OF VIOLENCE	POLITICAL BELIEFS: CHANGE COUNTRY YES %	CHANGE COUNTRY NO %	CHANGE LAWS YES %	CHANGE LAWS NO %	CHANGE GOV:T YES %	CHANGE GOV:T NO %
YES	21	-	23	18	21	15
DK	3	8	1	6	1	6
NO	77	92	76	83	78	79
N =	122	12	82	52	87	47

	COUNTRY BETTER/WORSE B %	COUNTRY BETTER/WORSE N/W %	LAWS BETTER/WORSE B %	LAWS BETTER/WORSE N/W %	GOV:T BETTER/WORSE B %	GOV:T BETTER/WORSE N/W %
YES	20	16	18	19	18	20
DK	2	5	4	2	4	2
NO	78	79	73	79	77	79
N =	91	43	71	63	84	49

TABLE V:2:G: Political beliefs and evaluation of violence as a means to improve one's own social situation among the G W U workers in Banjul.

The hypothesis that people feeling that the political objects have deteriorated are more positive to the use of violence than are those who have experienced improvements is not supported. But the second hypothesis that workers preferring changes in the political objects are more likely to be positive to the use of violence is confirmed by the results.

Can we, then, if we return to the argument on p 10 , explain these unexpected results by the help of an analysis of different frustration sequences? Positive to the use of violence are:

(1) 19-22 % of those feeling that the political objects have improved and preferring changes of them,

(2) 0-16 % of those experiencing improvement in the political objects and rejecting change,

(3) 17-23 % of those who have seen a deterioration in the objects and desiring changes, and

(4) 0-13 % of those who feel that the objects have deteriorated but not desiring changes are positive to the use of violence.

The number of cases in some of the combinations is very small (N = 2 and 10), but a tendency emerges: the combinations are not crucial; instead a preference for change seems to explain the positive evaluation of the use of violence.

5.2.5 Structural Positions and Violence.

For a description of the structural background I only point to what has been accounted for on 4.2.1 in the previous chapter and in 5.1.5 in the present chapter. Thus, the hypothesis will be dealt with directly, namely that low income workers, high educated workers and young workers are more likely than low educated and older workers to evaluate the use of violence positively (V:2:H, V:2:I and V:2:J).

USE OF VIOLENCE	INCOME		AGE			EDUCATION		
	LOW	HIGH	LOW	MED	HIGH	LOW	MED	HIGH
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
YES	32	8	29	9	7	5	21	32
DK	3	3	4	-	3	8	-	3
NO	64	89	67	91	90	88	79	65
N =	59	75	70	34	30	40	63	31

TABLES V:2:H, I and J: Income, age and education and their relationships to evaluation of violence as a means to improve one's own social situation among the G W U workers in Banjul.

The three hypotesis are supported, although in different degrees. However, the findings in the case of value inconsistency (p 18) should be considered. The three variables above are interrelated in a certain manner, and, thus, we cannot say which one is most important. There is a positive correlation between low income, high education and low age.

Also here are there differences between the ethnic groups, differences which cannot be explained in terms of variations in the distribution of other structural variables but are a

result of historical and social circumstances.[23)]

USE OF VIOLENCE	MANDINKAS %	WOLLOFS %	OTHERS %
YES	30	15	9
DK	2	4	3
NO	67	82	88
N =	46	55	33

TABLE V.2:K: Ethnic group and evaluation of violence as a means to improve the individual's own social situation among the G W U workers in Banjul.

The cause of the differences will not be analyzed here. Only a few comments will be made upon them. It is not presumed here that the relationship has any basis in an inherited personality trait or anything of that nature. Instead, it can be suggested that some historical and contemporary social, political and economic factors underlie the differences.

The findings of this part of the chapter might be summarized in the following manner:

(1) All the components of the CP have a relationship to the evaluation of violence, (2) belief patterns are more strongly related to evaluation of violence than are various kinds of deprivation, and (3) variations in beliefs are related to variations in structural positions and the latter seem to be crucial.

5.3 Justification of Violence.

In the two previous parts of this chapter, the relationships between the components of the conflict potential and the worker's personal evaluation of disobedience and violence were analyzed respectively. People in the two samples were also

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23) An index taking the structural variables of age, education and income into account and makes the ethnic groups comparable in these regards gives the following distribution of answers:

	MANDINKAS	WOLLOFS	OTHERS
YES	17.8	19.0	18.1
DK, NO	82.3	81.0	81.9

asked whether violence could be legitimate means(regardless of their willingness to use violence themselves), and here the farmers in Kerewan give affirmative answers to such an extent that the number of cases is enough to permit a multivariate analysis.

Some of the reasons for the differences in the distribution of the answers of the farmers on various questions have been discussed in a previous part of this chapter (see p 2 note 4). The fact that the farmers have given affirmative answers to a great extent on the two questions that will be analyzed here aan also be explained in still another way. The two present questions deal with what is legitimate or could be considered legitimate, not with what the farmers personally would actually do.[24)]

5.3.1 Absolute Deprivation and Justification of Violence.

A certain relationship between a feeling of absolute deprivation and justification of violence is assumed here: the higher the degree of deprivation, the more likely the individual is to justify the use of violence.

JUSTIFY THE USE OF VIOLENCE	DEGREE OF ABSOLUTE DEPRIVATION											
	ECONOMIC				POWER				RESPECT			
	BANJUL		KEREWAN		BANJUL		KEREWAN		BANJUL		KEREWAN	
	L %	H %	L %	H %	L %	H %	L %	H %	L %	H %	L %	H %
YES	76	88	67	68	76	88	70	67	83	85	66	72
DK	4	2	15	11	2	4	18	10	2	4	14	7
NO	20	9	18	21	22	8	11	23	15	11	20	21
N =	49	85	33	95	49	85	27	101	87	47	85	43

TABLE V:3:A: Economic, power and respect deprivation and justification of the use of violence among the G W U workers in Banjul and farmers i Kerewan.

The findings among the workers in Banjul support the hypothesis made above. Among the farmers there are only small differences between those experiencing a low degree of deprivation and those who are highly deprived, and when it concerns power values,

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24) The two statements which will be dealt with in the present and next part of this chapter have the following formulations: "People have the right to act violently when they are treated in a bad manner" and "People have the right to use violence against politicians if these are bad."

the findings contradict the assumption.

It has been shown in the previous parts of this chapter that the quantity of deprivation does not reach the importance of qualitative aspects (cause of deprivation). . These aspects will be dealt with later on. But first the second measure of absolute deprivation will be considered.

JUSTIFY THE USE OF VIOLENCE	DEGREE OF ABSOLUTE DEPRIVATION[25]											
	ECONOMIC				POWER				RESPECT			
	BANJUL		KEREWAN		BANJUL		KEREWAN		BANJUL		KEREWAN	
	L %	H %	L %	H %	L %	H %	L %	H %	L %	H %	L %	H %
YES	80	90	68	67	88	74	.....		82	91	70	67
DK	5	3	51	12	4	-	.....		4	-	9	13
NO	15	8	27	21	8	26	.....		14	9	22	20
N =	40	80	22	95	100	31	.....		56	64	69	54

TABLE V:3:B: Absolute deprivation (as measured by a combination of objective and subjective indices) and justification of the use of violence among the G W U workers in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan.

Neither does the second measure of absolute deprivation give results that unambiguously support the hypothesis stated above. Among the workers the assumption is supported in two cases but not when it comes to power values.

That is to say, young workers who merely vote or do not participate in politics at all but want to become MP's or ministers do not justify the use of violence as much as others do. Among the farmers the findings completely disprove the hypothesis.

What, then, about the social frames of reference and justification of violence?

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25) Power deprivation among the farmers measured in the second manner has been excluded since only a few farmers felt deprived so measured (see p 141).

BANJUL WORKERS

	ECONOMIC				POWER				RESPECT			
	GOV:T	WORK	ALLAH	ND	GOV:T	WORK	ALLAH	ND	GOV:T	WORK	ALLAH	ND
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
YES	77	90	81	89	86	96	74	65	86	86	79	82
DK	2	2	6	-	3	2	7	-	-	3	5	3
NO	21	8	13	11	10	2	19	35	14	10	16	15
N =	43	50	32	9	29	46	27	26	22	29	19	61

KEREWAN FARMERS

	GOV:T	VAR	ALLAH	GOV:T	VAR	ALLAH	GOV:T	VAR	ALLAH	ND
YES	92	58	66	88	60	66	.....	89	63	66
DK	-	8	14	-	10	14	.....	11	7	14
NO	8	33	20	13	30	20	.....	-	30	20
N =	(12)	(12)	99	(8)	20	92	(1)	(9)	30	83

TABLES V:3:C and V:3:D: Social frames of reference (as measured by the mentioned cause of deprivation) of the G W U workers in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan and their justification of violence.

Among the workers those referring to the working conditions as the obstacle to the elimination of their deprivation are most likely to justify the use of violence. Those referring to Allah or feeling no deprivation are least likely to do so. Workers mentioning the government are not the most positive to violence in general whereas they were the most positive when it came to the matter of their own use of violence.

Those farmers referring to "various" sources are least likely to justify the use of violence. In various sources are included answers like "I have no education", "My parents do not have any education", I am not a son of the Alkali's" etc.

5.3.2 Relative Deprivation and Justification of Violence.

Since it has been demonstrated that quantity of RD has no relationship to evaluation of violence (p 4), the analysis of choice of reference group and its relationship to justification of violence will be taken up directly. The hypothesis that those comparing themselves with higher reference groups are more likely than those comparing their situation with that of lower groups to justify the use of violence has been tested.

JUSTIFY THE USE OF VIOLENCE

	RELATIVE DEPRIVATION (QUALITATIVELY)									
	ECONOMIC					POWER				
	BANJUL			KEREWAN		BANJUL			KEREWAN	
	L %	H %	ND/DC %	L %	H %	L %	H %	ND/DC %	L %	H %
YES	87	87	61	68	68	92	92	60	70	60
DK	5	1	6	10	13	5	2	3	10	13
NO	8	12	33	22	19	3	7	37	20	27
N =	38	78	18	50	78	38	61	35	53	75

	RESPECT					
	BANJUL			KEREWAN		
	L %	H %	ND/DC %	L %	H %	ND/DC %
YES	93	84	79	67	74	66
DK	-	2	5	7	7	14
NO	7	13	16	27	19	20
N =	27	45	62	15	27	86

TABLE V:3:E: Relative deprivation (qualitatively) with regard to economic, power and respect values and justification of violence among the G W U workers in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan. Three people in Kerewan do not compare their situation with that of others. In the case of economic and power deprivation they have been included in the category "low".

Among the workers in Banjul there is a clear relationship between RD and the likelihood of justifying the use of violence. Relative deprivation of power values is most strongly related to this justification.

However, among the farmers there is a relationship only in the case of RD of respect values. The findings on economic and power values do not refute the proposition, so, in general, it can be concluded that there is a relationship between RD (qualitatively) and justification of the use of violence.

5.3.3 Value Inconsistency and Justification of Violence.

In previous parts of this chapter it has been hypothesized and demonstrated that certain combinations of values of the structural variables are linked to a positive evaluation of violence; certain inconsistent patterns are stronger related to a positive evaluation than are consistent patterns.

Before combination of the variables of education (relevant only for the Banjul sample, income and age is considered, the structural aspects mentioned in 5.1.5 will be sketched briefly. (The structural background of the Banjul workers has already been described, see 4.2 and 5.1.5.

Farmers with high income (in relation to others in the village) also have more power and have more land available than others have. Some of them are also businessmen selling on credits. Thus, low income farmers are more subordinate to others in their social relations. In the compound and in their work on the fields they have to obey the richer and more powerful, who often also are the leaders of the kinship groups. Furthermore, income correlates, to a large extent, with age, those of middle age having the largest income. Farmers of low age has low income as well as small influence on the life in the village.

It is hypothesized here that inconsistent patterns are closer related to justification of violence than are consistent patterns (V:3:F). Age/income, and the workers' and the farmers' view on violence is analyzed in the table below.

JUSTIFY THE USE OF VIOLENCE	BANJUL AGE LOW INCOME L %	BANJUL AGE LOW INCOME H %	BANJUL AGE HIGH INCOME L %	BANJUL AGE HIGH INCOME H %	KEREWAN AGE LOW INCOME L %	KEREWAN AGE LOW INCOME H %	KEREWAN AGE HIGH INCOME L %	KEREWAN AGE HIGH INCOME H %
YES	83	87	91	78	64	73	58	51
DK	2	3	9	3	9	7	20	7
NO	15	10	-	19	27	20	22	13
N =	48	39	11	36	22	30	45	31

TABLE V:3:F: Age/income as measure on inconsistency/consistency on one hand and justification of violence on the other among the G W U workers in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan. Inconsistent patterns are underlined.

First it should be noted that the number of individuals in one of the columns is too small to allow us to draw any firmer conclusions. However, it is appearent that the hypothesis does not receive complete support from the figures in table V:3:F. Workers with high age and low income are more likely than others to justify the use of violence; so far the hypothesis is supported. But among the farmers, age seems to be

more decisive than combinations of age and income; farmers with high age and low income can be assumed to be involved in the heaviest pattern of inconsistency but they are least prone to justify violence. Instead, age is the dividing line: young farmers are most positive to violence.

What, then, about the combinations including education among the G W U workers? The relationship is shown in the table below.

JUSTIFY THE USE OF VIOLENCE	AGE				EDUCATION			
	LOW		HIGH		LOW		HIGH	
	EDUCATION				INCOME			
	L	H	L	H	L	H	L	H
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
YES	85	85	88	58	88	87	83	78
DK	-	3	6	-	4	3	3	3
NO	15	12	6	41	9	10	14	19
N =	21	61	35	12	23	38	36	37

TABLE V:3:G: Age/education and education/income as measure on inconsistency/consistency on one hand and justification on the other among the G W U workers in Banjul. Inconsistent patterns are underlined.

As appointed above, a combination of, for instance, high education and low age in itself does not necessarily imply frustration, discontent etc, but combinations of age and education have to be considered in relation to various levels of income.

According to assumptions made in previous parts of this chapter, workers with high education and low income are more positive than others to violence. A corollary assumption would be that those in the consistent combination of high education and high income should be least positive. The first assumption is not supported by the findings but the second is.

5.3.4 Belief Patterns and Justification of Violence.

Again I start with the relationship between general beliefs and beliefs about violence and will then proceed to consider the latter in relation to political beliefs.

It is hypothesized that beliefs including (1) disobedience, (2) capability of acting, (3) non-divine influence, and (4) emphasize on present social life are linked to justification of violence more than other beliefs are.

JUSTIFY THE USE OF VIOLENCE

	GENERAL BELIEFS															
	BETTER OBEY POWERFUL				HUMAN BEINGS CAN CHANGE				THINGS DEPEND ON ALLAH				LIFE AFTER MORE IMPORTANT			
	BANJUL		KEREWAN		BANJUL		KEREWAN		BANJUL		KEREWAN		BANJUL		KEREWAN	
	YES %	NO %	YES %	NO %	YES %	NO %	YES %	NO %	YES %	NO %	YES %	NO %	YES %	NO %	YES %	NO %
YES	89	79	69	65	84	84	75	67	84	84	.....		84	82	69	62
DK	1	5	7	26	3	3	21	10	3	4	.....		2	4	11	14
NO	10	17	24	10	14	13	4	23	13	12	.....		13	15	20	24
N =	71	63	97	31	73	61	25	103	108	26			107	27	107	21

TABLE V:3:H: General beliefs and justification of violence among the G W U workers in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan. The answers to the question about Allah have been omitted in the Kerewan sample, since almost all farmers are positive to the question.

Differences in beliefs are related to variations in justification of violence only in a few cases, and when they are, the relationships go in a direction opposite to that assumed. Hence, it can be concluded that there is, in general, no relationship between general beliefs and justification of violence.

In the case of political beliefs, it has been hypothesized that people feeling that the political objects have deteriorated more than those experiencing improvement and that those preferring change of the objects more than those preferring status quo justify the use of violence.

JUSTIFY THE USE OF VIOLENCE

	POLITICAL BELIEFS											
	COUNTRY BETTER/WORSE				LAWS BETTER/WORSE				GOVERNMENT BETTER/WORSE			
	BANJUL		KEREWAN		BANJUL		KEREWAN		BANJUL		KEREWAN	
	B %	N/W %	B %	N/W %	B %	N/W %	B %	N/W %	B %	N/W %	B %	N/W %
YES	79	93	68	73	82	86	67	77	81	89	67	80
DK	2	5	11	18	3	3	12	7	2	4	12	10
NO	19	22	21	9	16	11	21	15	17	6	21	10
N =	91	43	117	11	71	63	115	13	84	49	118	10

TABLE V:3:I: Political beliefs (experienced changes of the political objects) and justification of violence among the G W U workers in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan.

The first hypothesis is confirmed by the findings among the workers; those feeling that the political objects have deteriorated are more likely to justify the use of violence. Among the farmers, the number of cases in the columns is too small to permit any conclusions. The figures have been included in order only to illustrate the tendency: it seems to go in the same direction as among the workers.

JUSTIFY THE USE OF VIOLENCE

	POLITICAL BELIEFS											
	CHANGE COUNTRY				CHANGE LAWS				CHANGE GOVERNMENT			
	BANJUL		KEREWAN		BANJUL		KEREWAN		BANJUL		KEREWAN	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
YES	84	75	68	67	88	77	87	66	85	81	69	66
DK	3	-	11	17	2	4	-	13	2	4	6	20
NO	12	25	21	17	10	19	13	22	13	15	24	14
N =	122	12	110	18	82	52	15	113	87	47	78	50

TABLE V:3:J: Political beliefs (preferred changes of the political objects) and justification of violence among the G W U workers in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan.

Among the workers the second hypothesis is supported; those preferring changes of the political objects are more positive to the use of violence than those who do not want such changes. Among the farmers, too, the hypothesis is confirmed. However, in both instances the number of cases in some too small to permit any reliable conclusions.

Finally the combination of perceived changes of the political objects and preferred changes has been tested in relation to justification of violence. Workers experiencing a deterioration of the political objects and at the same time preferring a change of them are more positive than others to the use of violence. Those who feel that things have improved and not wishing a change are least likely to justify the use of violence. The same also applies to the farmers.

5.3.5 Structural Position and Justification of Violence.

It is hypothesized that workers with (1) low income, (2) low age, and (3) high education are more likely than .than those with high income, high age and low education respectively to justify the use of violence. The same applies to the farmers, but here education has been excluded, since only a few of the farmers have any education.

JUSTIFY THE USE OF VIOLENCE

	INCOME				AGE						EDUCATION		
	BANJUL		KEREWAN		BANJUL			KEREWAN			BANJUL		
	L	H	L	H	L	M	H	L	M.	H	L	M	H
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
YES	85	83	59	84	83	91	77	70	68	67	95	76	84
DK	3	3	17	2	3	-	7	6	10	17	3	3	3
NO	12	15	24	13	14	9	17	24	22	17	3	21	13
N =	59	75	83	45	70	34	30	33	41	54	40	63	31

TABLE V:3:K: Income, age and education and their relationships to justification of violence among the G W U workers in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan.

The hypothesis concerning income does not receive any support from the figures in the table. Among the farmers, the result refutes the hypothesis. Neither does the hypothesis on age receive any support; middle aged workers are more likely than others to justify the use of violence, while the differences among the age categories of the farmers are so small that they can be neglected. In the case of education as well, the hypothesis is opposed by the findings; those workers with low education are most likely to justify violence.

It has been shown earlier that people with low income, low age and high education are more likely than others to evaluate personal use of violence positively. Here we have found that they are less likely to regard violence as a legitimate means to be used in general. Thus, it seems to have been revealed that evaluation of one's personal use of violence and the right of others to use violence are not only analytically but also empirically distinct from each other.[26)]

When summarizing the findings in this part of the chapter, we can say that (1) absolute deprivation and relative deprivation

covaries with justification of violence, (2) general beliefs do not have any relationship to violence but political beliefs have, and (3) structural variables were related to justification of violence in a manner opposite to that predicted.

5.4 Violence Against Politicians.

Justification of the use of violence against politicians is also assumed to be connected with the components of the conflict potential for the same reasons that other beliefs about violence are.[27] One can, however, suggest that fewer people are positive to the use of violence against politicians than to the use of violence in general, since the former should be considered more risky than the latter.[28]

5.4.1 Absolute Deprivation and Political Violence.

The hypothesis, that people experiencing a high degree of absolute deprivation are more likely than others to justify the use of violence against politicians ("political violence") has been stated. Two aspects are implied here: (1) people feeling deprived are assumed to be frustrated, and, thus, have a stronger tendency than others to consider violent behavior one way in which things can be changed, and (2) politicians, more than other persons, tend to be regarded as responsible for the social state of affairs.[29]

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26) As an illustration the following table is presented:

PERSONAL USE OF VIOLENCE	JUSTIFICATION OF VIOLENCE BANJUL	
	YES	NO
YES	21	9
DK	3	5
NO	77	86
N =	112	22

Kerewan has been omitted since too few farmers answered affirmatively to the question about personal use of violence.

27) See note 24.

JUSTIFY POLITICAL VIOLENCE

	DEGREE OF ABSOLUTE DEPRIVATION											
	ECONOMIC				POWER				RESPECT			
	BANJUL		KEREWAN		BANJUL		KEREWAN		BANJUL		KEREWAN	
	L %	H %	L %	H %	L %	H %	L %	H %	L %	H %	L %	H %
YES	61	75	82	82	70	71	83	78	61	87	78	91
DK	6	5	9	7	6	5	7	11	5	9	9	5
NO	33	20	9	11	24	25	10	11	33	9	13	5
N =	49	85	33	95	49	85	27	101	87	47	85	43

TABLE V:4:A: Economic, power and respect deprivation and justification of political violence among the G W U workers in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan.

Two things in the table demands further comments, namely the relationship between the distribution and the hypothesis made, and the difference between the workers and the farmers and the tendency among the latter to evaluate violence against politicians more positively than violence in general.

It can be said that hypothesis is partly supported by the findings; excpptions are economic and power deprivations among the farmers.

The workers are less likely to justify political violence than violence in general, while the opposite applies to the farmers: there are more farmers justifying political than other kinds of violence. From the data used here, it has not been possible to give an explanation to this.[30)]

The second measure of absolute deprivation gives almost the same result as the one used above.

JUSTIFY POLITICAL VIOLENCE

	DEGREE OF ABSOLUTE DEPRIVATION											
	ECONOMIC				POWER				RESPECT			
	BANJUL		KEREWAN		BANJUL		KEREWAN		BANJUL		KEREWAN	
	L %	H %	L %	H %	L %	H %	L %	H %	L %	H %	L %	H %
YES	68	76	82	80	70	71	.....		66	73	77	87
DK	8	3	5	12	7	-	.....		5	5	12	4
NO	25	21	14	11	23	29	.....		29	22	12	9
N =	40	80	22	95	100	31			56	64	69	54

TABLE V:4:B: Absolute deprivation (as measured by objective and subjective indices) and justification of political violence among the G W U workers in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan.

Again, the same pattern appears: the hypothesis is supported except in the case of economic deprivation among the farmers. Both measures give respect deprivation the strongest relationship to political violence. It should be recalled that respect values are the most preferred values among the workers as well as the farmers (see p 153).

The relationship between social farmers of reference and justification of political violence is illustrated in the table below.

JUSTIFY POLITICAL VIOLENCE

BANJUL WORKERS

	ECONOMIC				POWER				RESPECT			
	GOV:T	WORK	ALLAH	ND/ VAR	GOV:T	WORK	ALLAH	ND	GOV:T	WORK	ALLAH	ND
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
YES	74	72	63	67	79	78	59	54	82	83	68	59
DK	5	2	9	11	3	2	11	8	-	3	5	8
NO	21	26	28	22	17	20	30	39	18	14	26	33
N =	43	50	32	9	29	46	27	26	22	29	19	61

TABLE V:4:C: Social frames of reference (as measured by the mentioned cause of deprivation) of the G W U workers and their justification of political violence.

KEREWAN FARMERS

	ECONOMIC			POWER			RESPECT		
	GOV:T	VAR	ALLAH	GOV:T	VAR	ALLAH	VAR	ALLAH	ND
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
YES	83	83	83	100	75	84	89	90	78
DK	8	8	7	-	10	8	-	7	9
NO	8	8	10	-	15	9	11	3	13
N =	(12)	(12)	99	(8)	20	92	(9)	30	85

TABLE V:4:D: Social frames of reference (as measured by the mentioned cause of deprivation) of the farmers in Kerewan and their justification of political violence.

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28) Berkowitz 1962, pp 74 ff and 135 ff, Feierabend & Feierabend, 1972, p 156 and Huntington 1968, pp 273 ff.
29) Gurr 1970, pp 179 ff and Zolberg 1968, pp 78 ff.
30) It is possible that politicians are seen, among the farmers, as people that can be judged in another manner than persons in general, since they are perceived to be those responsible for the state of affairs. See, for instance, Huntington 1968, pp 298 ff.

Among the workers those referring to the government are most likely to justify political violence, while those feeling no deprivation or mentioning Allah are least likely to do so. Among the farmers those referring to Allah are most positive to political violence. However, the number of people in the other categories is not large enough to permit any comparison between the categories.

5.4.2 Relative Deprivation and Political Violence.

The quantity of RD has been shown to have no relationship whatsoever to various beliefs. Neither does it have in the case of political violence. Thus, the analysis will focus directly on the quality of RD, that is, the choice of reference groups. It is hypothesized that people choosing higher reference groups are more likely to justify political violence than are those who compare their situation with lower groups. Two aspects are implied here; (1) people who compare themselves with higher groups or classes (rich businessmen, politicians etc) have wider social frames of reference, and, hence, are more likely to consider politicians responsible for their deprivation,[31] and (2) comparison with higher groups implies, probably, but not necessarily, a higher degree of frustration.[32] Both these reinforce each other and heighten the probability that an individual will evaluate violence against a politician positively.

JUSTIFY POLITICAL VIOLENCE

	RELATIVE DEPRIVATION (QUALITATIVELY)															
	ECONOMIC					POWER				RESPECT						
	BANJUL			KEREWAN		BANJUL			KEREWAN		BANJUL			KEREWAN		
	L	H	ND/DC	L	H	L	H	ND/DC	L	H	L	H	ND/DC	L	H	ND/DC
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
YES	68	77	44	80	83	71	77	57	81	83	74	84	58	93	89	78
DK	5	3	17	10	6	5	3	9	9	7	4	-	10	7	4	9
NO	26	21	39	10	10	24	20	34	10	11	23	16	32	-	7	13
N =	38	78	18	50	78	38	61	35	53	75	27	45	62	15	27	86

TABLE V:4:E: Relative deprivation (qualitatively) with regard to economic, power and respect values and justification of political violence among the G W U workers in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan.

31) Gurr 1970, pp 178 ff.
32) Patchen 1968: I, pp 169 ff in Hyman & Singer, eds, 1968.

The hypothesis stated above is supported by the findings in the table. Those experiencing the highest degree of RD are most positive to political violence while those feeling no deprivation are least positive. The differences between lowly and highly deprived farmers are not very great, but it should be reminded that the variations in social frames of reference are wider among the workers than among the farmers. The reference groups taken among the farmers are,for the most part, situated in Kerewan or among the farming class, while the reference groups choosen by the workers might be elite groups.

5.4.3 Value Inconsistency and Political Violence.

People in inconsistent patterns are assumed to prefer political changes more than others do. This assumption is supported by the findings in the case of evaluation of the political objects; those in inconsistent patterns are more likely to prefer changes.[33] The relationship between combinations of structural variables and justification of political violence is shown below.

JUSTIFY POLITICAL VIOLENCE

	BANJUL				KEREWAN			
	AGE				AGE			
	LOW		HIGH		LOW		HIGH	
	INCOME				INCOME			
	L	H	L	H	L	H	L	H
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
YES	75	77	55	61	86	87	84	71
DK	2	10	9	3	-	-	11	16
NO	23	13	36	36	14	13	4	13
N =	48	39	11	36	22	30	45	31

TABLE V:4:F: Age/income as measure on consistency/inconsistency and justification of political violence among the G W U workers in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan. Inconsistent patterns underlined.

The number of cases in some of the columns in very small, but a certain tendency emerges: the inconsistent patterns

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33) The figures illustrating this will not be presented here. For a theoretical dicussion, see Galtung 1964, pp 95 and 98.

themselves do not seem to contribute to justification of political violence. Workers and farmers with high age and low income, for instance, might be expeeted to be the most positive towards political violence but this is not the case. It seems rather, that the dividing line lies between low and high age.

Next combinations of age/educatinn and education/income will be considered.

JUSTIFY POLITICAL VIOLENCE

	AGE				EDUCATION			
	LOW		HIGH		LOW		HIGH	
	EDUCATION				INCOME			
	L	H	L	H	L	H	L	H
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
YES	65	80	57	67	61	61	78	78
DK	15	2	6	-	9	11	-	3
NO	19	18	37	33	30	29	22	19
N =	26	61	31	12	23	38	36	37

TABLE V:4:G: Age/education and educatinn/income as measures on consistency/inconsistency and justification of political violence among the G W U workers in Banjul. Inconsistent patterns are underlined.

What has been hypothesized above seems to be partly confirmed by the figures in the table, although the number of cases in some of the columns is very small. But the relationships found are obviously spurious; in the case of age/education there is a crucial step between low and high education. The same applies in the case of education/income. Thus, young people with high education are more likely than others to justify political violence, and such an inconsistent pattern is probably not frustrating in itself. Rather, a combination of high education, low age and low income is the inconsistency pattern underlaying the positive evaluation of violence.[34)]

5.4.4 Belief Patterns and Political Violence.

Again, people rejecting obedience, divinity and importance of an afterlife and believing that human beings can change their environment are hypothized to be more positive to political violence than others are.

JUSTIFY POLITICAL VIOLENCE

	GENERAL BELIEFS															
	BETTER OBEY POWERFUL				HUMAN BEINGS CAN CHANGE				THINGS DEPEND ON ALLAH				LIFE AFTER MORE IMPORTANT			
	BANJUL		KEREWAN		BANJUL		KEREWAN		BANJUL		KEREWAN		BANJUL		KEREWAN	
	YES %	NO %	YES %	NO %	YES %	NO %	YES %	NO %	YES %	NO %	YES %	NO %	YES %	NO %	YES %	NO %
YES	69	71	80	87	73	67	92	80	69	76	....		68	78	82	81
DK	7	3	7	10	3	8	4	9	5	8	....		7	-	6	19
NO	24	25	12	3	25	24	4	12	26	16	....		25	22	12	-
N =	71	63	97	31	73	61	25	103	108	26	....		107	27	107	21

TABLE V:4:H: General beliefs and justification of political violence among the G W U workers in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan.

In general, the assumed relationships seem to be present, although the differences are not significant in some of the cases.

What, then, about political beliefs and evaluation of political violence? In general, among the workers as well as the farmers, those feeling that the political objects have improved are more likely to be positive to political violence than those experiencing deterioration.

JUSTIFY THE USE OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

	POLITICAL BELIEFS											
	COUNTRY BETTER/WORSE				LAWS BETTER/WORSE				GOVERNMENT BETTER/WORSE			
	BANJUL		KEREWAN		BANJUL		KEREWAN		BANJUL		KEREWAN	
	B %	N/W %	B %	N/W %	B %	N/W %	B %	N/W %	B %	N/W %	B %	N/W %
YES	76	65	80	100	82	86	83	77	76	61	82	80
DK	6	5	9	-	3	3	8	8	4	8	8	10
NO	22	30	11	-	16	11	10	15	20	30	10	10
N =	91	43	117	11	71	63	115	13	84	49	118	10

TABLE V:4:I: Political beliefs (experienced changes of the political objects) and justification of political violence among the G W U workers in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan.

34) This has been argued before (see p 12)but it must be emphasized again that a break-down of education, income and age could have given trichotomized patterns which would show strong relationships to beliefs about violence. However, the number of individuals in each sample is not large enough to permit breakdowns along four variables at the same time.

Next, the relationship between preferred change of the political objects on one hand and justification of political violence on the other will be considered. It has been hypothesized that those preferring changes are more likely than others to justify political violence.

JUSTIFY POLITICAL VIOLENCE

	POLITICAL BELIEFS											
	CHANGE COUNTRY				CHANGE LAWS				CHANGE GOVERNMENT			
	BANJUL		KEREWAN		BANJUL		KEREWAN		BANJUL		KEREWAN	
	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
YES	72	50	83	78	79	56	93	80	77	57	83	80
DK	4	17	7	11	1	12	-	9	3	9	9	6
NO	24	33	10	11	20	32	7	11	20	34	8	14
N =	112	12	110	18	82	52	15	113	87	47	78	50

TABLE V:4:J: Political beliefs (preferred changes of the political objects) and justification of political violence among the G W U workers in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan.

The findings in the table above support the hypothesis made, although the number of cases in some of the columns are very small.The combinations of experienced and preferred changes will then be discussed. No tables will be presented here; instead the following figures will be mentioned. The percentage that justify political violence in each category is:

77-92 % of those experiencing improvement and desiring changes,
40-57 % of those experiencing improvement but not desiring changes,
60-72 % of those experiencing deterioration and desiring changes.

In large, the same applies to the farmers in Kerewan.

If we, then, make a comparison between the relationship between political beliefs and evaluation of various kinds of violence we find the following.

Most positive do disobedience: those experiencing deterioration and preferring change,

most positive to personal use of violence: those feeling that the political objects have improved and desiring further change,

most positive to violence in general: those experiencing deterioration and preferring change.

5.4.5 Structural Position and Political Violence.

As we have seen in other parts where the relationship between structural position and violent beliefs have been analyzed, some of the structural variables were found to reinforce each other, while others were found to neutralize each other.

The hypothesis that people with low income are more likely than those with high income to justify political violence (V:4:A), high educated more than low educated, those of low age more than those of high age have been tested and the result is presented in the table below.

JUSTIFY POLITICAL VIOLENCE

	INCOME				AGE						EDUCATION		
	BANJUL		KEREWAN		BANJUL			KEREWAN			BANJUL		
	L	H	L	H	L	M	H	L	M	H	L	M	H
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
YES	71	69	84	78	74	68	63	82	85	80	63	75	71
DK	3	7	7	9	6	6	3	-	5	15	13	2	3
NO	25	24	8	13	20	27	33	18	10	6	25	24	26
N =	59	75	83	45	70	31	30	33	41	54	40	63	31

TABLES 4:5:A, 4:5:B and 4:5:C: Income, age and education on one hand and justification of political violence on the other among the G W U workers in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan.

In large, the hypotheses are supported by the findings in the tables, although the differences between various categories are not always significant and the relationships are not rectilinear. /As before/ certain combinations of variables are stronger related to justification than isolated variables.

5.5 The Conflict Potential and Various Beliefs.

We have seen that most of the components of the conflict potential are related in a certain manner to evaluation of violence. Here two aspects will be discussed: (1) the relationship between the conflict potential and other beliefs which have not been taken into consideration in previous parts of this chapter, and (2) the relationship between the components of the conflict potential.

The component covaries with beliefs about own effects on political life and beliefs about the effects of the political elite's actions on own value positions: the higher the degree of AD, RD, VI etc, the more do the workers and the farmers believe that it would not have great effects of they talked to a politician respectively that the political elite can affect them negatively through its actions.

However, no relationship is found between the components of the conflict potential and voting behavior. If social frames of references and choice of reference groups are taken into account, certain relationships do emerge: those mentioning the government as the cause of their deprivation and those referring to "higher" reference groups are more likely to abstain from voting or to vote for opposition parties. This applies among the workers as well as the farmers.

The components of the conflict potential are related to each other in a certain manner, which is presented schematically below.

Structural variables	Most prevalent beliefs: general	political	Quantity of AD	Perceived source of AD	Quantity of RD	Reference group/class chosen
BANJUL						
Education						
low	passive sacred	worse, no change	high	work, Allah	high	same class
high	active secular	better, change	med, low	gov:t, work	medium	high-high class
Education/ income						
low/low	passive sacred	worse, no change	high	Allah	high	same class
low/high	passive sacred	better, no change	medium	Allah	high	same class, high class
high/low	active secular	better change	low	gov:t	low or don't compare	high-high
high/high	active secular	better, no change	medium	gov:t, work	medium	high
KEREWAN						
Income						
low	passive sacred	better, change	high	Allah	high	same class
high	passive	better/ change	high	Allah	high	same class
Age						
low	passive sacred	change better, change	high	Allah gov:t	high	high class
high	passive sacred	better, no change	medium	Allah	medium	same class

The most pertinent and apparent patterns have been taken to their extreme and have been sketched above. That is not to say, for instance, that all low income farmers in Kerewan take their own class as their reference class but that it is a common characteristic of that income category to do so.

The structural variables are more closely related to the beliefs about violence than are subjective variables. But most often when structural and subjective variables reinforce each other, they have a strong bearing on evaluation of violence. For instance, a worker with high education and low income feeling highly deprived subjectively is very likely to be positive to the use of violence to improve his own social situation.

5.6 Summary.

Two of the purposes of the present work have been (1) to describe the conflict potential of the workers in the Gambia Workers' Union in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan in the Gambia, and (2) to test not only some general hypotheses about the differences between the intensity and scope of the conflict potential in the two groups sampled but also specific hypotheses concerning the relationship between the conflict potential and beliefs about violence. The stronger the components of the conflict potential, the more positive to the use of violence the workers and farmers were assumed to be.

The potential was assumed to be affected in certain ways by the actions of the political elite. The interaction between the elite and its environment (the masses and the material resources) were classified into five capabilities: (1) generative, (2) distributive, (3) convertive, (4) regulative, and (5) communicative.

The conflict potential comprises five components, namely (1) the structural context of the workers and the farmers and their structural positions (indicated by the variables of income, age, education and occupation), (2) absolute deprivation (the difference between expected and actual position in regard to economic, power and respect values) as measured by subjective self-anchoring striving scales, (3) relative deprivation (the difference between one's own actual position and those of relevant others in regard to economic, power and respect values) measured subjectively, (4) value inconsistency (discrepancy between value positions in the three categories mentioned), and (5) belief patterns (general and political beliefs).

The structural context of the workers and the farmers was described. It was found that the number of employment opportunities in the capital had not increased at the same rate as the number of people seeking jobs. The number of government employees had not increased during the last six or seven years, while there had been some expansion within the private sector. The real income of the workers was not higher in 1972

than in 1961, although it had fluctuated during the 1960's.

Furthermore, the young, well educated workers had no opportunity to attain positions in the formal political structures (parties, ministries, departments etc) to the extent that they felt entitled to. Instead, they were low paid workers in the tourist branch.

Among the farmers, the pattern of control of land had not changed; land is still controlled and allocated by the chief of the village and the old headmen of the compounds. The increase in population has created a lack of land, and there is a pressure on the farmers to migrate from the village. It was not possible to find out what real income the farmers have and changes in this income, since necessary data were not available. However, many of the farmers are in debt to the co-operative movement and to local businessmen. They borrow money not only for buying agricultural equipment but also for buying consumer goods. Life in the village is still controlled more by the chief of the village and the more well-to-do farmers than by politicians.

The following can be said about the subjective feelings of the workers and the farmers. The latter felt a larger quantity of deprivation (absolute as well as relative) than the former, which was contrary to one of the principal hypotheses stated. Two factors were explored in order to explain this unpredicted result: (1) the experienced change of the social situation of the workers and ther farmers, and (2) the social frames of reference of the people in the two samples. The farmers perceived their economic situation to have improved slightly and their respect position considerably, while their power situation had not changed. The workers had seen a small improvement in all categories of values.

Thus, the farmers had experienced greater improvement than the workers (subjectively), and, therefore, had a higher level of expectation; they believed more than the workers that their situation would continue to improve. People in the two samples were also asked to point out what importance they gave

to the values in the three categories, and it was found that respect values were given the highest priority among the farmers as well as the workers. Thus, the farmers and the workers felt least deprived of those values to which they gave highest priority.

The patterns of deprivation were explored further, and it was revealed that the workers, to a much larger extent than the farmers, regarded the national government as the cause of their deprivation or as an obstacle to the elimination of their deprivation. Most of the farmers mentioned Allah as the source of their deprivation. The cause of deprivation mentioned was taken to be an indication of the width of social frames of reference.

Variations in these frames were assumed to indicate the different social contexts within which the workers and the farmers considered their social situation when the scales were presented to them. The workers were found to have more secular and wider social frames of reference than the farmers.

Furthermore, the choice of reference group was investigated. The workers, more than the farmers, compared their situation to that of the elite groups in the capital. The farmers considered their situation mainly in relation to that of local businessmen and richer farmers.

Combinations of age, income and education (the latter only in Banjul) were taken as measures of value inconsistency. The inconsistency in itself seemed to be stronger among the farmers than among the workers; more farmers than workers were found to be situated in inconsistent patterns. However, the kind of inconsistency and the effects of various kinds of inconsistency were not explored.

The farmers were, more than the workers, found to believe
(1) that they had to accept their subordinate position,
(2) that they were not able to change their social situation,
(3) that social life is influenced by divine powers, and
(4) that an after-life is more important than the present.

Although the "subjective" components of the conflict potential in some regards (quantity of deprivation, for instance) were found to be stronger among the farmers than among the workers, only a few of the former said that they themselves were willing to use violence to improve their social situation, while about 20 % of the latter said that they were. This itself could be taken as a disproof for many of the hypotheses stated, but when qualitative aspects were taken into account (source of deprivation mentioned and choice of reference group), it was found that the "components of deprivation" was stronger among the workers than among the farmers.

In the case of justification of the use of violence, the farmers were more positive than the workers. Violence against politicians was particularly supported by the farmers.

The relation between the components of the conflict potential on one hand and evaluation of disobedience to the political elite, evaluation of personal use of violence to improve one's own social situation, and justification of violence in general and violence directed against politicians on the other hand are shown in the scheme below.

COMPONENT OF THE CONFLICT POTENTIAL	PARTICULARLY POSITIVE TO: DISOBEDIENCE TO THE POLITICAL ELITE	PERSONAL USE OF VIOLENCE	JUSTIFICATION OF VIOLENCE IN GENERAL		JUSTIFICATION OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE	
Absolute deprivation						
Subjectively: Quantity	High depriv more than low	High respect deprivation more than anything else	High econ. depriv in Banjul, high respect depriv in Kerewan		High respect deprivation in both samples	
Objectively: Quantity	Power depriv more than other kinds of depriv	Power depriv more than other kinds of depriv	High economic depriv in Banjul, no clear relationship in Kerewan		High economic depriv in Banjul, high respect depriv in Kerewan	
Mentioned cause of deprivation:			B:	K:	B:	K:
Government	‡‡‡‡‡ ‡‡‡‡‡	‡‡‡‡‡ ‡‡‡‡‡	‡‡‡	‡‡‡‡‡	‡‡‡‡	‡‡‡‡‡
Work cond:s village cond:s	‡‡‡‡ ‡‡‡‡	‡‡‡‡	‡‡‡‡‡	‡‡‡	‡‡‡‡	
Allah	‡‡ ‡‡	‡‡ ‡‡	‡‡‡‡‡	‡‡	‡‡‡	‡‡‡‡‡+
No depriv	‡‡‡‡ ‡‡‡‡	‡‡‡‡ ‡‡‡‡	‡‡	‡‡	‡‡‡	
Relative deprivation						
Quantity	No clear relationship					
Choice of reference group	Those choosing elite groups more than others	Those choosing elite groups more than others	Choice of groups just below elite groups in Banjul, no difference in Kerewan		Choice of groups just below the elite groups in Banjul, the same only for respect depriv in Kerewan	
Value inconsistency	Low age/high education High educ/ low income	High educ/ low income	High age/ low income, high age/low educ in Banjul, low age/ high income in Kerewan		Low age/high income, low age/high educ in Banjul, low age/high income in Kerewan	

COMPONENT OF THE CONFLICT POTENTIAL	PARTICULARLY POSITIVE TO: DISOBEDIENCE TO THE POLITICAL ELITE	PERSONAL USE OF VIOLENCE	JUSTIFICATION OF VIOLENCE IN GENERAL	JUSTIFICATION OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE
General beliefs	Things depend on Allah - negative answers	"Life after important", - negative answers Man can change the social situation	"You have better obey" - negative answers Life after not important	Things depend on Allah, life after important, you had better obey - negative answers
Political beliefs				
Political objects are better/ worse	Government worse	Ambigious	All political objects worse	All political objects worse
Preferred change of the political objects	Change the objects	Change the objects	Change the country, change the laws	Change the country, change the laws
Structural position				
Banjul	Young, low paid, well educated workers	Young, low paid, well educated workers	Low educated, old, low paid workers	Medium educated, low paid workers
Kerewan	---	---	High income farmers	High income farmers

Thus, there seems to be a difference between personal use of violence and justification of violence. Young, well educated workers experiencing improvement in their respect position but deterioration or status quo in their power position are more likely than others to evaluate personal use of violence positively.

Low educated, low paid and old workers justify the use of violence more than others do. Among the farmers the more well-to-do are more likely to justify the use of violence.

5.7 International Comparison.

Finally, the findings concerning the value positions and changes in these positions among the workers in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan will be compared to the results of a similar investigation in a number of other countries.

In 1960-1962 Cantril drew samples among the populations in a number of countries and people were told to consider their social situation against the background of self-anchoring striving scales.[35] They were also asked whether their situation had changed and what they thought about future changes.

Two factors make it difficult to compare the findings of this investigation with the results received in the present work: (1) in Cantril's investigation only one scale was used, and in the present three have been used, and (2) the averages in Cantril's investigation are based on nation-wide samples while in the present work, only small, limited samples have been drawn.

Despite these differences, a comparison will be made below between the workers in Banjul and farmers in Kerewan on one hand and the national populations of six countries on the other. The three scales used in the Gambia have been transferred to one; that is to say, the average positions on the three scales (economic, power and respect) will be used in the comparison. Six of the countries investigated by Cantril will be considered here, namely the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Egypt, India, the United States and Yugoslavia. The Dominicans were interviewed in 1962, after the death of Trujillo, and the Cubans in April-May 1960, that is, about one year after the revolution.

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35) Cantril 1965, passim.

	Position			Change in position		
	"past"	"present"	"expected"	Improve-ment	Status quo	Deterio-ration
	Average			Percentage		
G W U workers	3.1	4.1	9.0	40	48	12
Kerewan farmers	1.8	3.7	9.7	36	61	3
Dom. Republic	1.6	1.6	5.8	34	40	24
India	3.4	3.7	5.1	43	21	16
Egypt	4.6	5.5	8.0	67	12	20
Cuba	4.1	6.4	8.4	65	17	17
Yugosla-via	4.3	5.0	6.7	57	28	24
United States	5.9	6.6	7.8	46	29	23

TABLE V:7:A : Comparison between the G W U workers in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan and the populations in six selected countries. Sources: Cantril 1965, and questionnaires used in the Gambia.

The past position of the workers in Banjul and the farmers in Kerewan is lower than that of the populations of most of the six countries. The present position is near to that of the Indian population. But expected position is much higher among the Gambian workers and farmers than among the populations of the six countries. The reason for this difference is, probably, that the people in the Gambia have been asked what position they felt "entitled to", while the people in the other countries were asked what positions they believed to be attainable in the future.

Furthermore, the Gambian farmers and workers feel, to a lesser extent, than the populations of most of the other countries, that their situation has improved, but to a much larger extent that it has not changed at all.

What about future changes? No table will be presented in this case but it will be mentioned that the workers and farmers in Kerewan are more optimistic than all other populations except the Egyptian (and near to that of Cuban).

6 REFORMULATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

6.1 Frustration-aggression hypotheses.

Social psychological concepts like those of frustration, subjective deprivation and cognitive dissonance are, perhaps, suitable for analyses of small groups, but they are not capable of taking structural phenomena into account. That is why such concepts have been combined with structural aspects in the present work.

To a large extent, the assumed relationships between deprivation and beliefs about violence were found, and most of the hypotheses tested were based principally on frustration-aggression analyses. However, one important link has been omitted in the present work, and it would, probably, have been fruitful to have included it.[1)] The workers and the farmers were asked about their past and present value positions and the positions to which they felt entitled. But they were not asked which positions they thought they would be able to attain. The relation between present, probable and expected positions would have given many interesting and fruitful cues to an analysis of beliefs about violence as a means to improve one's own social situation.

The Gambians were, of course, asked what they believed about future changes in their value positions, but they were not asked <u>which</u> position or level they thought they would be able to attain.

The following relationship can be assumed to exist between the aspects mentioned above:



Probably, the relationship between position believed to be attainable and the position people feel entitled to has the strongest bearing on beliefs about violence. But this relationship has, thus, not been studied.

Another factor, relevant in the present context, is the weight given to the value categories, that is the preference order. It is hypothesized in frustration-aggression theory that the more a goal or value is preferred and desired, the stronger is the frustration felt if the goal or value is not attained.[2] The Gambian workers and farmers were ordered the values according to their preferences, as they were asked to. When analyzing the data collected, I combined the preference order with the degree of deprivation in each category, but no explicit account has been given for the results. The reason for this is that the number of cases in each cell is not large enough to permit a meaningful analysis. However, two aspects will be mentioned here, namely (1) the relation between the preferred category and beliefs about violence, and (2) the relation between preferred value category/actual position in that category on one hand and beliefs about violence on the other.

Those preferring power values are more positive than others to personal use of violence and to political violence, while they are less likely to justify the use of violence in general. 100 % (N = 17) of those giving highest priority to power values justify the use of political violence, while 67 % (N = 27) of those preferring economic values and 68 % (N = 63) do so.

Next the preferred category (regardless of which this category is) and position in that category has been studied. The positions have been classified into "low" and "high". There is no significant difference in evaluation of violence between people who say that they receive much of the value most preferred and those receiving little, except in one case:

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1) See Patchen 1968:II, p 337 in Hyman & Singer, eds, 1968, and Gurr 1970, pp 64-66.
2) See, for instance, Berkowitz 1962, pp 53-57.

those receiving only a little of values in the most preferred category are more likely than others to justify political violence.

Thus, in general, order of preference does not seem to have any relationship to beliefs about violence.

6.2 Structural Analysis.

It has to be repeated that subjective measures on deprivation do not take the social context into account, and they do not tell us whether or not a person feeling no deprivation at all is content with the structures. A person feeling no quantity of deprivation as measured by the subjective scales might, however, reject the structures. Therefore, his relation to the political system is qualitatively more strained than that of a person feeling some quantity of deprivation. The conflict potential of the former individual should be stronger than that of a person feeling some quantity of deprivation but accepting the system as such.

A complete analysis of the structures and the degree of deprivation would have implied the concepts of interest and ideology and not only subjective beliefs and patterns of deprivation. One could, for instance, have explored the beliefs of individuals implied in a structural contradiction and contradictory interests.

The structural background of the workers and the farmers was sketched, but a complete structural analysis would have demanded long term observation and the utilization of data that are not available. Therefore, some structural variables were used instead, but these were taken out of and isolated from their structural context.

In the introduction of the present work, the relationship between systematic violence and perception of this violence was discussed. It has not been investigated here, but the relation between structural variables and subjective deprivation has been analyzed. However, those feeling a high degree

deprivation as measured by a combination of structural variables and subjective variables (for instance, low income in proportion to the income desired) do not feel more deprived subjectively (as measured on the self-anchoring striving scales). Thus, the scales are not very good measures of awareness of systematic violence. Causes of deprivation mentioned seem to be a better measure. There is positive relationship between deprivation (as measured by structural variables) and mentioned cause of deprivation.

As structural variable, education by itself makes the largest differences in patterns of deprivation, causes of deprivation mentioned,belief patterns and awareness of systematic violence. The higher the level of education, the more likely the worker is to perceive the system or some of its structures as an obstacle to the elimination of the deprivation.

6.3 The Application of the Analytical Framework.

An analysis of the present kind would not be applicable in a society were all values are equally distributed and where all the members were informed about this equal distribution. Such a society does not exist today, but this phenomenon is mentioned explicitly here in order to show that I am aware of some of the limitations of an analysis of the present kind. That is to say, the nearer a society is to a situation of complete equality and the more the structures correspond to the beliefs of the people in society, the less fruitful an analysis of the present kind is.

Furthermore, to be complete, an analysis such as the present one would have included beliefs of the elite groups as well as the position of the Gambian political system in the international arena. The Gambian political elite acts in an environment where mobilization and availability of resources are determined to a large extent by groups, classes and decision-makers outside the Gambia.

6.4 Conclusions.

As shown in the present work, there is some relationship between what has been conceptualized as a conflict potential and beliefs about violence. What predictions, if any, can be made from these findings?

First it should be mentioned that the aim of the present work has not been to predict but to describe and understand (see p 10). Secondly, even if we wanted to make predictions, only uncertain answers could be given, because there are at least two factors influencing the predictive capability of the present work, namely (1) the validity of the answers themselves, and (2) the relationship between the answers given and the "real" beliefs on one side and actual behavior on the other.

It is not possible to say how valid the answers of the workers and the farmers are; that is we are not able to say to what extent the answers correspond to the truly held beliefs. At least among the farmers, there seemed to be a fear of exposing the real evaluations of violence and to reveal choice of political party in the elections.[3)]

The structure of the questions themselves is such that it is difficult to bring out the validity of the answers. The questions about violence are constructed in a hypothetical manner. Furthermore, open-ended answers give more information than structured alternatives of answer.[4)]

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3) There can be many reasons for this. First, at least among the farmers there was a widely held opinion that the national government had sent my co-worker and me to the village in order to investigate what the farmers thought about politics. We had to explain to them that their answers would not be presented to the government.

Secondly, the kind of social control inhibiting revolutionary uprisings in India and Japan as described by Moore, is present also in the Gambian countryside. People in each village are tied to kinship groups and are supervised by the Alkali and the yardowners. See Moore 1966.

4) Hyman 1957,p 28.

In the case of beliefs about violence there were only three alternatives: positive, neutral and negative. The main reason for this was that much larger samples would have been needed if the information received from a larger number of alternatives was to be analyzed fruitfully.[5)]

Even if the answers were valid and reliable (that is, the workers and farmers told me exactly what they felt and believed and that their feelings and beliefs were adequately transferred to the present work), it would not be possible to predict what they will do, how they will behave, in the future, Structural changes, changes in beliefs, actions of the political elite and other factors can very rapidly change not only the workers' and farmers' perceptions and their degree of deprivation but also their estimation of the utility and risk of using violence.[6)]

Finally, I would like to make some comments upon my perception of the workers' and farmers'perception of me. Among the workers it seemed to be easier than among the farmers to create an atmosphere in which the respondents were confident that I would not use the results of the investigation in a manner that would threaten them.

When I visited Kerewan in January 1973 (after the interview project had been done), I found that the people suffered from hunger; the rains had been too small during the rainy season to permit cultivation of, for instance, rice. It became known to me that the farmers had expected that their participation in the interview project would result in "assistance from the white men". This reaction from the farmers distressed me but it also made me realise some theoretical implications: this belief might have influenced the way in which the farmers answered to the questions. It is not improbable that the belief mentioned made the farmers put their expected level higher than they would have done if this belief had not been present.

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5) Galtung 1969:I, p 60.
6) See Gurr 1970, pp 210 and 239.

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973:2	Beckman, Björn	De ordinarie ledamöterna i länsstyrelsernas planeringsråd. Preliminära resultat från en enkätundersökning utförd i mars 1973.
973:3	Magnusson, Håkan	Sydvästra Skånes kommunalförbund. En undersökning av verksamheten 1965-1972.
974:1	Daun, Holger	Change, Conflict Potential and Politics. Two Gambian Case-Studies. (Akad avhandl.)